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Introduction

F

ifty years ago, Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. and Clyde L. Stapleton published
a case study of the practice of law before the Lexington–Fayette
Urban County (LFUC) Board of Adjustment.2 Described as “perhaps the
seminal early inquiry into the recurring criticism that variance–granting
boards pay little attention to the legal limitations on their powers,”3 the
article was sharply critical of the Board of Adjustment.4 Indeed, the article
was subtitled “A Case Study in Misrule.”5 Professor Dukeminier and Mr.
Stapleton were not alone in criticizing the Board of Adjustment;6 many
articles, published both before and after the Dukeminier–Stapleton study,
have criticized boards of adjustment for their failure to apply the law
properly.7
In the fifty years since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the LFUC
Board of Adjustment and its practices have matured and improved
considerably. That, however, is not to suggest that the Board of Adjustment
and its practices are free from criticism.
This Article presents a new empirical study of the LFUC Board of
Adjustment. Specifically, the study covers the eighteen–month period
from the Board’s July 2007 meeting through its December 2008 meeting.8
2 Jesse Dukeminier, Jr. & Clyde L. Stapleton, The Zoning Board of Adjustment: A Case
Study in Misrule, 50 Ky. L.J. 273, 274 (1962) [hereinafter Study].
3 Randall W. Sampson, Theory and Practice in the Granting of Dimensional Land Use Variances: Is the Legal Standard Conscientiously Applied, Consciously Ignored, or Something In Between?,
39 Urb. Law. 877, 894 (2007).
4 The Study authors state:
Our general conclusion is that the Board has not operated in such a manner as to
assure citizens equal protection of the law. It has not, during the seventeen months
of our study, produced a pattern of consistent, sound, and articulate judgments.
Nor have its operations assured the public that the comprehensive plan is not
being thwarted through the variance device. We do not mean by this to imply
any personal criticism of the individual members of the Board. To the best of our
knowledge they are all honest men and good citizens, serving without pay in a
thankless job. Our criticism goes to the institution, which we find is functioning
badly.

Study, supra note 2, at 322.
5 Id.
6 In fact, boards of adjustment and their power to grant variances have been subject to
criticism since the drafting of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act in the 1920s. See Ruth Knack
et al., The Real Story Behind the Standard Planning and Zoning Acts of the 1920s, Land Use & Zoning Dig., Feb. 1996, at 3, 5–6.
7 See Sampson, supra note 3, at 893–918 (citing and discussing a multitude of studies
criticizing variance practices by various boards and then describing and critiquing variance
practice in three jurisdictions in Colorado); David P. Bryden, The Impact of Variances: A Study of
Statewide Zoning, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 769, 770 & n.4 (1976–77) (stating that “[f]ew legal institutions have been more consistently and vigorously criticized than zoning boards of adjustment”
and citing eighteen studies, including the Dukeminier–Stapleton study).
8 I was appointed to the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment in July,
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During this period, 168 separate appeals were filed before the Board. This
Article discusses how the practice has changed and improved in the years
since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study and the problems and difficulties
that still remain.
The Article begins by describing the current procedure before the
LFUC Board of Adjustment and how it has changed since the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study. It then addresses the three basic types of appeals the Board
considers: (1) variances, (2) conditional use permits, and (3) administrative
appeals from the zoning administrator. With respect to each type of appeal,
the Article first describes the governing law and how it has changed since
the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. It then provides an empirical study of
the Board’s voting behavior. The Article concludes with an overview of the
ways in which the law and practice have changed since the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study and the problems that remain.
I. Procedure Before the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Board of
Adjustment
The procedure before the LFUC Board of Adjustment has changed
in a couple of significant ways since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study.
This section begins by describing the current procedure. It then discusses
the ways in which this procedure has changed significantly since the
Dukeminier–Stapleton study.
Chapter 100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes grants the Board of
Adjustment original jurisdiction over variances,9 conditional uses,10 and
changes in nonconforming uses.11 It also authorizes the Board to hear appeals
from the building inspector’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance.12
Although the Board has original jurisdiction in some cases, the Board never
2007. This study covers my first eighteen months of service on the Board. While some critics
may wish to discount the study for that reason, I do not believe that my presence on the Board
significantly changed the way it operated. Indeed, the fact that I was the only dissent (or just
one of two dissenters) in a number of cases that I criticize in this Article suggests that I did
not significantly impact the Board’s voting behavior. See, e.g., Section II.B.3, infra (critiquing
Board’s decision in Fantasy Friends Costuming); Section III.C.1.b, infra (critiquing Board’s decision in Athens Schoolhouse); Section III.C.3.a, infra (critiquing votes to approve Kangaroo Bob’s);
cf. Sampson, supra note 3, at 887 & n.48 (stating that study’s author used a mix of open–ended
and closed–ended interviews with board members and planning staff to avoid Hawthorne effect, which is the change in an “individual or group’s behavior that occurs when the individual
or group is aware of being observed”); Ronald M. Shapiro, The Zoning Variance Power – Constructive in Theory, Destructive in Practice, 29 Md. L. Rev. 3, 14 n.80 (1969) (criticizing study of
Philadelphia Board of Adjustment because researchers “worked very closely” with Board and
caused Board to be “on its best behavior” and which arguably led to Hawthorne effect).
9 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.241 (West 2006).
10 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.237 (West 2006).
11 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.253 (West 2006).
12 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.257 (West 2006).
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acts except on appeal from the Division of Building Inspection.13 Thus,
before the Board will consider any matter, the applicant must first apply to
the Division of Building Inspection for a building permit or certificate of
occupancy. If the applicant, or any affected person, is dissatisfied with the
building inspector’s decision, an appeal may be made to the Board.
The appeal must be made within thirty days after the applicant or his
agent receives notice of the building inspector’s decision.14 In order to
appeal, the applicant must complete an application form that is available
in the Secretary’s office15 and file a notice of appeal with the Board and
the building inspector whose decision is being challenged.16 Once the
building inspector has been notified that his decision is being appealed, the
inspector must forward all papers constituting the record of his decision to
the Board.17 After the notice of appeal has been received, the Board sets a
time for a public hearing and provides public notice in the local newspaper.18
As a courtesy, the Board also sends notice to all adjacent property owners
advising them of the appeal and the time of the hearing.
Each case is referred to a member of the professional staff who reviews
the application, usually inspects the property, and prepares a written report
making recommendations on the merits of the appeal. The report begins
by identifying the zoning designation and existing land uses with respect
to the property at issue and the surrounding property. It then identifies the
proposed land use for the property at issue pursuant to the most recent
comprehensive plan. It then clearly states the applicable legal requirements
under the zoning ordinance. The report then provides a case review which
includes the factual background and history, a discussion of the applicable
law, and concludes with a recommendation as to whether or not the appeal
should be approved. In setting forth the recommendation, the report offers
specific reasons that correspond to the applicable legal standards. If the
report recommends approval, it identifies any specific conditions that
should be imposed.
The Board holds a public meeting one afternoon each month to hear
appeals. There are typically ten to twelve cases scheduled for the hearing
each month. The Chair begins the meeting by sounding the agenda. First,
the Chair asks whether anyone wishes to postpone or withdraw any items
scheduled to be heard that day. Requests for postponement or withdrawal
13 Lexington–Fayette Urban County Gov’t, By–Laws of the Lexington–Fayette
Urban County. Bd. of Adjustment art. IX.A. (1987) [hereinafter By–Laws].
14 Id. art. IX.A.
15 Id. art. IX.C. Copies of the variance, conditional use permit, and administrative appeal
application forms are contained in the Appendix.
16 Id. art. IX.A.
17 Id. art. IX.A.
18 Cf. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.263 (West 2006) (requiring that public notice be provided
in accordance with KRS Chapter 424 which requires publication of legal notice in newspaper).
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are almost always granted without discussion. After disposing of requests for
postponement or withdrawals, the Board considers other agenda items that
can be completed in an expedited manner. Those items consist of items
in which (1) the staff recommends that the appellant’s appeal be approved
as requested; (2) the appellant concurs with the staff’s recommendation;
and (3) no one present at the meeting objects to the Board acting on the
matter without discussion.19 Typically, those items are approved without
discussion.20 Occasionally, Board members may ask the staff or appellant
a few questions before voting to approve the request.21 In a few rare
instances, the Board may engage in an extended discussion of an appeal
despite the fact that the staff recommended approval, the appellant agreed
with the staff’s recommendation, and no one appeared before the Board to
object to the staff’s recommendation.22
After disposing of the expedited items, the Board turns to the contested
items. Discussion of contested items will typically begin with the staff
discussing its report. The appellant is then given the opportunity to
respond, and any objectors may testify. Although appellants and objectors
are required to swear in before testifying, the procedure otherwise remains
very informal. Attorneys represent some appellants, but most applicants
appear without legal counsel.23 In a few instances, attorneys represent
objecting neighbors.24
There have been two significant changes in procedure since the
Dukeminier–Stapleton study. First, the parties are no longer required to

19 Between July 2007 and December 2008, 82 of the 168 separate appeals before the
Board could be decided on an expedited basis.
20 Forty–six of the eighty–two appeals that qualified for expedited treatment were approved by the Board without discussion.
21 There was a brief discussion in thirty–four of the eighty–two appeals that qualified
for expedited treatment.
22 There was an extended discussion in three of the eighty–two appeals that qualified for
expedited treatment. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, Minutes for the Bd. of Adjustment Meeting (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing an appeal for conditional use permit to allow mining in Vulcan Lands, Inc., V–2008–107, which was
filed after virtually identical appeal ended in tie vote in October and Board ultimately voted
to approve); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Oct. 31, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–95, an appeal for conditional use
permit to allow mining; ended in tie vote); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of
Adjustment, Minutes for the Bd. of Adjustment Meeting (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author)
(discussing Christ Centered Church, C–2008–21, an appeal for conditional use permit to expand church and add parking; Board ultimately voted to approve).
23 Attorneys represented appellants in forty–four cases. For practical advice on how to
argue before a board of adjustment, see Kathryn L. Moore, Practicing Before a Board of Adjustment: Seven Practical Tips, Ky. Bench & Bar, Jan. 2011, at 10.
24 In two of the forty–four cases in which attorneys represented appellants, attorneys
also represented the objecting neighbors. In another four cases, the objecting neighbors were
represented by an attorney but the appellant did not have legal representation.
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bring in, at their own expense, a stenographer to take proof for the purpose
of preparing a record for appeal to the circuit court.25 Now a member of the
planning staff records the meeting and prepares relatively detailed minutes
of the meeting. Although an appellant must pay to have the complete record
transcribed, the appellant can wait until the end of the hearing after the
Board has rendered its decision to decide whether to incur this expense.26
Second, unlike at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study,27 the
minutes provide some detail about the arguments and questions raised in
the hearing and explicitly state the reasons why the Board voted to approve
or disapprove each item. The Dukeminier–Stapleton study found that, as
a practical matter, Board decisions were typically final simply because the
paucity of the minutes and the unwillingness of most applicants to pay for
a stenographer prior to the Board’s decision ordinarily foreclosed judicial
review. Now that the minutes are sufficiently detailed and a complete
record is readily available, appellants need not, as a practical matter, waive
their right to appeal. Nevertheless, applicants rarely appeal the Board’s
decisions.28 In fact, not a single Board decision made between July 2007
and December 2008 was appealed to the Fayette County Circuit Court.29
II. Law and Practice Before the Board of Adjustment
Chapter 100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, sometimes referred to
as Kentucky’s planning and land use control enabling legislation, governs
planning and zoning in Kentucky. It authorizes, but does not require,

25 Cf. Study, supra note 2, at 277 (stating that parties must bring in a stenographer at their
own expense if they wish to take proof for purposes of an appeal).
26 In a case that was appealed after the study period, the appellant submitted a video
transcript of the hearings on the appeal. The hearings on that case exceeded six hours. See
Vulcan Constr. Materials, LLP, C–2010–110 (Dec. 2010).
27 Study, supra note 2, at 277 (describing the limited details provided in Board of Adjustment’s minutes).
28 There is nothing new or surprising about the fact that decisions of the Board are rarely
appealed. Only two of the 167 cases Dukeminier and Stapleton reviewed were appealed. See
Study, supra note 2, at 278; David W. Owens, The Zoning Variance: Reappraisal and Recommendations for Reform of a Much–Maligned Tool, 29 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 279, 316 (2004) (noting that
of the 1,806 variance appeals considered by North Carolina jurisdictions responding to survey
conducted in 2002, only forty–eight—or 2.5%—were appealed to superior court); Shapiro,
supra note 8, at 16 (noting that in a study done in the 1960s, the substance of only a handful of
the decisions rendered by boards in Baltimore and Boston were appealed); Thomas B. Donovan, Comment, Zoning: Variance Administration in Alameda County, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 101, 101
n.7 (1962) (noting that no judicial appeals were taken from any final administrative decisions
in a year in which 332 variance applications were filed).
29 My research assistant, Joe Bilby, did an extensive search of the Fayette Circuit Court’s
docket and did not find a single case filed against the Board of Adjustment between July 2007
and January 2010.
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cities and/or counties in the state to enact zoning regulations.30 Currently,
twenty–six of Kentucky’s 120 counties, including Fayette County, have
county–wide planning and zoning.31
If a city and/or county elects to enact zoning regulations, KRS 100.217
requires that the mayor and/or county judge/executive appoint three, five,
or seven citizens to serve on a board of adjustment before any zoning
regulation may have legal effect. Seven citizens serve on the Fayette–
Urban County Board of Adjustment.32
Kentucky courts have described the Board as an administrative agency
that serves as a “safety valve” to ensure that the zoning ordinance is both
workable and not arbitrary.33 Under appropriate circumstances, the Board
provides a vehicle for relief from strict application of the zoning scheme.34
The Board considers three basic types of appeals: (1) variances, (2)
conditional use permits, and (3) administrative appeals from the zoning
administrator. This section will first address the law and practice governing
variances. It will then turn to conditional use permits, which were called
special exceptions at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. Finally,
it will address administrative appeals from the zoning administrator,
including appeals involving nonconforming uses.
A. Variances
In common parlance, there are two different types of variances: (1)
use variances and (2) dimensional variances (sometimes referred to as
bulk35 or area variances).36 A use variance, as its name suggests, permits
30 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.203 (West 2006).
31 See Marshall D. Slagle, Land Use And Planning Issues, National Business Institute Seminar
on Legal Issues Involving Local Governments (Apr. 2008), in Nat’l Bus. Inst., Legal Issues Involving Local Governments 193, 197.
32 By–Laws, supra note 13, art. III.A.
33 See Bourbon Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment v. Currans, 873 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Ky. App. 1994);
Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals, 325 S.W.2d 324,
326 (Ky. 1959); Thomson v. Tafel, 218 S.W.2d 977, 981 (Ky. 1949).
34 See Currans, 873 S.W.2d at 837.
35 The Dukeminier–Stapleton study used the term “bulk variance.” Study, supra note
2, at 281.
36 According to Anderson’s American Law of Zoning, “[t]he distinction between ‘area’
and ‘use’ variances, and the imposition of separate requirements for the granting of each type,
are inventions of the court.” Kenneth H. Young, 3 Anderson’s American Law of Zoning
§ 20.06, at 424 (4th ed. 1996); see also Daniel R. Mandelker, Land Use Law § 6.42 (5th ed.
2003) (“Although the zoning statutes do not usually make this distinction, the courts have
always distinguished use from area variances.”). Interestingly, KRS Chapter 100 expressly
used the term “dimensional variance” for twenty years. See Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, § 1,
1966 Ky. Acts 708, 709 (defining “dimensional variance”). In 1986, Chapter 100 was amended,
among other ways, to delete the modifier, “dimensional,” from the term “variance” in the
definition section. See Act of Mar. 27, 1986, ch. 141, § 1, 1986 Ky. Acts 343, 344.
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the use of land in a manner other than that expressly permitted by the
zoning ordinance.37 A dimensional variance, in contrast, does not permit a
prohibited use. Instead, a dimensional variance permits a departure from
the dimensional terms of a zoning ordinance, such as the height, width,
or location of structures, and the size of yards and open spaces.38 There is
some debate as to whether density requirements invoke use variances or
dimensional variances.39
With respect to variances, the Dukeminier–Stapleton study began by
critiquing the Board’s decisions regarding use variances. It then discussed
bulk variances, excluding sign variances. Finally, it separately critiqued the
Board’s decisions regarding sign variances. Thus, this section will begin by
discussing use variances. It will then turn to dimensional variances (other
than sign variances) and conclude by discussing sign variances.
1. Use Variances.—The Dukeminier–Stapleton study noted that at the time
of the study, it was unclear whether Kentucky law permitted use variances.
It contended that two Kentucky cases40 could be interpreted as holding that
the Board of Adjustment does not have the power to grant use variances.41
Nevertheless, Dukeminier and Stapleton contended that the cases should
not be so interpreted and that the Board should be viewed as having the
power to grant use variances.42
The authors criticized the Board for granting three of the twelve use
variances requested because “[i]n none of them was there any evidence on
record that could even come close to satisfying the legal requirements for

37 Young, supra note 36, § 20.06, at 4. The Dukeminier–Stapleton study defined a use
variance as “allow[ing] a structure or use in a district restricted against such structure or use.”
Study, supra note 2, at 281.
38 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(24) (West 2006) (defining variances for purposes of
KRS Chapter 100); see also Young, supra note 36, at § 20.07, at 426–27 (“Area variances involve
matters such as setback lines, frontage requirements, height limitations, lot–size restrictions,
density regulations, offstreet parking, and yard requirements.” (footnotes omitted)). The
Dukeminier–Stapleton study defined a bulk variance as “giv[ing] the property owner relief
from some ordinance requirements with respect to area, height, setback, parking spaces, and
such.” Study, supra note 2, at 281.
39 See Mandelker, supra note 36, § 6.42 (“The courts are divided on whether an increase
in density requires a use or an area variance.”).
40 Bray v. Beyer, 166 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1942); Arrow Transp. Co. v. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 299 S.W.2d 95 (Ky. 1957).
41 Study, supra note 2, at 281–82.
42 Id. at 282–83.
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a variance.”43 In contrast, Dukeminier and Stapleton were more supportive
of the remaining cases44 in which the Board denied the requests. They said:
In none of these cases was there any evidence in the minutes
of the Board or in the petition that the petitioner had met even
one of the requirements for a variance set forth above. If no
additional evidence was presented at the hearing, the Board
had no authority to grant the requests, and they were properly
denied.45

Shortly after the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the General Assembly
amended KRS Chapter 100 to make it clear that the Board does not have
the power to grant use variances.46 Specifically, KRS 100.247 now provides
that “[t]he board shall not possess the power to grant a variance to permit a
use of any land, building, or structure which is not permitted by the zoning

43 Id. at 285.
44 The Board denied seven use variance requests. One request had not been disposed of
at the time of the study and one variance was granted as a use variance but in fact involved a
use that was permitted as a special exception. Id. at 283.
45 Id. at 284.
46 Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, § 54, 1966 Ky. Acts 708, 728–29. In his extensive study
of the 1966 Act, Professor Tarlock noted that Kentucky law was once unclear as to whether
use variances were permitted but did not otherwise provide any explanation as to why the
Kentucky enabling legislation was amended to expressly prohibit use variances. See A. Dan
Tarlock, Kentucky Planning and Land Use Control Enabling Legislation: An Analysis of the 1966
Revision of K.R.S. Chapter 100, 56 Ky. L.J. 556, 609 (1968).
Presumably, the Kentucky legislature decided to expressly prohibit use variances because
of the risk of harm they create. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court has explained:
Use variances by their nature have the potential to bring about great changes in
neighborhood character, but area variances usually do not have this effect. While
area variances provide an increment of relief (normally small) from a physical dimensional restriction such as building height, setback and so forth, use variances
permit wholesale deviation from the way in which land in the zone is used.

Ziervogel v. Wash. Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 676 N.W.2d 401, 408, 563–64 (Wis. 2004) (citations
omitted); see also Owens, supra note 28, at 289–90 (noting that one of the justifications given
for judicial gloss imposing lower standard for dimensional variance than for use variance is that
“dimensional variances pose less of a risk of harm to neighbors”).

2011–  2012]

FIFTY YEARS LATER

445

regulation in the zone in question, or to alter density requirements in the
zone in question.”47
Thus, not surprisingly, no applications requesting use variances were
filed between July 2007 and December 2008, and no use variances were
granted during that period.48
2. Dimensional Variances (Excluding Variances for Signs).—At the time
of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, Kentucky law clearly authorized
the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Board of Adjustment to grant
dimensional variances. Specifically, KRS 100.470(c) granted the Board the
power to:
[a]uthorize, upon application or appeal, such variances from the
terms of the ordinance or of any plans, rules or regulations made
thereunder, as will not be contrary to the public interest, where
a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance, plans,
rules or regulations would result in unnecessary hardship, and so
that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial
justice done.49

The Dukeminier–Stapleton study found that dimensional variances
(excluding variances for signs) were the most common type of relief
requested,50 and that the vast majority of applications (eighty–eight percent)
were granted despite the fact that the staff only recommended that about
forty percent of the requests be granted.51 Dukeminier and Stapleton noted
that this high rate of approval “would be justified if the Board acted within
its powers and granted only those petitions which met the requirements
of hardship.”52 Nevertheless, after discussing the individual cases in some
detail, Dukeminier and Stapleton concluded:
If we judge the Board’s actions by the standards set forth at
the beginning of this section on variances, the conclusion

47 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.247 (West 2006). The Lexington–Fayette Urban County
Zoning Ordinance uses similar language to expressly prohibit use variances. Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 7–6(b)(2) (2007).
48 This apparently is not true in all jurisdictions. According to a study of variance practices in 441 cities and counties in North Carolina, some use variances were granted despite
the fact that use variances have been illegal in North Carolina for more than fifty years. See
Owens, supra note 28, at 308–10.
49 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.470(1)(c) (1953) (repealed 1966) (applicable to cities of the second
class). Similar, though not identical standards applied to cities of the first class. See Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 100.082(3) (1953) (repealed 1966).
50 Study, supra note 2, at 286 (“The Board acted on fifty cases involving fifty–one such
requests . . . .”).
51 Id. (“Of these requests the board granted forty–four–or 88%–and denied seven.”).
52 Id. at 286–87.
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seems inescapable that in a great number of these cases the
Board abused its discretion, in that there were no allegations
or evidence of legal hardship in the petitions, no substantial
evidence in the minutes to support any finding of hardship, and
no findings that conditions or hardships alleged were not typical
or recurrent (a finding which section 24.4222 of the zoning
ordinance expressly makes a prerequisite for a variance in every
case).53

Variance requests continue to be relatively common, and the Board
continues to approve most requests. Specifically, between July 2007 and
December 2008, applicants requested variances (other than for signs) in
fifty–one different cases.54 The Board approved thirty–eight of the fifty–one
cases, or about seventy–five percent of the cases. The Board disapproved
six cases, reached a tie vote in two cases, and the remaining five cases were
either withdrawn or postponed indefinitely.
Although the disposition of cases has been similar, there have been
three significant changes with respect to variances since the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study: (1) the legal standards applicable to variances have
been relaxed; (2) the Board typically makes findings that generally track
the legal requirements; and (3) the Board is now much more likely to
follow the recommendations of the professional staff than it was during
the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. This section will address each of these
changes.
(a) Change in Applicable Legal Standards
Commentators, including Dukeminier and Stapleton, have long
criticized boards of adjustment for granting variances in the absence of
unnecessary hardship.55 As discussed above, at the time of the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study, KRS 100.470(c) authorized the Board to grant dimensional
variances “where a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance,
plans, rules or regulations would result in unnecessary hardship . . . .”56 In
53 Id. at 291.
54 Seven of the appeals involved requests for conditional uses as well as variances, and
two of the appeals involved administrative reviews as well as appeals for variances.
55 See supra note 7.
56 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.470(1)(c) (1953) (repealed 1966) (applicable to cities of the second
class). Similar, though not identical standards applied to cities of the first class. See Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 100.082(3) (West 2006) (repealed 1966).
This language closely tracked the variance standard under the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act. Specifically, Section 7 of the Standard Act grants the Board of Adjustment power:
[t]o authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to special
conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance will result in
unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed and
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1988, the Kentucky legislature amended KRS Chapter 100 to eliminate the
requirement that the Board find unnecessary hardship (or deprivation of
reasonable use)57 before granting a variance.58 Instead, the 1988 legislation
made unnecessary hardship (or deprivation of reasonable use) one of three
factors that the Board of Adjustment should consider in deciding whether
to grant a variance.59 Specifically, KRS 100.243 now provides:
(1) Before any variance is granted, the board must find
that the granting of the variance will not adversely
affect the public health, safety or welfare, will not
alter the essential character of the general vicinity,
will not cause a hazard or a nuisance to the public,
and will not allow an unreasonable circumvention
of the requirements of the zoning regulations.60
In making these findings, the board shall consider
whether:
(a) The requested variance arises from special
circumstances which do not generally apply to
land in the general vicinity, or in the same zone;
(b) The strict application of the provisions of the
regulation would deprive the applicant of the

substantial justice done.

A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act § 7(3) (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1928), available at
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingAct1926.pdf.
57 In 1966, the Kentucky General Assembly substantially revised Kentucky’s planning
and land use control enabling legislation to create uniform law applicable to all classes of
cities. Prior to 1966, different enabling legislation applied to different classes of cities. See
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.031–830 (1953) (repealed 1966); cf. Tarlock, supra note 46 (providing a
detailed discussion of the 1966 legislation and the changes it wrought).
Among other things, the 1966 legislation replaced the unnecessary hardship standard
with a requirement that the Board find that strict application of the zoning ordinance would
“deprive the applicant of a reasonable use of the land” before granting a dimensional variance.
Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, § 53(b), 1966 Ky. Acts 708, 728.
In 1986, the Kentucky General Assembly resurrected the unnecessary hardship standard.
Specifically, it amended KRS 100.243 to provide that prior to granting a variance, the board
must find that strict application of the zoning ordinance “would deprive the applicant of a
reasonable use of the land or would create an unnecessary hardship on the applicant.” Act of Mar.
27, 1986, ch. 141, § 26, 1986 Ky. Acts 343, 353 (emphasis added).
58 Act of March 31, 1988, ch. 144, § 4, 1988 Ky. Acts 372, 374–75.
59 Id.
60 Interestingly, the Standard Zoning Act and most state zoning laws do not require
boards of adjustment to make findings of fact in variance cases. Mandelker, supra note 36, §
6.52. Some, but not all courts, require boards to make findings of facts in variance cases. Id.
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reasonable use of the land or would create an
unnecessary hardship on the applicant; and
(c) The circumstances are the result of actions of the
applicant taken subsequent to the adoption of the
zoning regulation from which relief is sought.
(2) The board shall deny any request for a variance arising
from circumstances that are the result of willful violations
of the zoning regulation by the applicant subsequent to
the adoption of the zoning regulation from which relief is
sought.61

According to the co–sponsor of the 1988 amendment, Bill Lear, the new
legislation was intended to grant the Board of Adjustment more discretion
in deciding when to grant a variance.62 The legislature recognized that
under the existing law, the Board of Adjustment had to make findings that
were “essentially impossible to make.”63 The legislature viewed the Board
as a safety valve and wanted the Board to have the ability to grant variances
when, in its discretion, it thought variances were appropriate. Accordingly,
the legislature amended Chapter 100 to make unnecessary hardship simply
a factor the Board should consider in deciding whether or not to grant a

61 Not surprisingly, the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Zoning Ordinance Article
uses virtually identical language to describe the findings required for a variance. See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 7–6(b)(1) (2007). Interestingly,
however, the By–Laws of the LFUC Board of Adjustment are identical to the standards promulgated in the 1986 Act and do not reflect the changes introduced by the 1988 Act. See
By–Laws, supra note 13, art. VIII.A. This is likely due to the fact that the By–Laws have not
been amended since 1987.
62 According to the 1988 Legislative Record, HB 240 is described as, among other things,
“simplify[ing] the findings necessary for granting variances.”18 Leg. Rec. 68 (Ky. 1988). Unfortunately, there is little other legislative history available. The House Cities Committee and
Senate Cities Committee submitted no written reports and did not audiotape their meetings
during the 1988 session. At the suggestion of John McKee of the Legislative Research Commission, I contacted Bill Lear, who was co–sponsor of the 1988 Act and chair of a Task Force
on Chapter 100.
63 Telephone Interview with Bill Lear, Co–Sponsor of the 1988 Act & Chair of a Task
Force on Chapter 100 (Nov. 19, 2009); cf. Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land
Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 Calif. L. Rev. 837, 847 (1983) (“[J]urisprudence
of land decisions is bound to fail unless it takes account of how these decisions are actually
made.”).
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variance, and ceased to require the Board to find unnecessary hardship
before granting a variance.64
One could argue65 that the 1988 amendment to KRS 100.243
impermissibly grants the Board too much discretion in violation of
Kentucky’s strict separation of powers doctrine.66
Section 27 of the Kentucky Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and
each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit:
Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive,
to another; and those which are judicial, to another.67

Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution further provides that “[n]o
person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall

64 See Act of Mar. 31, 1988, ch. 144, § 4, 1988 Ky. Acts 372, 374–75. In 1992, the New York
legislature enacted a similar change to its law governing dimensional variances. Specifically,
it eliminated the “practical difficulties” requirement applicable to dimensional variances. See
Act of June 30, 1992, ch. 248, § 11, 1992 N.Y. Laws 2869, 2871. Instead, New York law now
requires that the Board weigh the benefit to the applicant of granting a variance “against ‘the
detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood or community’” in deciding
whether to grant a dimensional variance. Sasso v. Osgood, 657 N.E.2d 254, 264 (N.Y. 1995); see
also James A. Coon et al., The Land Use Recodification Project, 13 Pace L. Rev. 559, 580, 587–89
(1993) (noting that law governing dimensional variances had been in “total confusion” prior to
1992 amendment and describing new statutory requirements).
65 On the other hand, if the Board were characterized as a mediator rather than a quasi–
judicial body, the important question would be whether potential objectors were given notice
and the opportunity to be heard rather than whether the flexible standards constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative power. Cf. Rose, supra note 63, at 860 (describing variance
boards as “representative groups of concerned but fair–minded citizens, compromising and
smoothing conflicts among neighbors,” and noting that “[i]f this view of board–as–mediator
had prevailed, we might have seen a very different jurisprudence of local land use matters”);
David M. Friebus, Note, A New Uncertainty in Local Land Use: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of State v. Outagamie County Board of Adjustment, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 571, 586 (contending
that dimensional variances “appear to be tailor–made for boards of adjustment, which have
the kind of local expertise necessary to make these decisions and the capacity to [handle] the
large number of claims that might be brought before them. Consequently, there would appear
to be a presumption in favor of more discretion and a need for flexibility in terms of area variances rather than use variances”).
66 See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Thomas E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and
Development Regulation Law § 5.16 (2d ed. 2007) (“As with any delegation of legislative
authority, standards must be sufficiently clear to guide the administrative decisionmaking
and prevent the exercise of uncontrolled discretion.”); cf. Carol M. Rose, New Models for Local
Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1155, 1158 n.14 (1985) (noting that courts in Illinois and
Maryland overturned the variance process in the 1930s because it was an “improper delegation of ‘legislative’ powers”).
67 Ky. Const. § 27.
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exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the
instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.”68
The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to
require a strict separation of powers.69 In fact, the Kentucky Supreme
Court has declared that “in the area of nondelegation, Kentucky may be
unsurpassed by any state in the Union.”70 Under this strict nondelegation
doctrine, “it is fundamental that the legislature must prescribe some
standard governing the scope of administrative action.”71 Moreover, the
requirement that “the legislature must lay down policies and establish
standards”72 is not as toothless as the federal “intelligible–principle rule.”73
No Kentucky74 case has expressly addressed the question of whether
KRS 100.243 provides adequate standards to satisfy Kentucky’s strict
separation of powers doctrine.75 In dicta, however, the Kentucky Supreme
68 Ky. Const. § 28.
69 See Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 862 (2005) (“Likewise, we and our
predecessor court have interpreted Sections 27 and 28 to mandate a strict separation of powers.”); see also Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the Delegation Doctrine in the
States, 8 Admin. L.J. Am. U. 567, 580–82 (1994) (describing Kentucky as a state following strict
standards or safeguards delegation doctrine); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering
Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1167, 1196 (1999)
(describing Kentucky as state “following a ‘strong’ nondelegation approach”).
70 Bd. of Trs. of the Judicial Form Ret. Sys. v. Att’y Gen., 132 S.W.3d 770, 782 (Ky. 2003).
71 Kerth v. Hopkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 346 S.W.2d 737, 741 (Ky. 1961).
72 Bloemer v. Turner, 137 S.W.2d 387, 391 (Ky. 1939).
73 Bd. of Trs., 132 S.W.3d at 782.
74 For a discussion of the delegation of power doctrine and local land use decisions in
Maine, see Orlando E. Delogu & Susan E. Spokes, The Long–Standing Requirement that Delegations of Land Use Control Power Contain “Meaningful” Standards to Restrain and Guide Decision–
Makers Should Not Be Weakened, 48 Me. L. Rev. 49 (1996).
75 The “adequate standards” test has had a checkered history in Kentucky law. Cf. John
M. Rogers, Michael P. Healy, & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Administrative Law 367 (2d
ed. 2008) (“The nondelegation doctrine has lurched back and forth in Kentucky.”).
The Kentucky Supreme Court was said to have rejected the “adequate standards” requirement in favor of a general “safeguards” test to determine the constitutionality of statutes
delegating discretion to administrative agencies in Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern
Kentucky, Inc., 352 S.W.2d 203, 207–08 (Ky. 1961). See Ky. Comm’n on Human Rights v. Barbour, 587 S.W.2d 849, 850–51 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (“[T]he necessity for standards or guidelines
accompanying legislative delegations was expressly rejected by the former Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Butler . . . .”); Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Legitimizing the Administrative State: The Judicial
Development of the Nondelegation Doctrine in Kentucky, 4 N. Ky. L. Rev. 87, 107 (1977) (stating that
in Butler, “the court repudiated the adequate standards requirement and adopted a general
‘safeguards’ test for determining the constitutionality of statutes delegating discretion to administrative agencies”).
In Butler, the court clearly applied a “safeguards” approach rather than the “adequate
standards” approach. See Butler, 352 S.W.2d at 208 (“Let us, then, examine this law in terms
of the practical needs of effective government, and in terms of safeguards against abuse and
injustice.”). Whether it “expressly rejected” the “adequate standards” approach is less clear.
In Butler, the court noted the proposition that “’[t]he need is usually not for standards but for
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Court has suggested that section 100.243 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
would survive such a challenge.
In Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commission v. Schmidt,76 the
Kentucky Supreme Court considered a challenge to Jefferson County’s
“Innovative Residential Development Regulations.” Those regulations
“were designed to ‘encourage flexibility of design by allowing zero lot
line, row house, cluster housing and other innovative designs which meet
the intent of the guidelines of the Comprehensive Plan.’”77 Under the
regulations, a developer could build on lots that were smaller than those
required by the zoning ordinance if the developer provided an area of
common open space, generally equal to the reduction in lot sizes.78 The
regulations permitted the Planning Commission to grant “waivers” of the
zoning regulation’s requirements regarding minimum lot size, minimum
width size, yard requirements, and distance between buildings and floor
area ratio.79 The grant of waivers was subject to three conditions: “1) the
specifics for the zoning district and subdivision regulations cannot be met;
2) the proposal meets the intent of the Innovative Regulation; and 3) the
waivers do not harm the public health, safety and welfare.”80
The court held that the regulations were an unlawful delegation of
legislative power to the Planning Commission. The court stated the general
rule that “[t]he ‘delegation of discretion is not unlawful’ only ‘if sufficient
standards controlling the exercise of that discretion are found in the act.’”81
The court found that the three standards failed to “limit the Planning

safeguards,’” but never expressly held that the “adequate standards” approach should never
apply. Id. at 207 (quoting Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 151 (1958)).
In the years since Butler, the court has applied the adequate standards approach. See,
e.g., Legislative Research Comm’n v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907, 915 (Ky. 1984) (“[D]elegation
must have standards controlling the exercise of administrative discretion.”). Indeed, in recent
years, the Kentucky Supreme Court has applied the adequate standards test without even
referring to the general safeguards test. See Bd. of Trs., 132 S.W.3d at 781–85; see also Fletcher
v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 862–63 (Ky. 2005) (stating that “while the General Assembly cannot delegate its power to make law, it can make a law that delegates the power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes its own action depend—so
long as the law establishes policies and standards governing the exercise of that delegation”
and referring to Board of Trustees v. Attorney General “for a detailed discussion of the ‘nondelegation doctrine.’”).
In light of these recent cases, this article will assume that the “adequate standards” test is
the appropriate test for examining whether a delegation to an administrative agency survives
a separation of power challenge under Kentucky law today.
76 Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Planning Comm’n v. Schmidt, 83 S.W.3d 449 (Ky. 2002).
77 Id. at 452 (quoting Jefferson County, Ky., Development Code § 9.5A (1982)).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 454.
81 Id. at 455 (quoting Holsclaw v. Stephens, 507 S.W.2d 462, 471 (Ky. 1973)).
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Commission’s discretion in any way.”82 With respect to the first condition
that the specifics of the zoning district and subdivision regulations cannot
be met, the court found that the developer need only intentionally propose
a subdivision that would not fit within the zoning district to satisfy that
requirement.83 With respect to the second condition that the proposal meet
the intent of the Innovative Development Regulations, the court found
that “a developer [could] easily satisfy [that] requirement by submitting
a proposal that meets the general requirements for an innovative
subdivision.”84 Finally, the court found that the third requirement providing
that the waiver must not harm the public health, safety and welfare was
“vague and, in essence, grants almost unbridled discretion.”85
The court did not specifically address the constitutionality of Section
100.243 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes. The court did, however,
contrast waivers under the Innovative Development Regulations with
the requirements KRS 100.243 imposes on variances and described the
requirements under KRS 100.243 as “very strict requirements”86 that
“severely limit[] the conditions under which a variance may be granted.”87
Although I would not describe the KRS 100.243 standards as “very strict
requirements,” the court’s dicta in Schmidt suggests that the Kentucky
Supreme Court would view KRS 100.243 as imposing “sufficient standards”
to control the exercise of Board of Adjustment’s discretion in granting
variances and thus not constitute an impermissible delegation of power
to the Board of Adjustment in violation of Kentucky’s strict separation of
powers doctrine.
(b) Board’s Findings
I believe that the Board’s decisions in the six cases in which the Board
denied the applicant’s request for a variance and the two cases in which it
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 451 (“Again the developer must meet very strict requirements, but a Board of
Adjustment can grant the variance.”).
87 Id. (“Before a variance is granted the empowering legislation requires a public hearing, but more importantly the legislation . . . severely limits the conditions under which a variance may be granted. Among other things, a variance can be granted only upon a finding that
it will not alter the essential character of the general vicinity nor unreasonably circumvent the
requirements of the zoning regulations.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.243 (West 2006)); see also id. at 454 (“Thus, the zoning regulations that
permit the establishment of an innovative subdivision without meeting the strict requirements
of KRS 100.243 for a variance are unlawful.” (emphasis added)); id. at 455 (“Once a comprehensive plan is adopted, it can only be avoided through rezoning or variance, neither easy to
obtain as both are strictly circumscribed.” (emphasis added)).
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reached a tie vote are fully supportable under the law. In these cases, the
applicant, not the Board, bears the burden of proof.88 Thus, the Board need
not grant the applicant a variance unless the applicant offers compelling
evidence such that the denial of relief is arbitrary.89 In none of these eight
cases did the applicant offer compelling evidence. Moreover, in each of the
six cases in which it voted to disapprove, the Board expressly found that
at least one of the requirements or relevant considerations for a variance
was not satisfied. For example, in denying an appeal for a number of
variances to allow front yard paving that exceeded the zoning ordinance’s
requirements, the Board found, among other things, that “[g]ranting the
requested variances would result in over fifty percent of the front yard area
being maintained as pavement, which would be out of character with other
properties in the general vicinity and detrimental to the appearance of the
neighborhood.”90 In denying a variance to reduce the required setback for
dancing and live entertainment from 100–feet from a residential zone to 30–
feet, the Board found, among other things, that “[g]ranting the requested
variance has significant potential to adversely impact a well established
residential area located as close as 30’ from the building to be used for live
entertainment and dancing.”91
With respect to the thirty–eight cases in which the Board approved the
applicant’s request for a variance, it is difficult to criticize the substance of
those decisions because the standards for granting a variance under current
Kentucky law are fairly easy to satisfy.92 If Kentucky law still required that
the Board find unnecessary hardship or deprivation of reasonable use before
granting a dimensional variance, the Board would deserve considerable
criticism. The Board only expressly found unnecessary hardship or
deprivation of reasonable use in twenty of the thirty–eight cases in which
it granted a variance. Kentucky law, however, no longer requires that the
Board find unnecessary hardship or deprivation of reasonable use before
granting a dimensional variance. Instead, unnecessary hardship/deprivation
of reasonable use is simply one of three factors KRS 100.243 directs the
Board to consider before granting a variance.
Not only has the change in the law made it more difficult to criticize
the substance of the Board’s decisions granting variances, but the Board’s

88 See Bourbon Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment v. Currans, 873 S.W.2d 836, 838–39 (Ky. Ct. App.
1994).
89 Id.
90 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 12, 16 (Aug. 31, 2007)
(on file with author) (making finding c in Kenneth & Virginia Jones, V–2007–76).
91 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9, 12 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(on file with author) (making finding a in James Lamont Hudson, V–2007–80).
92 See § 100.243. The requirements are discussed in detail supra Part II.A.2.a. As noted
above, I disagree with the Schmidt court’s characterization of the standards as “very strict.” See
supra Part II.A.2.a.
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decisions, as reported in the minutes of the Board’s meetings, have
improved considerably since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. First,
and most significantly, the decisions recite specific facts in support of the
findings as required by KRS 100.243.93 For example, in Farah Builders,
LLC, the Board offered the following reasons for granting the variance:
1.

Granting the requested variance will not adversely
affect the public health, safety or welfare, nor alter the
character of the general vicinity. There are a number
of brick walls that appear to be taller than 6’ in the
immediate vicinity, and the fence/wall on the adjoining
property to the north has a height of between 8.5’ and
9’, as authorized by the Board just a few years ago.

2.

Granting the requested variance will not allow an
unreasonable circumvention of the requirements of
the Zoning Ordinance, as there are similar walls on
both sides of Tates Creek Road in this area.

3.

Strict application of the Zoning Ordinance would
force the appellant to construct a fence/wall with a
maximum height of 6’, which would likely result in a
loss of privacy and disturbances from noises associated
with traffic on Tates Creek Road. Also, a 6’ tall fence
or wall would likely appear out of character, given the
taller height of the wall on the immediately adjoining
property to the north.

4.

The requested variance is not the result of a willful
violation of the Zoning Ordinance, as the fence/wall
has not yet been constructed.94

Second, the Board does a better job of tracking the law by making
findings required by KRS 100.243. Specifically, in all thirty–eight of the
cases in which the Board granted a variance, the Board made the first
two specific findings required by KRS 100.243: (1) that the variance “will
not adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare,” and (2) that the
variance “will not alter the essential character of the general vicinity.”95 In
addition, in all but one of the cases, the Board expressly considered and
93 Cf. Clifford v. Harrison Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, No. 2005–CA–001990–MR, 2007 WL
29426 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 5, 2007) (vacating Board of Adjustment’s grant of conditional use permit where Board only made conclusory statement that requirements of ordinance had been
met and did not make any findings of fact); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 13 (criticizing boards for
supporting their decisions with boilerplate language lacking substance); Donovan, supra note
28, at 107 (criticizing commission and board for using “nearly identical standardized resolutions to reduce their decision to writing”).
94 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjust. 4 (Aug. 2007) (on file with
author) (discussing Farah Builders, LLC, V–2007–75).
95 § 100.243.
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found at least one of the three factors KRS 100.243 directs the Board to
consider in determining whether to grant a dimensional variance. Moreover,
in sixteen of the cases the Board expressly found two of the three factors,
and in one of the cases the Board found all three factors.
Nevertheless, the Board of Adjustment’s decisions granting dimensional
variances still do not fully comply with the law. Current law requires that
the Board make four specific findings before approving a variance.96 In
not a single case did the Board expressly make all four of the required
findings before granting a variance, and in only two cases did the Board
expressly make three of the four findings. Arguably, the Board implicitly
made the third finding, that the variance will not cause a hazard or a
nuisance to the public, each time it expressly made the first finding that
the variance will not adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare. In
only one case, however, did the Board expressly make the third finding as
required by KRS 100.243.97 And, in only one case did the Board expressly
make the fourth finding, that the variance will not allow an unreasonable
circumvention of the requirements of the zoning ordinance, as required by
KRS 100.243.98
Thus, while the Board of Adjustment’s decisions are more supportable
now than they were during the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study,
they still do not fully comply with the law. Because Kentucky no longer
requires a finding of undue hardship/deprivation of reasonable use before a
variance can be granted, the Board can no longer be criticized for granting
variances in the absence of undue hardship/deprivation of reasonable use.
Nevertheless, the Board can and should be criticized for granting variances
without expressly making all four of the findings required by KRS 100.243.
(c) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
Dukeminier and Stapleton implicitly criticized the Board for failing to
follow the staff’s recommendations. They noted that after investigating the
facts, the planning staff recommended that the Board only grant twenty
of the requests. Then, presumably referring to the same twenty cases,
Dukeminier and Stapleton declared, “[o]n the basis of the facts alleged in
the petition and the evidence in the minutes, in not more than twenty, or

96 See id.; supra Part II.A.2.a.
97 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3–4 (Aug. 22, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Rev. & Mrs. George Naze, V–2008–40).
98 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Farah Builders, LLC, V–2007–75).
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approximately forty percent of these cases were the legal requirements for
a variance satisfied.”99
No one could criticize the current Board for failing to follow the staff’s
recommendations today. Indeed, the staff recommended approval in all
thirty–eight cases in which the Board voted to approve,100 and the staff
recommended disapproval in all but one of the six cases that the Board
voted to disapprove. In the two cases in which the Board reached a tie
vote, the staff recommended approval. Thus, the Board followed the
staff’s recommendation in forty–three of the forty–six cases that were
neither withdrawn nor indefinitely postponed, or ninety–three percent
of the cases. The Board did not always adopt the staff’s recommendation
verbatim. Sometimes it made modifications to the staff’s recommendation.
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the Board was quite deferential to the
staff.
(d) Summary
The Board of Adjustment’s bulk variance decisions (excluding
variances for signs) from July 2007 through December 2008 are subject to
less criticism than those rendered at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton
study.
First, and perhaps most significantly, the Board can no longer be
criticized for granting variances where there is no evidence of unnecessary
hardship because Kentucky law no longer requires that the Board find
unnecessary hardship before granting a variance. Instead, KRS 100.243
now provides that unnecessary hardship is simply a factor the Board should
consider in deciding whether to grant a variance.
Second, the Board of Adjustment appears to have done a better job
of tracking the legal requirements for a variance in its decisions rendered
between July 2007 and December 2008 than it did during the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study. In addition, the Board has done a good job of providing
specific facts in support of its decisions granting variances.
Finally, the Board of Adjustment can no longer be criticized for
disregarding the professional staff’s recommendations. The Board of
Adjustment followed the staff’s recommendation in forty–three of the
forty–six dimensional variance requests (other than sign variances) it
decided between July 2007 and December 2008.
Despite its improvements, the Board’s decisions are not entirely
free from criticism. First, and most significantly, the Board has not fully
complied with KRS 100.243’s requirement that the Board make four
separate findings before granting a variance. The Board did not expressly
99 Study, supra note 2, at 287.
100 In three instances, the staff changed its initial recommendation from disapproval to
approval.
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make all four required findings in a single case approving the applicant’s
request for a variance between July 2007 and December 2008. Moreover, in
only one of the thirty–eight cases granting variance requests did the Board
expressly address the three factors (including unnecessary hardship) that
KRS 100.243 directs the Board to consider when deciding whether to grant
a variance.
3. Dimensional Variances for Signs.—Although Dukeminier and Stapleton
were critical of the Board’s decisions regarding dimensional variances that
did not apply to signs, they saved their harshest criticism for the Board’s
decisions regarding dimensional variances for signs. Indeed, Dukeminier
and Stapleton began their discussion of sign variances by stating that
“in this subsection we present a batch of cases that show how a board
of adjustment can rewrite the zoning ordinance and bring about almost
complete breakdown in enforcement of the law.”101
Dukeminier and Stapleton noted that the Board only granted three of
fourteen variance requests for signs between January, 1960, and September,
1960.102 In September, 1960, one member of the Board changed, and with
it, apparently, the Board’s approach to sign variances.103 With respect to the
twenty–eight requests104 made between September, 1960, and June, 1961,
the Board ultimately105 granted twenty–six, or ninety–three percent, of the
requests.106 The planning staff, in contrast, recommended that the Board
only grant three of the requests.107
In critiquing these decisions, Dukeminier and Stapleton declared:
In not a single one of these cases did the petitioner in his petition
attempt to show evidence to meet all the requirements for a
variance. Indeed, in very few did the petitioner show sufficient
evidence to meet even one requirement. Various hardships were
101 Study, supra note 2, at 291.
102 Id. at 292.
103 Dukeminier and Stapleton illuminated the role of the change in personnel on the
Board as follows:
Some observers of the Board have inferred from these cases that the Board’s policy
shifted when one membership changed in September, 1960. This is not verifiable, however, since the decisions were unanimous except in the few cases where
dissents have been noted in the footnotes. Yet, without some such explanation, it
is difficult to reconcile these apparently inconsistent decisions. Of course consistency may not have been a virtue sought by the Board. We recognize that these
decisions may simply be the result of an ad hoc approach under which equal treatment in equal circumstances is of minor importance.

Id. at 302.
104 Four of those requests sought to reverse earlier decisions. Id. at 292.
105 Twenty–four of the requests were granted on the first hearing and two others were
granted on rehearing. Id. at 293.
106 Id. at 292–93.
107 Id. at 292.
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alleged, such as it was “extremely necessary to the success of the
commercial enterprise,” petitioner’s sign could be seen better if
it were nonconforming, there were other nonconforming signs in
the area, and the building had been so designed that there was
no place to put a conforming sign (clearly a self–made hardship).
None of these so–called “hardships” is a hardship under the
enabling act and ordinance,108 and none of them is sufficient
reason for granting a variance. The minutes of the Board are as
devoid of substantiating evidence as the petitions.109

After describing the myriad cases in which the Board disregarded the
legal requirements for variances, Dukeminier and Stapleton concluded:
In the area of sign regulation the Board’s decisions reflect very
little concern with the rule of law and the values that emanate
therefrom. It is arguable that the rule of law has been replaced
here by rule by fiat, but more probably it has been largely
replaced by anarchy.110

The law and practice regarding sign variances have changed considerably
since the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. First, the LFUC
Zoning Ordinance now strictly regulates signs and severely circumscribes
the Board’s authority to grant sign variances. Second, the current Board is
much more deferential to the planning staff’s recommendations regarding
108 At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Lexington–Fayette County
Zoning Ordinance–Resolution, with the judicial gloss put on that language, required that five
conditions be found before a finding of “unnecessary hardship” that would justify a variance:
(1)

because of the uniqueness of the lot, the land will not yield a reasonable return if the signs
must conform to the ordinance;

(2)

the hardship is not created by the petitioner;

(3)

the owner’s plight is peculiar to the lot and not caused by general conditions in the neighborhood;

(4)

the conditions are not so typical or recurrent that they can be dealt with by a general regulation; and

(5)

the variance will not result in substantial impairment of the community plan.

Id. at 292; see also id. at 279–80.
109 Id. at 293; see also id. at 295 (stating that cases “show, as do the New Circle Road
cases, that having let one nonconforming sign in, the Board feels it cannot deny others the
same privilege”).
110 Id. at 303. The staff expressed a similar sentiment. According to Dukeminier and
Krier, the staff decried in one staff report:
The Board has, by their own actions, in the past, all but amended this particular
provision of the Zoning Ordinance–Resolution along the Beltline and other arteries. It is unfortunate that the Board’s usurpation of legislative authority has not
been brought to the attention of the courts before the intent and effect of the
Ordinance was destroyed.

Id. at 295.
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sign variances. This section will discuss these two changes in more detail.
								
(a) Law Governing Sign Variances
The Kentucky Revised Statutes authorize cities and counties to
regulate the size, width, height, bulk, and location of signs.111 In addition,
the Kentucky Revised Statutes authorize boards of adjustment to grant
variances with respect to signs.112 The Kentucky Revised Statutes, however,
do not impose any particular restrictions on sign variances. Sign variances
are subject to the general rules governing all dimensional variances.113
The current LFUC Zoning Ordinance imposes very strict and detailed
regulations regarding the number, size, height, type, and location of
signs.114 In addition, the LFUC Zoning Ordinance limits the Board’s power
to grant sign variances.115 Specifically, the ordinance prohibits the Board
from granting variances (1) to increase the number of permitted signs; (2)
to permit any sign, design feature, information, copy, or design type that
is not specifically permitted in the zone in which the sign is to be located;
and (3) to increase the maximum total permitted sign area on a single lot
or building.116
(b) Board’s Findings
In light of the severe limitations the zoning ordinance places on the
power of the Board to grant sign variances, it is perhaps not surprising that
111 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.203(1)(b) (West 2006).
112 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.241 (West 2006) (granting board the power to hear and
decide applications for variances); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(24) (West 2006) (defining
“variance,” in relevant part, as “departure from dimensional terms of the zoning regulation
pertaining to the height, width, length, or location of structures”) (emphasis added); id. §
100.111(21) (defining “structure” to include signs).
113 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 100.241–.247 (West 2006).
114 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 17 (2007).
115 The express limitations on sign variances were incorporated as part of a comprehensive revision of the zoning ordinance in 1983. The express limitations were thought to be
necessary as a result of the Chapter 100 prohibition on use variances. See Minutes, Lexington–
Fayette Urban Cnty. Planning Comm’n, Pub. Hearing 2 (June 1, 1983) (on file with author)
(“The Board of Adjustment, under KRS 100, has the power to grant dimensional variances.
Therefore, the variances related to the sign regulations would be strictly of a dimensional
nature. The Board would not have the power to increase the total number of signs, permit
otherwise prohibited signs, or increase total sign area for a lot.”).
116 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 17–8(a) (2007). Interestingly, the Zoning Ordinance incorporates the 1986 statutory variance standards for sign
variances rather the current standards adopted in 1988. Cf. supra note 53 (discussing the current statutory requirements and the requirements applicable under the 1986 Act).
Specifically, Section 17–8(b) of the LFUC Zoning Ordinance provides:
Before granting a variance to the dimensional requirements for a sign, the Board
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the Board rarely hears sign variances now. Indeed, in the eighteen month
period between July 2007 and December 2008, the Board only considered
one appeal for a sign variance.117 In that case, the Board followed the staff’s
recommendation and approved a “variance to reduce the required setback
for a free standing sign from 10 feet to 5.67 feet to allow an existing sign to
remain” in its current location.118
In approving the sign variance, the Board specifically made two of the
four necessary findings required for a variance: (1) that the variance should
not adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare, and (2) that it
would not alter the character of the general vicinity. It did not specifically
find (1) that the variance would not cause a hazard or nuisance to the public,
or (2) that the variance would not allow an unreasonable circumvention of
the requirements of the zoning regulations.
The Board arguably considered whether the requested variance arose
from special circumstances which do not generally apply to land in the
general vicinity, or in the same zone when it found that “[t]he design
features of the sign, in particular its low height, and the location of the
required landscaping for the parking lot, resulted in a special situation
that favored placement of the sign a few feet less than the 10’ minimum
required setback.”119 It arguably considered undue hardship when it found
that:
Strict application of the Zoning Ordinance would force the
appellant to move the sign 3.33’ feet farther back from the street.
At that location it would have to be elevated, probably on a pole,
thereby making it much more visually intrusive and possibly
shall find all of the following, which shall be recorded along with any imposed
conditions or restrictions in the minutes and records and issued in written form to
the applicant to constitute proof of the variance:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

The requested variance arises from special circumstances which do not generally apply to land in the general vicinity or in the same zone.
The strict application of the provisions of the sign regulations of this Zoning
Ordinance would deprive the applicant of a reasonable use of the land or
would create unnecessary hardship on the applicant.
Such special circumstances are not the result of actions of the applicant
taken subsequent to the adoption or amendment of the sign regulation of
this Zoning Ordinance.
Reasons that the variance will not adversely affect the public health, safety
and welfare, and will not alter the essential character of the general vicinity,
and will not cause a hazard or a nuisance to the public.

117 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Charleston Dev., Inc., V–2008–7). A second sign case, involving
both an administrative appeal and variance, was filed. The staff recommended that both the
administrative appeal and variance request be denied. After seeking an initial one month
postponement, the applicant withdrew the case. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty.
Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Castleton Lyons, Inc.,
AV–2007–84).
118 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Charleston Dev., Inc., V–2008–7).
119 Id. at 3–4.
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interfering with sight triangles for each access drive that serves
the property. Moving the sign farther back would also result
in a loss of parking spaces, as well as a potentially awkward
appearance of the parking lot and associated landscaping.120

In addition to the single sign variance the Board considered between
July 2007 and December 2008, seven administrative appeals involving signs
were filed during that period of that time. Those appeals are discussed in
section III.C.2.b.
(c) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
The current Board of Adjustment, unlike the Board of Adjustment
at the time of the Dukemenier–Stapleton study, was deferential to the
professional staff’s recommendations. In the single sign variance case,
the Board followed the staff’s recommendation and approved the request
without discussion for the reasons recommended by the staff.
(d) Summary
Dukeminier and Stapleton were extremely critical of the Board’s
decisions regarding sign variances in their study. Since then, the zoning
ordinance has been amended to severely circumscribe the Board’s power
to grant variances. As a result, the Board only decided one sign variance
case between July 2007 and December 2008. In that case, the Board voted,
without discussion, to approve the variance for the reasons recommended
by the staff.
B. Conditional Uses
After critiquing the Board of Adjustment’s variance decisions,
Dukeminier and Stapleton turned to “special exceptions.” Accordingly,
this section will turn to conditional uses, the term now used for special
exceptions. It will begin by discussing the law governing conditional uses. It
will then discuss the Board of Adjustment’s decisions regarding conditional
use applications for uses other than for home occupations.121 It will then
turn to conditional use applications for home occupations.122 Finally, it will
120 Id.
121 After discussing the Board’s special exception decisions, Dukeminier and Stapleton
turned to temporary permits. At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Board had
the power to grant temporary permits for uses that did not conform to the zoning ordinance.
Study, supra note 2, at 309. The Board no longer has the power to grant temporary permits.
Cf. Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 7 (2007) (outlining the
Board’s powers). Thus, this article does not address temporary permits.
122 At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, home occupations were not treated
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address the Board’s decisions in hearings reviewing previously–approved
conditional use permits.
1. Law Governing Conditional Uses.—At the time of the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study, the Kentucky enabling legislation authorized the LFUC
Board of Adjustment to “hear and decide appeals and applications for
special exceptions.”123 The enabling legislation neither defined the term
“special exception,”124 nor imposed any particular standards for the granting
of special exceptions.125 It did, however, require the “concurring vote of
four members of the board” before a special exception could be granted.126
Citing case law, Dukeminier and Stapleton explained that “[s]pecial
exceptions are uses permitted by the zoning ordinance when specified
facts and conditions enumerated in the ordinance are found by the board
to exist.”127 Dukeminier and Stapleton found that the Lexington ordinance
authorized two different types of special exceptions: (1) uses that were
permitted in specified districts if certain conditions were met; and (2)
uses that were permitted in specified districts “‘when authorized by the
Board of Adjustment.’”128 Dukeminier and Stapleton viewed the first type
of special exception as “‘true’ special exception[s] or conditional use[s],
which require[d] the Board to act as a fact–finding body and exercise some
limited discretion” in determining whether the applicant met the stated
conditions.129 Dukeminier and Stapleton described the second type of
special exception as “absolutely discretionary,” and noted that the “only
as conditional uses. Instead, they were considered in appeals from the building inspector’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance. Thus, Dukeminier and Stapleton did not consider them
in conjunction with special use decisions but instead with appeals from the building inspector.
Because home occupations are now treated as conditional uses, this article considers them in
conjunction with conditional use decisions.
123 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.470(1)(b) (1953) (repealed 1966). That statute was applicable to
cities of the second class. As noted in supra note 53, at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton
study, different enabling legislation applied to different classes of cities.
124 The statute simply provided, in relevant part, that “[a]pplications to the board of
adjustment for special exception or relief by way of variance may be made by any property
owner or tenant aggrieved.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.450 (1953) (repealed 1966).
125 Kentucky’s enabling legislation differed from the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act in that the Standard Act authorized the board “in appropriate cases and subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards, [to] make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in
harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with general or specific rules
therein contained.” Advisory Comm. on Zoning, A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
§ 7 (U.S. Dep’t of Commerce 1926), available at http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/
SZEnablingAct1926.pdf.
126 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.470(3) (1953) (repealed 1966).
127 Study, supra note 2, at 304 (citing Kline v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 325 S.W.2d 324 (Ky. 1959)).
128 Id.
129 Id.
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standard,” if it could be called a standard, was the requirement found in
the Board’s rules of procedure that “‘if the Board finds the use as proposed
does not conflict with the purpose and intent of the ordinance, it must
approve the application.’”130
Dukeminier and Stapleton questioned the constitutionality of the
“absolutely discretionary” special exceptions.131 They noted that the
court of appeals had held that similar land use control regulations were
unconstitutional when no reasonably definite standard was provided to
guide discretion.132 They contended that even if the first section of the
ordinance providing that the ordinance is “for the purpose of promoting
the public health, safety, morals or the general welfare” were treated as a
standard applicable to the granting of special exceptions, it would not be a
sufficiently definite standard under prior Kentucky case law.133
A few years after the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Kentucky
legislature substantially revised chapter 100 of the Kentucky Revised
Statutes,134 and, among other things, replaced the term “special use” with
the term “conditional use.”135 The Kentucky Revised Statutes now define
a “conditional use” as:
a use which is essential to or would promote the public health,
safety, or welfare in one (1) or more zones, but which would
impair the integrity and character of the zone in which it is
located, or in adjoining zones, unless restrictions on location,

130 Id. (quoting Lexington–Fayette County Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, Rules and
Procedure 2 (1961)).
131 Id. at 304.
132 Id. at 305 (citing Bowman v. Bd. of Councilman, 196 S.W.2d 730 (1946)); Town of
Jamestown v. Allen, 144 S.W.2d 807 (1940); Town of Bloomfield v. Bayne, 266 S.W. 885 (1924)).
133 Study, supra note 2, at 305–06 (discussing in detail the Kentucky Court of Appeals
case striking down an ordinance giving the Board of Commissioners authority to license a
trailer park when it would not “jeopardize the public health, safety, morals and welfare of the
inhabitants of the City of Covington, . . . [taking] into consideration the topography and density of the population of the location applicable in the particular case” (alteration in original)
(quoting Schneider v. Wink, 350 S.W.2d 504, 504–05 (Ky. 1961)).
134 See Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, 1966 Ky. Acts 708. For a detailed discussion of the
1966 legislation and the changes it wrought, see Tarlock, supra note 46.
135 Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, § 1(e), 1966 Ky. Acts 708, 709 (defining conditional use);
cf. Carlton v. Taylor, 569 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (“Historically, the term ‘conditional use’ has replaced the term ‘special exception’ in most modern zoning ordinances.”).
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size, extent, and character of performance are imposed in
addition to those imposed in the zoning regulation[.]136

The Kentucky Revised Statutes define a “conditional use permit” as:
legal authorization to undertake a conditional use, issued by the
administrative official pursuant to authorization by the board of
adjustment, consisting of two (2) parts:
(a)
		

A statement of the factual determination by the board of
adjustment which justifies the issuance of the permit; and

(b)
		

A statement of the specific conditions which must be met
in order for the use to be permitted[.]137

Section 100.237 authorizes the Board of Adjustment to “hear and decide
applications for conditional use permits to allow the proper integration
into the community of uses which are specifically named in the zoning
regulations which may be suitable only in specific locations in the zone only
if certain conditions are met[.]”138 It further authorizes the Board to impose
“necessary conditions such as time limitations, requirements that one (1)
or more things be done before the request can be initiated, or conditions
of a continuing nature.”139 It does not, however, impose any particular
standards on the granting of conditional uses. Indeed, one commentator
has described the Board’s power to grant conditional uses as “extensive and
gives it a fulcrum to bargain with a landowner for favorable concessions in
return for the issuance of a permit.”140
The LFUC Zoning Ordinance authorizes the Board of Adjustment “to
hear and decide applications for conditional use permits. . . .”141 Although the
zoning ordinance does not specifically define the term “conditional use,”
the provision granting the Board the power to grant conditional uses begins

136 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(6) (West 2006). The definition of the term “conditional
use” has remained virtually unchanged since it was introduced in the 1966 Act. The only difference is that the current definition includes the number “(1)” after the word “one” while
the definition in the 1966 Act did not. Compare id., with Act of Mar. 23, 1966, ch. 172, § 1(e),
1966 Ky. Acts 708, 709.
137 § 100.111(7). Like the definition of the term “conditional use,” the definition of
“conditional use permit” has remained virtually unchanged since its introduction in 1966.
The only notable difference is that the current definition includes the number “(2)” after the
word “two” while the definition in the 1966 Act did not. Compare id., with Act of Mar. 23, 1966,
ch. 172, § 1(f), 1966 Ky. Acts 708, 709.
138 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.237 (West 2006).
139 Id. § 100.237(1).
140 Tarlock, supra note 46, at 612.
141 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 7–6(a) (2007).
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by closely tracking the definition of conditional uses in Section 100.111(6)
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes.142 It then adds an additional element to
the definition of conditional use. Specifically, it describes conditional uses
as uses “which would not have an adverse influence on existing or future
development of the subject property or its surrounding neighborhood.”143
The zoning ordinance also imposes two additional requirements on the
Board before it may grant a conditional use. First, it requires that the Board
find that the necessary public facilities and services are or soon will be
adequate to serve the proposed use.144 Second, it requires that the Board
“provide for the continuation of existing or proposed collector streets, and
whenever possible, provide for the continuation of local streets.”145
Like the zoning ordinance at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton
study, the current zoning ordinance authorizes two types of conditional
uses: (1) uses that are permitted in specified districts if certain conditions
are met; and (2) uses that are permitted only with Board approval, but
without any specific conditions attached. For example, Article 8–22(d)(8) of
the ordinance imposes six specific conditions on banks as conditional uses
in the light industrial district.146 Article 8–22(d)(1) of the LFUC zoning
142 Specifically, Article 7–6(a) of the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Zoning Ordinance provides:
The Board shall have the power to hear and decide applications for conditional
use permits to allow the proper integration into the planning area of uses which
are specifically named in [the] Zoning Ordinance, which may be suitable only in
specific locations in the zone only if certain conditions are met, and which would
not have an adverse influence on existing or future development of the subject
property or its surrounding neighborhood.

Id. (emphasis added).
143 Id.
144 Specifically, Article 7–6(a)(2) provides that:
In approving a conditional use permit, the Board shall find that the public facilities
and services that will be needed are, or will soon be, adequate to serve the proposed use. The Board shall give consideration to the road system sewage disposal
facilities, utilities, fire and police protection and other services and facilities as are
relevant to the proposed use. The Board may establish conditions to ensure that
the proposed conditional use will not have an adverse influence on the subject
property or the surrounding neighborhood.

Id. art. 7–6(a)(2).
145 Id. art. 7–6(a)(3).
146 Specifically, Article 8–22(d)(8) of the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Zoning Ordinance provides:
Banks, with or without drive–through facilities, except as provided as part of an
Industrial Mixed–Use Project, provided:
a.

The site lies within the area of a development plan approved by the
Planning Commission, having a minimum one hundred (100) acres
zoned industrial;

b.

There shall be an on–site stacking capacity of a minimum of twenty
(20) cars for each bank having drive–through facilities;

c.

The site shall not have direct access to an arterial street;
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ordinance, in contrast, lists automobile race tracks as a conditional use in
the light industrial zone, but does not impose any specific conditions with
respect to automobile race tracks.147
In the years since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated that “a zoning ordinance must
contain standards to be used in determining whether to permit or deny
a conditional use, so as not to vest absolute and arbitrary power in the
administrative agency.”148 The court, however, has provided limited
guidance on what constitutes sufficient standards.
In the first case, to declare that a zoning ordinance must delineate
sufficient standards to guide the board of adjustment in deciding whether
or not to grant a conditional use permit, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
struck down a special exception/conditional use provision in a zoning
ordinance for failure to delineate standards.149 The zoning ordinance in
Carlton v. Taylor150 provided an itemized list of businesses permitted in the
“local” business districts.151 It then authorized the Board of Adjustment
to “grant ‘special exceptions’ for other retail businesses ‘if it determines
that the proposed use would not be detrimental to the development of the
district as a retail shopping area’.”152 The court did not find any problem
with the portion of the ordinance listing the specific businesses that were
permitted in the “local” business districts.153 With respect to the provision
in the ordinance authorizing other retail businesses, under which the Board
can authorize a retail business “if [the Board] determines that the proposed
use would not be detrimental to the development of the district as a retail
shopping area,”154 the court found that that provision did not provide
the board with sufficient guidance in deciding whether to grant or deny
d.

There exists, within the development plan area, industrial businesses
having a full–time, non–seasonal, on–site total employee population of
at least five hundred (500) employees;

e.

There exists, within a one–mile radius of the property boundaries of
the proposed site, industrial businesses having a full–time, non–seasonal, on–site total employee population of at least twenty–five hundred (2,500) employees;

f.

A site development plan is submitted to, and approved by, the Board
of Adjustment and the Planning Commission.

Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–22(d)(8) (2007).
147 See id. art. 8–22(d)(1).
148 Keogh v. Woodford Cnty. Bd. of Adjustments, 243 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007)
(quoting Hardin Cnty. v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592, 595 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995)).
149 Carlton, 569 S.W.2d at 681. The court found the term “special exception” used in the
zoning ordinance synonymous with the term “conditional use.” Id.
150 Id. at 679.
151 Id. at 682 (Park, J., concurring).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 681.
154 Id. at 682 (Park, J., concurring).
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a special exception and thus was unconstitutional for failure to delineate
standards.155
In the second case to announce that a zoning ordinance must delineate
sufficient standards, the Kentucky Court of Appeals struck down a zoning
ordinance that authorized a very unique kind of conditional use. In Hardin
County v. Jost,156 the zoning ordinance designated the entire unincorporated
area of the county as a single zone and designated three types of uses for
the zone: (1) “uses–by–right,” (2) “prohibited uses,” and (3) “conditional
uses.”157 “Agricultural and single family residential uses [were] designated
as ‘uses–by–right,’” while uses that had “a negative impact on the quality
and supply of water, or which endangered public health, or historic sites,
[were] designated as ‘prohibited uses.’”158 All other uses were designated
as “conditional uses,” defined as “use[s] of land or activit[ies] permitted
only after fulfillment of all local regulations.”159 The local regulations
applied a complex “Development Guidance System” that included a point
system and individual “compatibility assessment” meetings to determine
whether a conditional use permit should be granted.160 The court found
that the zoning ordinance failed to contain adequate standards to guide the
planning commission in deciding whether to grant or deny a conditional use
permit. It declared, “While application of the growth guidance assessment
can place a prospective property owner on notice as to what uses cannot
be made of the property, it cannot tell him with any degree of certainty
whether any particular use can be made of the property.”161
In the most recent case to announce that zoning ordinances must contain
sufficient standards, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that a zoning
155 Id. at 680.
156 Hardin Cnty. v. Jost, 897 S.W.2d 592 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
157 Id. at 593.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 593–94. The Development Guidance System first required a “growth guidance
assessment” pursuant to which proposed land uses were evaluated using a point system that
awarded points based on the project’s proximity to previously developed areas and amenities
and the suitability of the soil for agricultural purposes. If a proposed project received sufficient points, it would be submitted for a “compatibility assessment” pursuant to which the
applicant, neighboring property owners, and the commission staff would meet to discuss the
proposed development. If no consensus were reached at the compatibility meeting, a public
hearing would be held and the planning commission would decide whether to reject the project or place conditions on the project to make it “compatible.” Id.
161 Id. at 595. The court further declared:
The ordinance must be drafted to conform to the definition [of conditional use
contained in KRS 100.111(6)], not vice versa. Since the entire Development Guidance System is predicated upon virtually every use being a “conditional use,” and
since that term, as defined in KRS 100.111(6), makes no sense when applied in
that context, the system is not workable.

Id. at 596.
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ordinance that listed “Tourist home along State or Federal highways”
as a conditional use in the agricultural (A–1) zone without defining the
term “tourist home” did not impermissibly grant the Board of Adjustment
unfettered discretion to determine whether the landowner’s application
met the standards for a conditional use permit for a “tourist home.”162 In
Keogh v. Woodford County Board of Adjustments, the court found that when
the term “tourist home” was considered within the context of the zoning
ordinance’s scheme for granting conditional uses, it provided a sufficiently
definite framework for the Planning Director and Board to act.163 The court,
however, did not describe that framework in any detail. Instead, it simply
noted the neighbors did not argue that the zoning ordinance conflicted
with the definition of conditional use contained in Section 100.111(6) of
the Kentucky Revised Statutes or that the ordinance failed to set specific
guidelines for granting conditional uses.164
The court of appeals also addressed the issue of standards in an
unreported opinion. In Burke v. Oldham County Board of Adjustment and
Appeals,165 homeowners challenged the granting of a conditional use permit
to allow underground quarrying of limestone. The zoning ordinance at
issue provided:
In the interest of the public convenience, safety, morals and
welfare and to encourage the best use of land, certain land uses,
due to their extent, nature of operation, limited application, or
relationship to certain natural resources, must be considered as
singular cases. The uses listed in this section may be allowed
by the Board of Adjustments in certain districts, after public
hearing, by Conditional Use Permit, provided the Board of
Adjustments finds such uses to be essential or desirable [sic]
and not in conflict with the elements and objectives of the
Comprehensive Plan.166

The zoning ordinance then listed twenty–three different conditional
uses, including the extraction of minerals.167 The ordinance imposed

162 Keogh v. Woodford Cnty. Bd. of Adjustments, 243 S.W.3d 369, 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Burke v. Oldham Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment & Appeals, No. 2002–CA–001695–MR,
2003 WL 22025917, at *1 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
166 Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting Oldham County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance
§ 211).
167 Id.
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three specific conditions on conditional use permits for “Extraction, Rock
Quarries, Mineral and Earth Products”:
(1) Establishment by the responsible authority or approved
engineer of the final ground elevations to be attained for
the operations.
(2) Filing of a performance bond equal to $5,000.00 per acre
with the County or City to insure proper finishing of the
area into a usable condition.
(3) Plan of use of the area following completion of the
operation.168

The court rejected the landowners’ claim that allowing conditional uses
in the first place was an impermissible delegation of zoning power reserved
by the legislature to the fiscal court.169 The court found that the fiscal court
properly exercised its zoning power by identifying the specific conditional
uses that were permissible.170 The court then rejected the landowners’
claim that the ordinance gave the Board unlimited discretion and thus
was an unconstitutional delegation of power.171 In reaching this result the
court took four factors into account. First, the Board was limited to granting
conditional uses for the twenty–three listed uses, or uses that are similar to
those listed.172 Second, the ordinance required the Board to find that the
use was “essential or desireable [sic] and not in conflict with the elements
and objectives of the Comprehensive Plan.”173 Third, the zoning ordinance
imposed the three separate conditions on conditional use permits for
mineral extraction as described above.174 Finally, the Board was required to
consider other conditions it “fe[lt] necessary to further the purposes of this
regulation and further the public’s best interest.”175
No reported case has addressed the question of whether conditional
uses under the LFUC zoning ordinance satisfy the requirement that the
zoning ordinance contain sufficient standards so as not to vest absolute
168 Id. at *2–3 (footnote omitted) (quoting Oldham County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance
§ 211).
169 Id. at *2.
170 Id. at *2. The court noted that the ordinance was consistent with the requirements
of section 100.237 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes and that the landowners were not challenging the constitutionality of section 100.237. Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Oldham County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 211)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
174 Id. at *2–3.
175 Id. at *3 (quoting Oldham County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 211) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and arbitrary power in the Board.176 Based on the four cases described
above, however, it appears that conditional uses under the LFUC zoning
ordinance would survive any such challenge.
First, the LFUC zoning ordinance closely tracks the definition of
conditional use contained in KRS 100.111(6).177 Thus, conditional uses
under the LFUC zoning ordinance are unlikely to run into the problems
posed by the zoning ordinance in Hardin County v. Jost, which strayed
far from the definition of conditional uses under the Kentucky enabling
legislation. Second, in each of the twenty–four scheduled zones in the
LFUC zoning ordinance, conditional uses are specifically identified and
listed.178 Thus, conditional uses under the LFUC zoning ordinance do
not raise the same problems as the zoning ordinance in Carlton v. Taylor
that authorized the Board to grant special exception for “other retail
businesses” if the Board determined the use would not be detrimental to
the development of the district as a shopping center.179
Finally, like the zoning ordinance in Burke v. Oldham County Board of
Adjustment and Appeals, the LFUC zoning ordinance does impose some,

176 Nor am I aware of any unreported case addressing the issue.
177 See supra note 32.
178 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance arts. 8–1(d), 8–2(d),
8–3(d), 8–4(d), 8–5(d), 8–6(d), 8–7(d), 8–8(d), 8–9(d), 8–10(d), 8–11(d), 8–12(d), 8–13(d),
8–14(d), 8–15(d), 8–16(d), 8–17(d), 8–18(d), 8–19(d), 8–20(d), 8–21(d), 8–22(d), 8–23(d),
8–24(d) (2007). Specific conditional uses are also identified in other zones, such as the expansion area zones, that do not fall within the article 8 scheduled zones. See Lexington–Fayette
Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance arts. 10–2, 11–4, 12–4, 22A–3(d), 23(A)–4(d), 23A–
5(d), 23A–6(d), 23A–7(d), 23A–8(d), 23A–9(d), 23A–10(d), 24B–5, 28–3(d), 28–4(d), 28–5(d)
(2007).
179 Carlton v. Taylor, 569 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978). Arguably, a few conditional
uses may be too broad. For example, all of the agricultural zones include as a conditional use:
Any uses that are clearly incidental and subordinate to a small farm winery operation licensed as such by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, other than those specifically outlined in KRS 100, and permitted by Article 8–1(c)(2), which may include
special events with or without live entertainment or a small bistro/restaurant of
up to (2) seats per 1,000 gallons of wine, brandies and cordials produced or compounded on site per year.

Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(d)(27) (2007); see also id.
art. 8–2(d)(16); id. art. 8–3(d)(12): id. art. 8–4(d)(13).
Arguably, this provision may grant too much discretion to the Board, because it does not
specifically identify any of the incidental and subordinate uses that may be authorized. It is
worth noting, however, that the ordinance does impose limitations on special events. Specifically, it provides:
For special events, documentation shall be provided that arrangements have been
made with the LFUCG Division of Fire and Emergency Services for approval of
fire suppression and control; that Fayette County Health Department approval has
been obtained for the septic system and/or portable toilets; that Fayette County
Health Department approval has been obtained for any food services offered,
whether it be provided on site or catered for each event; and that approval be
obtained from the Division of Building Inspection for any temporary structures
used (i.e., tents).
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albeit limited, standards on conditional uses.180 First, it requires that the
Board “find that the necessary public facilities and services that will
be needed are, or will soon be, adequate to serve the proposed use.”181
Second, it requires the Board to “provide for the continuation of existing
or proposed collector streets, and whenever possible, provide for the
continuation of local streets.”182 In addition, like the zoning ordinance
in Burke, it authorizes the Board to “attach necessary conditions such as
time limitations, requirements that one or more things be done before the
request can be initiated, or conditions of a continuing nature and which
would not have an adverse influence on existing or future development
of the subject property or other property in the neigborhood,”183 and to
“establish conditions to ensure that the proposed conditional use will
not have an adverse influence on the subject property or the surrounding
neighborhood.”184
A fifth case also arguably supports the view that the LFUC zoning
ordinance provides the Board with sufficient standards to decide applications
for conditional uses so long as the Board makes factual determinations
that show that it has considered the effect the proposed land use would
have on public health, safety and welfare.185 In Davis v. Richardson, the
court of appeals, then the highest court in Kentucky, reviewed a Board’s
decision to grant a conditional use permit for a social club under a zoning
ordinance that authorized social clubs as conditional uses in any zone.186
The court noted that the fact that social clubs were conditional uses in any
zone meant that the Board of Adjustment rather than the legislature made
“the only effective determination concerning whether the particular land
use at the particular location is consistent with and promotes the public
health, safety or welfare in the overall zoning scheme.”187 The delegation
doctrine was not at issue in the case, and the court did not strike down the
conditional use provision for failure to provide the board with sufficient
standards. Instead, the court remanded the case for the Board to make
factual determinations to demonstrate that the Board had “considered the
effect of the proposed land use on the public health, safety and welfare in
the zone affected, in adjoining zones and on the overall zoning scheme.”188
Id. art. 8–1(d)(27); see also id. art 8–2(d)(16); id. art. 8–3(d)(12); id. art 8–4(d)(13).
180 See Burke v. Oldham Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment & Appeals, No. 2002–CA–001695–MR,
2003 WL 22025917, at *1–2 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
181 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 7–6(a)(2) (2007).
182 Id. art. 7–6(a)(3).
183 Id. art. 7–6(a)(1).
184 Id. art. 7–6(a)(2).
185 Davis v. Richardson, 507 S.W.2d 446, 449 (Ky. 1974).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 448.
188 Id. at 449.
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Of course, Davis v. Richardson would be stronger support for the proposition
that the LFUC zoning ordinance provides sufficient standards to guide the
Board in deciding conditional use applications if the delegation doctrine
were expressly raised and discussed in the opinion.
In sum, chapter 100 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes now permits
the Board of Adjustment to authorize conditional uses, rather than special
exceptions, which was the terminology used at the time of the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study. Like the zoning ordinance at the time of the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study, the current LFUC zoning ordinance authorizes two
types of conditional uses: (1) uses that are permitted in specified districts
if certain conditions are met; and (2) uses that are permitted “only with
Board approval” without attaching any specific conditions.189 Although
Dukeminier and Stapleton questioned the constitutionality of the latter
type of conditional use, dicta in a number of cases decided since the
Dukeminier–Stapleton study suggest that such conditional uses under the
LFUC zoning ordinance would survive a challenge under the delegation
doctrine.190
2. Conditional Use Applications for Uses Other than for Home Occupations.—
The Board considered seventeen requests for special exceptions during the
period of time covered by the Dukeminier–Stapleton study.191 Two of the
requests were for “true” special exceptions—that is, special exceptions for
which the zoning ordinance set forth specific conditions that were required
to be met.192 The remaining fifteen requests were for “discretionary”
special exceptions.193
The Board granted the two “true” special exceptions and thirteen
of the fifteen “discretionary” requests.194 Dukeminier and Stapleton
criticized the Board for granting the two “true” special exceptions, because
the applicants did not meet the specific conditions in either case.195 With
respect to the discretionary requests, Dukeminier and Stapleton declared:
On the basis of the disposition of these cases it is not possible
to say whether the Board acted wisely or unwisely, fairly or
unfairly, or whether a sound or unsound planning theory
189 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 7–8 (2007).
190 See Burke v. Oldham Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment & Appeals, No. 2002–CA–001695–MR,
2003 WL 22025917, at *1–3 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003).
191 Study, supra note 2, at 306. One case involved two requests, so the Board considered
sixteen cases with a total of seventeen requests. Id.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 308. Some of the discretionary special exception requests were appealed to the
Board as variance requests, but Dukeminier and Stapleton classified them as special exceptions to resolve all doubts in favor of the Board. Id. at 308–09.
194 Id. at 306–08.
195 Id. at 306–07.
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underlay the Board’s actions. The minutes of the Board are
sketchy, and no written opinions are filed. Without any policies,
standards, or rules to guide the Board’s decisions, and without
any requirement that the Board justify its actions by an opinion,
the possibilities of arbitrary use of power are great. But there is
no proof here that they have been realized or not realized. We
are simply in the dark.196

From July 2007 through December 2008, 104 conditional use
applications for uses other than home occupations appeared on the Board’s
agenda.197 The Board approved 89 of the 104 conditional use applications
and disapproved six.198 The Board reached a tie vote in three of the cases,
and the applicants withdrew six of the applications.199
(a) Board’s Decisions
It is not clear how many of the 104 conditional use applications
Dukeminier and Stapleton would characterize as “true” conditional
uses, and how many they would describe as “discretionary” conditional
uses.200 Because, unlike Dukeminier and Stapleton, I believe that the
“discretionary” conditional uses are not likely to be stricken for violating
the impermissible delegation doctrine, I will not attempt to distinguish
the “true” conditional uses from the “discretionary” conditional uses.
196 Id. at 309.
197 Eight of the conditional use applications also included a variance request, and one of
the applications included an administrative review.
198 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (July 2007 – Dec. 2008)
(on file with author).
199 Id. In one case about the Worldwide Church of God, the applicant postponed the
case and it never returned to the agenda. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of
Adjustment 6 (July 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Worldwide Church of God,
C–2008–57). At the Board meeting, the staff advised the Board that the applicant had been
working with the Division of Building Inspection and that applicant might withdraw the case.
Id. Since the case never again appeared on the Board’s agenda, it appears that the applicant
withdrew the application before the staff prepared the following month’s agenda. Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with author).
200 Arguably, the application for a bed and breakfast establishment would qualify as a
“true special exception” because the zoning ordinance imposes eleven specific requirements
for a use to qualify as a bed and breakfast establishment. Lexington–Fayette Urban County,
Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2007). Those conditions, however, are contained in the
definition of “bed and breakfast” and do not relate to the location of the bed and breakfast.
Thus, they may not qualify as “true” special exceptions. Id. Arguably, the three applications to
permit dancing and live entertainment would qualify as “true” special exceptions because the
zoning ordinance imposes a specific condition related to location: such uses must be at least
100 feet from a residential zone. Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance
art. 12–4(a) (2007). The zoning ordinance, however, does not identify many other specific conditions with respect to those uses. Thus, it is not clear whether they would qualify as “true”
special exceptions. Id.
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Nevertheless, I will note that in every case in which the zoning ordinance
imposed specific conditions with respect to a conditional use, the Board
found that the specific conditions were satisfied before granting the
conditional use permit. If a specific condition was not satisfied, the Board
disapproved the request.
The Board clearly appeared to be acting within the bounds of the law
in the six conditional use permit applications it disapproved. The Board
disapproved two of the applications because the applicant did not meet
specific additional conditions imposed by the zoning ordinance.201 The
Board disapproved another application because testimony at the hearing
revealed that the applicant planned to use the property in a way that was
not permitted under the zoning ordinance.202 The Board disapproved
two family child care applications due to specific concerns related to the
proposed site: one site had inadequate on–street parking203 and the other
site raised traffic and safety concerns.204 Finally, the Board disapproved an
application to continue operation of a night club with live entertainment
and dancing due to the disruptive manner in which the night club had

201 In Krista Meadows, the Board disapproved a request for a family child care, because
it did not satisfy the ordinance’s minimum off–street parking requirements. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 17–18 (May 30, 2008) (on file with author)
(discussing Krista Meadows, C–2008–42).
In James Lamont Hudson, the applicant applied for a conditional use permit for a night
club with live entertainment and dancing. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of
Adjustment 9–12 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing James Lamont Hudson,
CV–2007–80).The ordinance required that such a use be at least 100 feet from a residential
zone. Because the proposed use was to be within thirty feet of a residence zone, the applicant
also sought a variance. The Board rejected the applicant’s request for a variance to locate the
use within thirty feet of a residential zone because, among other reasons, it had significant
potential to adversely affect the nearby well–established residential area. It then disapproved
the conditional use application because it did not satisfy the mandatory 100–foot setback
requirement. Id.
202 In Johnny Winchester, the applicant sought a conditional use permit for vehicle storage. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 10 (July 25, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Johnny Winchester, C–2008–32). Testimony at the hearing revealed
that wrecked and inoperable vehicles would be stored on the site. Because the ordinance
explicitly states that a vehicle storage yard does not include storage of inoperable vehicles,
the Board disapproved the application. The Board also disapproved the application because
testimony at the hearing indicated that the storage lot would not be paved as required. Id. For
the definition of vehicle storage yard, see Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning
Ordinance art. 1–11 (2008).
203 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 18–19 (May 30, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Carla Jackson–Stovall, C–2008–32).The Board also disapproved that application because the proposed extended hours of operation increased the potential for disturbing residents in the area. Id. at 19.
204 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 14 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Assia Tounova–Stoencheva, C–2008–13).
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been operating in that location and the adverse impact it had had on the
surrounding area.205
Two of the cases that resulted in a tie vote also included requests
for variances.206 Much of the testimony before the Board in those cases
focused on the variance requests.207 As discussed above, in neither of those
cases did the applicant present compelling evidence in favor of its variance
request.208 Thus, I do not believe that the Board erred in failing to grant
relief in those two cases.
With respect to the third case that resulted in a tie vote after its first
application, I believe that the Board should have voted to approve it
initially.209 Indeed, the Board considered an identical application two
months after the first application, and the Board approved the request the
second time.210
In that case, the applicant requested a conditional use permit to
conduct an underground mining/quarrying operation on land located below
the Royal Spring Aquifer.211 Although no member of the public appeared
to object and the staff members of the Board recommended approval,
the Board held a very lengthy hearing on the matter.212 Two of the four
Board members present and voting on the matter213 were very concerned
205 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 23–24 (July 25, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing La Bamba, LLC, C–2008–69).
206 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 13–19 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Panagia Pantovasilissa Greek Orthodox Church, CV–2008–
24); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2–4 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Ky. Data Link, Inc., CV–2007–106).
207 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 13–19 (Dec. 12,
2008) (on file with author) (discussing Panagia Pantovasilissa Greek Orthodox Church, CV–
2008–24); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 19–27 (Apr. 25, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Panagia Pantovasilissa Greek Orthodox Church, CV–2008–
24); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2–4 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing KY Data Link, Inc., CV–2007–106).
208 See supra Part II.A.2.b.
209 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 11–20 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–95).
210 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5–10 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–107). Because the first application resulted in a tie vote, the applicant was entitled to and did file a second conditional use
application asking for the same relief. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 20 (Oct. 31, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc. C–2008–95);
(Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5–10 (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–107).
211 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 11–20 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–95).
212 See id.
213 Five Board members attended the hearing. I was one of those members, but I abstained from voting in that case. The applicant proposed to swap land with the University
of Kentucky as part of its proposed operations. Prior to the meeting, the applicant’s attorney
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about the project and its potential harm to the Royal Spring Aquifer. In
response to these Board member’s concerns, two members of the Royal
Spring Wellhead Protection Committee testified before the Board.214 They
explained that the Committee had held two meetings with the applicant
where they had the opportunity to ask very difficult and detailed questions
regarding the protection of the Aquifer.215 As a result of these meetings,
the Committee proposed that two conditions be added to the conditional
use permit to address their concerns.216 The Committee members testified
that they supported the application so long as it was subject to the two
proposed conditions.217 The staff’s recommendation to the Board included
these two conditions, as conditions four and five.218 An employee for
the Kentucky Division of Water, Watershed Management Branch, also
testified.219 He testified that he was responsible for including groundwater
protection in the third proposed condition,220 which requires that the
facility comply with the Mining/Quarrying Ordinance as well as Federal
and State regulations.221 He noted that the Division of Water does not have
a legal right to say whether it supports or opposes the project but urged the
applicant to use caution.222 A number of other witnesses testified for the
applicant. They all stated that they believed that mining operations were
safe and would not adversely affect the Aquifer.223 Two Board members
voted to disapprove the application because the applicant
failed to support the burden of proving that the proposed mining
operation will not become detrimental to the Royal Spring
Aquifer, as the property lies within the Recharge Area. Due to

suggested that he thought I should abstain from voting because I am an employee of the
University of Kentucky. Accordingly, I abstained from voting.
214 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment at 14–15 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–95).
215 Id. at 14.
216 Id.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 11–12. The first condition (recommended by the staff as condition four) required that the applicant (1) “provide final plans for the design and construction of the [entrance] portals to the [] Royal Spring Aquifer Wellhead Committee”; (2) “meet with the Committee to review/discuss the plans”; and (3) provide the Committee sufficient time to report
any concerns with the plans to the Division of Building Inspection prior to construction of the
portals. Id. The second condition (recommended by the staff as condition five) required the
applicant to provide monthly reports to the Committee and the Georgetown Municipal Water
and Sewer Service during construction of the entrance portals. Id.
219 Id. at 18.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 11.
222 Id. at 19.
223 Id. at 11–19.
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its proximity to the Aquifer, the burden is very high to prove
that a major water source will not be adversely impacted.224

Two members of the Board voted against the motion to disapprove.225
Two months after the tie vote, the Board reconsidered the matter.226
The Board again held a lengthy hearing on the matter.227 Again, the
staff recommended approval and no members of the public opposed the
application. In fact, a number of citizens attended the meeting to support
the application.228 This time, four members of the Board voted to approve
the application and only one member opposed.229 None of the members
who had voted in the preceding hearing changed their vote. The final
vote changed because two members who were not present at the earlier
hearing voted to approve the application, and one member who had voted
against the application in the earlier meeting was not present at the second
meeting. I believe that the Board was right in approving the application.230
I believe that the applicant provided sufficient evidence to show that
its mining operations would not compromise the aquifer and otherwise
satisfied the requirements for a conditional use permit.
Unlike at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, we are not in
the dark as to why the Board approved the eighty–nine conditional use
permits. In each and every case in which the Board approved a conditional
use permit, it provided reasons why it was approving the permit. At a
minimum, in each case the Board found that the proposed use would not
adversely affect the subject or surrounding property. The Board’s finding
in each instance was not simply a conclusory statement. Instead, the Board
offered specific facts with respect to the property and proposed use. To
illustrate, in approving a conditional use for the expansion of an existing
church, the Board found that:
Granting the requested conditional use permit should not
adversely affect the subject or surrounding properties, as
224 Id. at 19.
225 Id. at 20.
226 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5–10 (Dec. 12, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–107). Because the first application resulted in a tie vote, the applicant was entitled to and did file a second conditional use
application asking for the same relief. See id.
227 See id.
228 See id. As noted above, the applicant planned to swap some land in the deal, and the
swapped land included land that would be used as part of the “Legacy Trail,” a “9–mile walking/biking trail that w[ould] begin in the East End area of Lexington” and end at the Horse
Park. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 15 (Oct. 31, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Vulcan Lands, Inc., C–2008–95). The citizens appeared at the
meeting to support the Legacy Trail. See id.
229 Id. at 10.
230 As discussed in note 213, I abstained from voting in this matter. See supra note 213.
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the proposed expansion will be immediately adjacent to the
existing church building and will satisfy all applicable setback
requirements. The site is well buffered from nearby residential
areas by a railroad line and by a variety of commercial and
industrial uses on immediately adjacent properties.231

As discussed above, the Kentucky zoning enabling legislation does
not impose any explicit standards on the granting of conditional use
permits.232 It does, however, define a conditional use permit as consisting
of two parts: (1) “[a] statement of the factual determination by the board
of adjustment which justifies the issuance of the permit;” and (2) “[a]
statement of the specific conditions which must be met in order for the
use to be permitted.”233 It appears that the Board satisfied the first part of
the legislative definition of conditional use permit in each case in which it
granted a conditional use permit because it offered specific reasons why the
permit should be issued in each case, and those reasons always included
specific facts explaining why the proposed use would not adversely affect
the subject or surrounding property.
Second, the Board appears to have satisfied the second element of
the statutory definition of a conditional use permit in each case in which
the Board approved a conditional use permit, because the Board imposed
specific conditions on the granting of every permit. The most typical
conditions were that (1) the use comply with the submitted site plan; (2) all
necessary permits be obtained from the Division of Building Inspection; and
(3) a storm water management plan be implemented.234 Where necessary
and appropriate, more tailored conditions were imposed. For example, in a
case in which the Board approved a conditional use permit for a temporary
modular classroom building, the Board required that the modular building
“be removed within three years after action by the Board, or at the time
the second floor of the main school building has been finished and can be
occupied, whichever comes first.”235
Perhaps the most unique and interesting condition the Board imposed
was a requirement that parents be provided information “encouraging
231 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Jack C. Stewart, C–2007–70).
232 See supra Part II.B.1.
233 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(7) (2006).
234 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (July 27,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing conditions 1, 2, and 4 with respect to Majestic Dev. Co.,
LLC, C–2007–56); id. at 8 (discussing conditions 1, 2, and 3 with respect to Headley–Whitney
Museum, Inc., C–2007–64); id. at 5–6 (discussing conditions 1 and 2 with respect to New
Horizons Church, C–2007–61); id. at 7–8 (discussing conditions 1 and 2 with respect to The
Church for All Nations, C–2007–63).
235 Id. at 4–5 (discussing condition 4 with respect to Lexington Universal Acad., CV–
2007–65).
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them to use the YMCA’s parking lot and footpaths to access the fields, and
explaining why on–street parking can lead to safety and other problems.”236
That condition was imposed in a case in which the YMCA sought to expand
its facilities. Neighbors were very concerned about, among other things,
the impact the expansion would have on parking in the neighborhood.
The YMCA agreed to that condition, among others, after meeting with the
neighbors and two neighborhood associations.237 Although the YMCA had
met with neighbors and the neighborhood association, neighbors appeared
to object to the request at the first hearing scheduled to hear the matter.238
In light of the opposition, the Board continued the hearing until the
following month.239 The following month, neighbors again objected, and
the Board approved the request with a number of modifications.240 Those
modifications included conditions that “the multi–purpose fields will not
be used beyond or after 7:00 p.m.” and that “[t]he scheduled activities may
begin no earlier than 10:00 a.m. on Saturday, and 12:00 p.m. on Sunday, and
8:00 a.m., Monday through Friday.”241
Unlike the Kentucky enabling legislation, the LFUC Zoning Ordinance
does impose specific requirements on the granting of conditional use
permits. First, the zoning ordinance describes a conditional use as a use
that does “not have an adverse influence on existing or future development
of the subject property or its surrounding neighborhood.”242 Second,
it requires that the Board “find that the necessary public facilities and
services . . . are, or will soon be, adequate to serve the proposed use.”243
Finally, it requires that the Board “provide for the continuation of existing
or proposed collector streets, and whenever possible, provide for the
continuation of local streets.”244
In every case in which the Board granted a conditional use permit, the
Board offered specific facts in support of a finding that the conditional use
would not have an adverse affect on the subject or surrounding property.

236 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 13 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to YMCA of Cent. Ky., C–2007–67).
237 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 19–20 (Aug. 31,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing YMCA of Cent. Ky., C–2007–67, and stating that council member testified that he worked with the YMCA, neighbors and two neighborhood associations regarding the proposal).
238 See id. at 19–22.
239 See id. at 22.
240 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 17–22 (Sept. 28,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing YMCA of Cent. Ky., C–2007–67).
241 Id. at 22 (adding new conditions 6 and 7).
242 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 7–6(a) (2007).
243 Id. art. 7–6(a)(2).
244 Id. art. 7–6(a)(3).
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Thus, the Board clearly appears to have satisfied the first conditional use
permit requirement under the LFUC Zoning Ordinance.
Second, in all but one case in which the Board approved a request for a
conditional use permit,245 the Board found that all necessary facilities and
services are, or soon will be, adequate to serve the proposed use. Usually,
the Board simply declared that “[a]ll necessary public facilities are available
and adequate for the proposed use,”246 that “[a]ll necessary public and
private facilities and services are available and adequate for the proposed
use,”247 or something along those lines. When necessary, additional facts
were offered to support the finding.248
In none of the cases in which the Board granted a conditional use
permit did the Board expressly address the requirement that the use
provide for the continuation of existing or proposed collector streets. This
is because most cases did not require the creation of new streets. For
example, granting a conditional use permit to allow a temporary modular
245 In approving a conditional use permit to extend the regulations of the Planned
Neighborhood Residential zone up to fifty feet into the adjoining single–family residential
and agricultural–urban zones on the same property for the purpose of providing additional
parking spaces, the Board did not make a finding that all necessary facilities and services
are, or soon will be, adequate to serve the proposed use. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban
Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Dec. 14, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing CMW, Inc.,
C–2007–107). The failure to make a finding with respect to facilities and services could have
been based on a belief that additional parking does not require any facilities or services. More
likely, however, the failure to find that facilities and services were adequate was simply an
oversight. Cf. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Jan. 25, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing DJ Acquisitions, LLC, C–2007–103) (finding that “[a]ll necessary public services and facilities are available and adequate for the proposed use” in a
case in which the Board approved a conditional use permit to construct a parking lot to serve
an adjoining commercial use); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment
8–9 (June 27, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Am. Ave. Baptist Church, C–2008–60)
(making similar finding in appeal for conditional use to expand church parking lot); Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 21–23 (May 30, 2008) (on file with author)
(discussing CMW, Inc./Copper Hill Kingdom Hall, C–2008–50) (making similar finding in a
case in which Board approved a request to amend a previously approved site plan “for the
purpose of revising proposed storm water management basins and associated parking”).
246 E.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 10 (June 27, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing First Fed. Bank, C–2008–62).
247 E.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 8 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Holston Gases, Inc., C–2007–90).
248 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 13 (June
27, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Keeneland Ass’n, Inc., C–2008–64) (finding that
“[t]rash pickup/disposal and sewer treatment (septic system) are privately provided; there is
adequate space for any storm water management treatment that might be required; and public
services such as police and fire protection are available and adequate for the proposed uses”);
Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9 (Nov. 30, 2007) (on file with
author) (discussing Hargus S. Sexton, C–2007–94) (finding that “[s]ewage treatment will be
provided on site, and all necessary public services, such as police and fire protection, are available and adequate for the proposed use”).
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classroom building on a school’s property did not require the creation of
new streets.249 In the two cases in which new access roads were created, the
Board required that the new access roads be subject to review and approval
by the Division of Traffic Engineering.250 Thus, although the Board never
expressly addressed street continuations, in no case does it appear that the
Board violated the requirement that the use provide for the continuation of
existing or proposed collector streets.
I believe that the Board generally satisfied the legal requirements
for granting conditional use permits in almost all of the cases in which it
granted a conditional use permit. I do, however, believe that the Board
erred in granting a conditional use permit in one case.
In that case, the applicant sought a conditional use permit to expand
a museum in the Agricultural–Rural (A–R) zone.251 Museums are not
authorized as conditional uses in the A–R zone.252 In 1984, the applicant was
granted “a conditional use permit in order to erect and occupy an addition to
existing museum facilities in the Agricultural–Rural (A–R) zone.”253 At that
time, “[t]he staff and the Board found that the museum’s educational focus
was sufficient to allow the expansion as a use similar enough to a ‘school for
academic instruction.’”254 Schools for academic instruction are authorized
as conditional uses in the A–R zone.255 The zoning ordinance does and did
define “schools for academic instruction” as “all schools offering primarily
classroom instruction with participation of teachers and students, limited to
elementary, junior and middle high schools, high schools, junior colleges,
249 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (July 27, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Lexington Universal Acad., CV–2007–65).
250 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9 (Nov. 30, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Hargus S. Sexton, C–2007–94);
Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on file with
author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Keeneland Ass’n, Inc., C–2007–69).
251 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 8 (July 27, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney Museum, Inc., C–2007–64).
252 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(d) (2007)
(listing all conditional uses permitted for structures located in an A–R zone, which does not
include museums). Interestingly, prior to filing the conditional use application, the applicant
had applied for a text amendment to the zoning ordinance to allow museums as conditional
uses in the A–R zone. There was opposition to this request. Case Report, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (July 16, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Headley–
Whitney Museum, Inc., C–2007–64). When the applicant discovered that the museum had
been granted a conditional use permit in 1984, it decided to postpone the request for the
text amendment and pursue the conditional use permit. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban
Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9 (July 27, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney
Museum, Inc., C–2007–64).
253 Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (July 16, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney Museum, Inc., C–2007–64).
254 Id.
255 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(d)(20)
(2007).
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colleges, theological seminaries, bible colleges, and universities; but not
including business colleges, technical or trade schools.”256 The museum
may have had an educational mission, but it clearly did not offer “primarily
classroom instruction.” Thus, I do not believe that it should have qualified
as a school for academic instruction, and the conditional use permit to
expand operations should not have been granted.257
(b) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
The staff recommended approval in all eighty–nine cases of the
conditional use cases in which the Board voted to approve,258 and the staff
recommended disapproval in four of the six cases that the Board voted
to disapprove. In the three cases in which the Board reached a tie vote,
the staff recommended approval. Thus, the Board followed the staff’s
recommendation in ninety–three of the ninety–eight cases that were
neither withdrawn nor indefinitely postponed, or ninety–five per cent
of the cases. That is not to suggest that the Board always accepted the
staff’s recommendation without change. Occasionally, at the hearing, the
Board would make some modifications to the staff’s recommendation. For
example, in one case, the Board added two conditions to a conditional use
permit for family child care for up to twelve children in a Single Family
Residential Zone, in response to neighbors’ objections to the request.259

256 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2007). The
zoning ordinance has defined “schools for academic instruction” in this manner since before
1983. See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 24.89, 6–7 (Proposed Text, Feb. 8, 1983) (on file with author) (containing identical definition of schools for
academic instruction).
257 The Board voted 4–2 to approve the conditional use permit. I was one of the two
Board members to vote against the request. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty.
Bd. of Adjustment 13–14 (July 27, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney
Museum, Inc., C–2007–64). At the meeting, a staff member said it was not clear whether a
new museum with no prior history would be granted a conditional use permit as a “school for
academic instruction.” Id. at 9–10.
258 In one case, the staff changed its initial recommendation from disapproval to approval. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 14–23 (Feb. 29, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
259 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9–10 (Aug. 22, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Tara Richard, C–2008–75). The Board added the conditions
that (1) “this conditional use permit shall be null and void if the appellant no longer resides at
this location,” and (2) “[t]he bottom portion of the fence shall be covered next to 2820 Winter
Garden Drive.” Id. at 10.
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On the whole, however, the Board was quite deferential to the staff and its
recommendations.
(c) Summary
Unlike at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Board now
clearly explains why it is granting or denying a request for a conditional use
permit.260 I believe that the Board clearly identified appropriate reasons in
each of the cases in which it denied the relief. In addition, in each of the
cases in which the Board granted the conditional use permit, the Board
offered specific facts explaining why the proposed use would not have
an adverse affect on the subject or surrounding property and imposed
appropriate specific conditions.261 Thus, I believe that, on the whole,
the Board’s decisions are supportable. I do, however, disagree with the
substance of two of the Board’s decisions.
3. Decisions Regarding Conditional Use Applications for Home Occupations.—At
the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the local zoning ordinance
granted the Board the power to authorize any “customary incidental home
occupations when conducted within a dwelling and not in any accessory
building.”262 The zoning ordinance did not define home occupations in
any way. Instead, the Board was charged with interpreting which home
occupations were customarily incidental to the use of the premises as a
residence.263 During the period of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the
Board considered twenty–eight requests for home occupations.264 The
proposed home occupations included fourteen beauty shops, three repair
shops, two real estate offices, an accountant’s office, an antique shop, and a
printing shop.265 The Board granted twenty–four of the requests, and denied
four.266 Dukeminier and Stapleton concluded “that the Board classified as

260 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, 7–8 (Aug. 31,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing Jack C. Stewart, C–2007–70).
261 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 8–15 (July 27,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney Museum, Inc., C–2007–64).
262 Study, supra note 2, at 311 (quoting Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning
Ordinance § 8.24 (1962)).
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 311–12. The three remaining requests were for “a shop for fabricating rubber
stamps, a business telephone for a washing machine repairman who did none of his work at
home, and a permit for ‘breeding and merchandising tropical fish.’” Id. at 312.
266 Id. at 311.
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a home occupation almost any occupation that can be performed in, and
might occasionally be found in, a home.”267
The Lexington–Fayette Urban County Zoning Ordinance now defines
a “home occupation” as “[a] gainful occupation or profession carried on
in a residence, such as the studio of an artist or sculptor; dressmaking and
tailoring; upholstery; handicrafts; tutoring; individual musical instruction
(provided no instrument is amplified); and professional services . . . .”268 It
specifically excludes from the definition of home occupation: “barber shops,
beauty parlors, offices for escort services, massage parlors, automobile and
small engine repair, medical or dental office, photo studios, palm reading or
fortune telling, home cooking and catering; and uses, other than upholstery,
which are first permitted in the B–4, I–1 or I–2 zone.”269 The ordinance
requires that home occupations satisfy eight separate conditions, including
requirements that (1) the use occupy “no more than twenty–five percent
(25%) or three hundred (300) square feet of the dwelling, whichever is
less;” (2) the use be “conducted entirely within the dwelling and not in
any accessory building;” (3) the use be “carried on only by residents of the
dwelling;” and (4) there be no outside signage on the premises.270
The ordinance lists home occupations as accessory uses in the agricultural
zones271 and as conditional uses in the residential and apartment zones.272
267 Id. at 314.
268 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2007).
269 Id.
270 Id. Specifically, the ordinance requires that the home occupation be performed under the following conditions:
(1)

The use is clearly incidental and secondary to use for dwelling purposes and
occupies no more than twenty–five percent (25%) or three hundred (300)
square feet of the dwelling, whichever is less;

(2)

The use is conducted entirely within a dwelling and not in any accessory
building;

(3)

The use is carried on only by residents of the dwelling;

(4)

No commodities are sold or stored, except as are produced by the residents
on the premises;

(5)

The use does not require external alteration of the dwelling;

(6)

The use does not adversely affect the uses permitted in the immediate
neighborhood by excessive traffic generation or noise;

(7)

No outside signage shall be permitted on the premises;

(8)

No additional blacktop, concrete or gravel parking shall be permitted beyond that normally provided in comparable neighborhood homes.

Id.
271 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(c)(3), –2(c)(3),
–3(c)(3) (2007).
272 Id. art. 8–5(d)(3), 8–6(d)(1), 8–7(d)(1), 8–8(d)(1), 8–9(d)(1), 8–10(d)(1), 8–11(d)(1),
8–12(d)(1), 8–13(d)(1), 8–14(d)(1); id. art. 22A–3(d) (1983); id. art. 23A–5(d)(1), 23A–6(d)(1),
23A–7(d), 23A–8(d), 23A–9(d)(1).
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The Board decided five separate appeals for conditional use permits for
home occupations between July 2007 and December 2008. Requests were
made for five different types of home occupations: (1) dressmaking,273 (2)
embroidery,274 (3) wedding florist,275 (4) gunsmith276 and (5) hat making.277
The staff recommended approval in all five cases and the Board followed
the staff’s recommendation and approved all five requests.278
In each case, the Board conditioned the approval upon, among other
things, compliance with the eight conditions set forth in the zoning
ordinance.279 The Board imposed two additional conditions on almost
each approval: (1) prohibiting customers from coming to the home for any
reason,280 and (2) limiting its approval to the specific appellant, so that each
permit was to be null and void if the appellant ceased to own or occupy the
residence.281
I believe that the Board followed the law in all but one case, the
dressmaking case. In that case, the property owner and co–owner of
273 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
274 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Karen Rardin, C–2008–10).
275 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (Apr. 25, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Jeanie Gorrell, C–2008–28).
276 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (June 27, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Ronald F. Adams, C–2008–58).
277 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (Sept. 26, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Blythe Savage, C–2008–83).
278 See supra note 245, at 5–6; supra note 246, at 5–6; supra note 247, at 7–8; supra note
248, at 7–8; supra note 249, at 7–8.
279 See supra note 241; Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7
(Sept. 26, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing condition 1 with respect to Blythe Savage,
C–2008–83); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (June 27, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Ronald F. Adams, C–2008–58);
Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with
author) (discussing condition 2 with respect to Jeanie Gorrell, C–2008–28); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing
condition 1 with respect to Karen Rardin, C–2008–10); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban
Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5–6 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing condition 1 with
respect to Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
280 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Sept. 26, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing condition 3 with respect to Blythe Savage, C–2008–83); Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author)
(discussing condition 4 with respect to Jeanie Gorrell, C–2008–28); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing condition 3 with respect to Karen Rardin, C–2008–10); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty.
Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing condition 3 with respect
to Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
281 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Sept. 26, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Blythe Savage, C–2008–83); Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (June 27, 2008) (on file with author)
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the business stated that a part–owner of the business lived a few blocks
away and would work, but not reside, at the property.282 One of the eight
conditions the zoning ordinance imposes on home occupations requires
that “[t]he use [be] carried on only by residents of the dwelling.”283 Legal
counsel advised the Board that this was “an appropriate issue for the
Board to interpret.”284 The staff asserted that traffic disruptions are the
key concern with home occupations and that might explain the residency
requirement.285 The staff and legal counsel suggested that the condition
be interpreted as a clear prohibition against hiring employees and that the
following condition be added to the approval: “Only the co–owners of the
business shall participate in the business, and no outside employees shall
participate.”286 The Board voted to approve the conditional use permit with
this additional condition.287
I am sympathetic to the Board’s decision to approve the conditional
use permit. Only one person other than a resident of the property would
work on the property and thus, it is unlikely that the proposed home
occupation would cause a great deal of additional traffic and/or disrupt the
neighborhood. Nevertheless, I do not believe the Board had the power to
grant the conditional use permit.288I do not believe that the language, “[t]he
use is carried on only by residents of the dwelling”289 is either ambiguous
or means that employees may not be hired. It means what it says: the use
may only be carried on by “residents” of the property. A co–owner who
does not reside at the property is no more a “resident” of the property
than an employee who does not reside at the property. Moreover, a single,
non–resident co–owner causes no more additional traffic than does a single,
non–resident employee. In fact, a single employee who lives next door

(discussing condition 12 with respect to Ronald F. Adams, C–2008–58); Minutes, Lexington–
Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7–8 (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing
condition 7 with respect to Jeanie Gorrell, C–2008–28); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban
Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Karen Rardin, C–2008–10); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing condition 4 with respect to Fantasy
Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
282 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
283 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2007) (providing condition 3 within the definition of “Home Occupation”).
284 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 I was the sole member of the Board present to vote against the appeal. See id.
289 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2007) (providing condition three within the definition of ‘Home Occupation’).
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and walks to the house may create less traffic than a single co–owner who
lives several blocks away and drives to the house. Although the conditions
may be intended to protect the neighborhood from traffic disruptions, the
zoning ordinance does not authorize the Board to waive the conditions if
the proposed use will not disrupt the neighborhood. Thus, I believe that
the Board erred in granting this conditional use permit.
In sum, the Board decided five appeals for conditional use permits
between July 2007 and December 2008. The staff recommended approval
in all five cases and the Board followed the staff’s recommendation in all
five cases. I believe that the Board acted within the bounds of the law
in all but one case. In that case, I believe that the Board impermissibly
interpreted an unambiguous condition so as to waive the condition.
4. Decisions in Conditional Use Permit Reviews.—Occasionally, the Board
may review a conditional use permit that it has already approved. These
reviews arise in two different situations. First, the Board may include as a
condition to approving the permit that the permit be reviewed after a set
period of time.290 Second, if the building inspector determines that one or
more conditions imposed by the permit have been violated, the building
inspector may request a hearing before the Board to consider whether the
Board should revoke the permit.291
Dukeminier and Stapleton did not mention any conditional use permit
reviews in their study of the Board’s decisions between January 1960 and
May 1961. In the current study of the Board’s decisions between July 2007
and December 2008, hearings were scheduled to review five different
conditional use permits.
Hearings for four of the permits were scheduled as conditions to the
granting of the permits.292 Three of the permits were approved following
290 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (July 25,
2008) (on file with author) (discussing Peter Taylor, C–2006–4) (“At its January 2006 public
hearing, the Board approved a conditional use permit for a riding arena, subject to nine conditions, one of which was a review of the conditional use one year from the date the Certificate
of Occupancy was issued . . . .”).
291 See, e.g., Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Aug. 31,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing James G. Wilhite, C–2000–28) (“The Division of
Building Inspection has requested a revocation hearing for failure to comply with the
conditions imposed by the Board.”).
292 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Hardwood Holdings, C–2005–138, involving a conditional use
permit for recreational facility to include sports bar/café in a light industrial zone); Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (July 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Peter Taylor, C–2006–4, involving a conditional use permit for riding arena in an agricultural–rural zone); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (Jan. 25,
2008) (on file with author) (discussing Carolyn Wagoner, C–2005–139, involving a conditional
use permit to allow vehicle storage in a light industrial zone); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Robert
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the scheduled hearings.293 The hearing scheduled for the fourth permit
was postponed for one month and removed from the Board’s agenda when
the appellant sent a letter to the Board stating that she would no longer
pursue the conditional use permit.294
The building inspector requested a revocation hearing for the fifth
permit.295 The revocation hearing was first requested in August 2007.296
In August, September, and October, the permitee requested, and the
Board granted, without discussion, one–month postponements.297 When
the permitee requested his fourth postponement in November, a Board
member expressed concern about the repeated requests for postponement
and suggested that this might the final postponement.298 The Chair of the
Board asked the building inspector to comment on the request for yet
another postponement.299 The building inspector said that “he had no
objection to another month’s postponement; and that he appreciated the
Board’s indulgence.”300 He explained that this was a complicated situation
involving the approved site as well as an adjacent lot and that the permitee

H. Vanlandingham, C–2005–120, involving a conditional use permit for a plant nursery in an
agricultural–urban zone).
One of the four permits, the permit for Robert H. Vanlandingham, was scheduled for a
six–month and a twelve–month review. It was approved both times. See Minutes, Lexington–
Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4–5 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Robert H. Vanlandingham, C–2006–120); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd.
of Adjustment 4 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Robert H. Vanlandingham,
C–2006–120).
293 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (Oct. 31, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Hardwood Holdings, C–2005–138); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Robert
H. Vanlandingham, C–2006–120) (declaring approval after twelve–month review); Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 5 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author)
(discussing Robert H. Vanlandingham, C–2006–120) (declaring approval after six–month review); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (July 25, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Peter Taylor, C–2006–4).
294 Because the case was withdrawn before the agenda was written, it does not appear
on the agenda. So, the fact that it is not on the agenda for the next meeting means that it was
withdrawn. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb. 29, 2008)
(on file with author).
295 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing James G. Wilhite, C–2000–28).
296 See id.
297 See id.; Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2–3 (Sept. 28,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing James G. Wilhite, C–2000–28); Minutes, Lexington–
Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 1–2 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing
James G. Wilhite, C–2000–28).
298 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Nov. 30, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing James G. Wilhite, C–2000–28).
299 Id.
300 Id.
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was working to resolve the problems.301 The Board granted a two–month
postponement in November with the understanding that this would be
the last postponement.302 Apparently the permitee resolved the problems
and the building inspector withdrew the request for a revocation hearing,
because the matter never again appeared on the Board’s agenda.
In each of the five conditional use permit review cases, the Board
deferred to the building inspector’s recommendation. In a couple of cases,
however, members of the Board questioned the building inspector’s actions
and recommendations. First, in the case that the Board postponed and the
appellant later withdrew the request for a conditional use permit, the Chair
of the Board of Adjustment questioned why the building inspector had
granted a certificate of occupation to the landowner.303 In that case, the
landowner had requested a conditional use permit to allow a vehicle storage
yard in a light industrial zone.304 The Board had granted a conditional use
permit subject to eleven conditions, including conditions that (1) the
property “be paved and resurfaced, as necessary, prior to obtaining an
occupancy permit”; and (2) the permit be reviewed six months after the
issuance of a certificate of occupancy.305 The landowner did not appear
at the scheduled hearing.306 The building inspector explained that the
landowner had never fully exercised the permit because satisfying the
conditions, especially the requirement that the lot be paved, proved to be
more expensive than the landowner had anticipated.307
Thus, the building inspector thought that the landowner had decided
never to operate the business, but was awaiting confirmation of that fact from
the owner in writing.308 The Chair of the Board questioned why a certificate
of occupancy had been issued when all of the required conditions had not
been satisfied. The building inspector explained that the certificate had
been issued “in good faith after some discussions regarding the appellant’s
plans and contracts out for bids; but for whatever reason(s), they didn’t
follow through.”309
In a case that required both a six–month and twelve–month review
of a conditional use permit, a Board member questioned the landowner’s
actions and the building inspector’s recommendation.310 In that case, the
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Carolyn Wagoner, C–2005–139).
304 Id. at 5.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 6.
308 See id.
309 Id.
310 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2–3 (Mar. 28, 2008)
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Board granted a conditional use permit for a plant nursery in an agricultural–
urban zone.311 At the twelve–month review, a Board member questioned
whether the landowner had been manufacturing mulch at the rear of the
property and noted that manufacturing mulch was not something that had
been anticipated by the Board to be part of the nursery.312 The landowner
explained “that he had been grinding branches and trunks from storm–
damaged trees on his property and was using the wood chips to stabilize
his nursery stock.”313 He contended that “[h]e was not manufacturing
mulch.”314 The building inspector agreed that the landowner was not
manufacturing mulch, and that manufacturing mulch was a totally different
and much more complex process.315 The building inspector noted that no
complaints had been received about the operation of the property, and
“everything seemed to be in order.”316 The building inspector asserted that
the wood grinding was not a violation of his conditional use permit and that
the landowner had been “very cooperative in the past to take care of any
problems that might arise as a result of the business.”317 The Board, with
the exception of the member who questioned the wood grinding operation,
voted to approve the one–year review.318
It appears that the Board acted appropriately and within the limits of
the law in approving two of the three conditional use permit reviews.319
Technically, the Board should not have approved the conditional use permit
reviews in the nursery case, because the landowner did not satisfy one of
the eight conditions imposed in that case. Specifically, the landowner did
not satisfy condition five, which provided that
[t]he existing southerly access to be used for the plant nursery
shall be improved in accordance with a permit issued by the
(on file with author) (discussing Robert H. Vanlandingham, C–2006–120). Apparently the two
scheduled reviews were required because the landowner had a history of noncompliance. See
id. at 4 (noting that the president of the neighborhood association states that she was present
at twelve–month review, because appellant had a history of noncompliance).
311 See id. at 4.
312 Id. at 3.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 4.
318 Id.
319 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Oct. 31, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Hardwood Holdings, C–2005–138) (noting that the building
inspection reports stated that no complaints have been received since issuance of the Certificate of Occupancy and that licenses were intact and in good standing); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6 (July 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing
Peter Taylor, C–2006–4) (noting that the building inspector reported that the riding arena is a
great facility and that the landowner has been very cooperative with the building inspection).
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Kentucky Transportation Cabinet. This permit shall be obtained,
and all required improvements completed, prior to establishing
the plant nursery. At a minimum, this access shall be paved from
Liberty Road for a distance of 50’ back from the right–of–way.320

As a practical matter, however, I believe that the Board acted reasonably
despite the fact that this condition was not satisfied. At the six month
review, the attorney distributed a letter from the Lexington–Fayette
Urban County Government stating that “the city [was] installing a sewer
in front of [the landowner]’s property, and within [50’] of Liberty Road.”321
The attorney stated that the landowner had not yet paved the driveway
as required by condition five, because the landowner was waiting for the
sewer improvements to be completed before paving.322 When approving
the six month review, the Board added the following language to condition
five: “Pavement shall be completed within six months, prior to the one–
year review.”323
At the twelve–month review, the attorney reported that “[t]he sewers
were now in, and final grading work was being done” but that the drive had
not yet been paved.324 The attorney said that the landowner “had obtained
two estimates for paving, but the work [had] not [been] done due to the
weather.”325 The attorney asked that the building inspector verify that
the work had been completed and bring it back to the Board for review
if not done properly.326 Without further discussion of the paving issue, the
Board voted to approve the one–year review “based on the finding that [the
landowner] appeared to be in compliance with the conditions that were
imposed and the fact that there [had] been no disturbance to surrounding
property owners.”327
Although technically the landowner did not satisfy condition five at
the twelve–month review, it does not seem unreasonable for the Board to
have approved the permit and rely on the building inspector to bring any
problems with the paving to the Board’s attention at a later date. It would
have been unnecessarily harsh for the Board to revoke the permit because
the drive had not yet been paved when paving appeared imminent. And
it would have been inefficient to have scheduled another hearing simply
320 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 4 (Sept. 28, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing condition five with respect to Robert Vanlandingham, C–2006–
120).
321 Id. at 4–5.
322 See id. at 5.
323 Id.
324 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Robert H. Vanlandingham, C–2006–120).
325 Id.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 3–4.
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so that the building inspector could report that the drive had been paved
as required. It was more efficient to approve the conditional use permit at
the hearing and leave it to the building inspector to schedule a revocation
hearing if the drive turned out not to be properly paved.
In sum, the Board deferred to the building inspector’s recommendation
in the three cases in which it reviewed conditional use permits that had
already been granted. The Board acted appropriately and within the
bounds of the law in two of the three cases. Technically, it should not
have approved the third case, but its decision to approve the case was not
unreasonable under the circumstances. It is worth noting that although
the Board followed the building inspector’s recommendation in all of the
conditional use permit review cases, members of the Board did question
the building inspector’s actions and recommendations in a couple of the
cases.
C. Appeals from the Zoning Administrator
Since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, Kentucky law has authorized
the Board to hear appeals from the building inspector’s interpretation of
the zoning ordinance.328 Dukeminier and Stapleton divided these cases
into three separate categories: (1) home occupations, (2) nonconforming
uses and (3) miscellaneous.329
Dukeminier and Stapleton included home occupations in this section
of their paper, because, at the time of their study, the Lexington Zoning
Ordinance had a separate section authorizing incidental home occupations.330
Today, home occupations are listed as accessory or conditional uses in the
LFUC Zoning Ordinance.331 Thus, the home occupation cases are included

328 At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, section 100.450 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provided that “appeals to said board [of adjustment] may be taken by any property owner or tenant, or any city officer, department, board or bureau, affected by any ruling
of any administrative officer in the enforcement of KRS 100.320 to 100.490 or any ordinance,
regulations or rules enacted pursuant thereto.” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 100.450 (1953) (repealed 1966).
Section 100.257 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes now provides:
The board of adjustment shall have the power to hear and decide cases where it
is alleged by an applicant that there is error in any order, requirement, decision,
grant, or refusal made by an administrative official in the enforcement of the zoning regulation. Such appeal shall be taken within thirty (30) days.

Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.257 (West 2006).
329 Study, supra note 2, at 310–11.
330 See id. at 311 (quoting Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance
art. 8–24).
331 See, e.g., Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(c)(3),
8–2(c)(3), 8–3(c)(3), 8–5(d)(3) (2007).
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in the discussion of conditional uses in the preceding section rather than in
this section.332
The sixteen separate appeals from building inspection’s interpretation
of the zoning ordinance that the Board considered between July 2007
and January 2009 are most logically separated into the following three
categories: (1) nonconforming uses and structures, (2) signs, and (3)
miscellaneous.333 This section will begin by discussing the nonconforming
use cases. It will then turn to the sign cases. Finally, it will address the
remaining, miscellaneous cases.
1. Nonconforming Uses and Structures.—The Kentucky Revised Statutes
define a “[n]onconforming use or structure” as “an activity or a building,
sign, structure, or a portion thereof which lawfully existed before the
adoption or amendment of the zoning regulation, but which does not

332 See supra Part II.B.3.
333 Seven of the cases were postponed or continued at least one time. In only two of
these seven cases, did the applicant receive the relief it requested. In one case, Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6, the staff initially recommended that the Board disapprove.
Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with
author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC., A–2008–6). The applicant postponed
the case for a month, and convinced the staff to change its interpretation of the law and recommend approval. Id.; see Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 14–15
(Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–
6). When the case was heard the following month, the Board voted 4–2 to approve the application. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 23 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC., A–2008–6). In the second case,
Emergency Disaster Services, the applicant postponed the case for two consecutive months.
Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 1 (Nov. 21, 2008) (on file with
author) (discussing Emergency Disaster Servs., A–2008–111); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Dec. 12, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Emergency
Disaster Servs., A–2008–101). Then, in January 2009, the applicant withdrew the request because building inspection no longer objected to the applicant’s use of the property. Minutes,
Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Jan. 30, 2009) (on file with author) (discussing Emergency Disaster Servs., A–2008–101). The remaining five cases were indefinitely
postponed, withdrawn, or ultimately disapproved by the Board. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 18 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Triumph
Signs, A–2008–18); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 23 (Jan. 25,
2008) (on file with author) (discussing Clayton Signs, Inc., A–2007–73); Minutes, Lexington–
Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing
Castleton Lyons, Inc., AV–2007–84)); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 23 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Clayton Signs, Inc., A–2007–73);
see Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment, Minutes for the Board of
Adjustment Meeting 16 (July 27, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Darnell Watkins,
A–2007–57); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (July 27, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing The Lamar Cos., A–2007–59); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 18 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Triumph
Signs, A–2008–18); see Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 16 (July
27, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Darnell Watkins, A–2007–57).
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conform to all of the regulations contained in the zoning regulation which
pertain to the zone in which it is located[.]”334
(a) Law Governing Nonconforming Uses and Structures
In some ways, the Kentucky law governing nonconforming uses and
structures has remained unchanged since the Dukeminier–Stapleton
study. Specifically, since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, Kentucky law
has permitted nonconforming uses and structures to continue335 and has
permitted nonconforming uses or structures to be changed to another
nonconforming use, so long as the new nonconforming use is in the same
or more restrictive classification.336
On the other hand, the Kentucky enabling legislation and Lexington
zoning ordinances with respect to nonconforming uses have changed in
several significant ways since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. First, at
the time of Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Lexington zoning ordinance
required that “‘any nonconforming use of land not involving any structure’
and ‘any nonconforming sign, billboard and other similar structure valued
at $750.00 or less’ within the city must cease or be removed within two
years after the enactment of the ordinance.”337 Dukeminier and Stapleton
pronounced these two provisions “undoubtedly void” as contrary to the
enabling legislation.338 The LFUC Zoning Ordinance no longer requires
334 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(13) (West 2006). Although the Kentucky enabling legislation at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study did not have a separate provision defining nonconforming uses and structures, the current statutory definition is consistent with the
use of this term at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. Compare id., with Study, supra
note 2, at 314–15, and Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.355 (1953) (repealed 1966).
335 Section 100.253 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes currently provides that “[t]he lawful use of a building or premises, existing at the time of the adoption of any zoning regulations affecting it, may be continued, although such use does not conform to the provisions of
such regulations, except as otherwise provided herein.” Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.253(1) (West
2006). At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, section 100.355 provided:
(1)

The lawful use of land for trade, industry or residence, in cities of the second class and in counties containing such a city, existing at the time of the
adoption of any zoning regulation or restriction, or at the time of the adjustment or revision thereof, or amendment thereto, although such use does
not conform to the provisions of such new regulations or restrictions, may
be continued.

(2)

The use of a building or structure existing at the time of the adoption of any
zoning regulation or restriction, or at the time of any adjustment or revision
thereof or amendment thereto, although such use does not conform to the
provisions of such new regulations or restrictions, may be continued . . . .

§ 100.355.
336 At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, section 100.355(2) provided that “a
nonconforming use of the building or structure may be changed to another nonconforming
use of the same or more restricted classification.” Id. § 100.355(2).
337 Study, supra note 2, at 315 (quoting § 100.355).
338 Id.
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such nonconforming uses or structures to cease. Instead, the LFUC Zoning
Ordinance now permits all nonconforming uses and structures to continue
so long as they otherwise remain lawful.339
Second, at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Lexington
zoning ordinance prohibited the reconstruction of nonconforming
buildings when more than sixty–five percent of the fair market value of
the building had been destroyed or damaged by fire, flood, or act of God,340
and prohibited the extension of a building containing a nonconforming
use.341 Dukeminier and Stapleton contended that these two prohibitions
were inconsistent with a Kentucky Court of Appeals decision in which the
court held that a “land owner could demolish [an] existing structure and
construct a new, larger building for carrying on his business.”342 The LFUC
Zoning Ordinance no longer prohibits the reconstruction of buildings that
have been destroyed or damaged. It does, however, limit the reconstructed
building to the size of the building before the destruction or damage.343
Although the latter part of this zoning provision may be inconsistent
with the case cited by Dukeminier and Stapleton, the current zoning
enabling legislation expressly prohibits “the enlargement or extension of a
nonconforming use beyond the scope and area of its operation at the time
the regulation which makes its use nonconforming was adopted . . . .”344
Thus, this provision in the current zoning ordinance clearly appears valid.
Third, at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Lexington
zoning ordinance authorized the “use of a nonconforming building or
structure to ‘be changed to a use permitted in the most restricted district in
which such nonconforming use is permitted.’”345 The Lexington–Fayette
Urban County Zoning Ordinance now provides that “[a]ny non–conforming
use may be changed to another non–conforming use . . . provided the
proposed use is in the same or a more restrictive classification than the
previous use.”346 This provision governing changes in use under the LFUC
Zoning Ordinance will be discussed in more detail below.
Fourth, the enabling legislation now has an interesting exception to the
general rule that the board of adjustment may not “permit a change from

339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346

Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–3 to –4 (2007).
Study, supra note 2, at 315 (citing Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 5.223 (1962)).
Id. at 316 (citing Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 5.225 (1962)).
Id.
Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–3(f), –4(b) (2007).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.253(2) (West 2006).
Study, supra note 2, at 315 (quoting Lexington, Ky., Zoning Ordinance § 5.221).
Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–3(e) (2007).
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one (1) nonconforming use to another unless the new nonconforming use
is in the same or a more restrictive classification . . . .”347
Specifically, section 100.253(2) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
provides that:
[T]he board of adjustment may grant approval, effective
to maintain nonconforming–use status, for enlargements
or extensions, made or to be made, of the facilities of a
nonconforming use, where the use consists of the presenting of
a major public attraction or attractions, such as a sports event
or events, which has been presented at the same site over such
period of years and has such attributes and public acceptance
as to have attained international prestige and to have achieved
the status of a public tradition, contributing substantially to
the economy of the community and state, of which prestige
and status the site is an essential element, and where the
enlargement or extension was or is designed to maintain the
prestige and status by meeting the increasing demands of
participants and patrons.348

This provision was added in 1978349 to permit the expansion of Churchill
Downs, a nonconforming racetrack located in a residential zone.350 Although
the Kentucky Constitution prohibits “special legislation” “where a general
law can be made applicable,”351 the exception does not appear to run afoul
of that Constitutional prohibition because the exception expressly applies
not just to Churchill Downs, but to any use that is “a major public attraction,
. . . which has been presented at the same site over such period of years and
has such attributes and public acceptance as to have attained international
prestige and to have achieved the status of a public tradition.”352
Finally, the enabling legislation now permits an illegal use to become a
legal nonconforming use if (1) the use has been in continuous existence for
ten years and (2) the use “has not been the subject of any adverse order or
other adverse action by [building inspection] during said period.”353 This
347 § 100.253(2).
348 Id. § 100.253(2).
349 Act of March 30, 1978, ch. 327, sec. 3(2), § 100.253, 1978 Ky. Acts 931, 932.
350 Mike Brown, Senate Approves Bill on Churchill Downs Zoning, Courier–J. (Louisville),
Mar. 9, 1978, at B9.
351 Ky. Const. § 59, cl. 29.
352 § 100.253(2). But c.f., Schoo v. Rose, 270 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954) (holding that the
statute in issue was too specific to satisfy the Kentucky Constitution). The Kentucky Court
of Appeals declared in this seminal case that to satisfy Section 59, “(1) [the legislation] must
apply equally to all in a class, and (2) there must be distinctive and natural reasons inducing
and supporting the classification.” Schoo, 270 S.W.2d at 941.
353 § 100.253(3). In 1986, the Kentucky legislature amended Chapter 100 to permit an illegal use to become a nonconforming use. Act of March 25, 1986, ch. 141, sec. 28(3), § 100.253,
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provision, however, does not apply in all jurisdictions in Kentucky, including
Lexington–Fayette County, because it has an urban county government.354
At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Kentucky enabling
legislation did not expressly authorize long–standing illegal uses in any
jurisdictions to be converted into nonconforming uses.
(b) Board’s Nonconforming Use and Structure Decisions
The Board considered four separate nonconforming use cases in the
Dukeminier–Stapleton study.355 Dukeminier and Stapleton found that in
all four cases the Board followed the applicable law as it should have.356
Five different nonconforming use cases appeared on the Board’s agenda
between July 2007 and December 2008. In the first case, the appellant
sought to expand a nonconforming structure.357 The staff recommended
disapproval because the LFUC zoning ordinance prohibits the expansion
of nonconforming uses.358The appellant did not appear at the hearing so
the Board voted to postpone the case.359 The appellant later withdrew his
application.
In the second case,360 the appellant sought to change from one
nonconforming use to another. For many years, the property, located in
a two family residential/historic district overlay zone, had been used as a
wholesale tobacco and candy facility distribution facility. In 2006, the Board
approved a change in nonconforming use to permit the building to be
converted to three residential units with a real estate office and a showroom.
The appellant then decided to eliminate the retail/office space and filed an
appeal asking for permission to convert the property into five loft–style
1986 Ky. Acts 343, 354.
354 See § 100.253(4) (excluding application of Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.253(2) “to counties containing a city of the first class, a city of the second class, a consolidated local government, or an urban–county government.”).
355 Study, supra note 2, at 316–17.
356 In two of the cases, Dukeminier and Stapleton contended that the zoning regulations’ limitations on alterations and enlargements were inconsistent with the Kentucky Court
of Appeals’ decision in Butler v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment & Appeals,
224 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1949). See Study, supra note 2, at 316. Nevertheless, Dukeminier and Stapleton approved the Board’s decision to follow the zoning ordinance as written because “[t]he
Board has no power to consider whether the ordinance is valid.” Id. at 317. In the other two
cases, Dukeminier and Stapleton believed that the Board followed the proper legal principle
and substantial evidence, respectively, to arrive at the correct decision. Id.
357 Agenda, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (July 27, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Darnell Watkins, A–2007–57).
358 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County., Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–3, –4 (2007).
359 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (July 27, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Darnell Watkins, A–2007–57).
360 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing WML Props., LLC and Kerry T. Cauthen, AV–2007–85).
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dwelling units, with no office or showroom. The staff recommended that
the appeal be approved because “the additional residential units that are
proposed are first permitted in a more restrictive zoning classification (a
residential zone) than an office/retail use (first permitted in a P–1 and
B–1 zone)”361 and thus satisfies the principal requirement for a change in
nonconforming use under the LFUC zoning ordinance that “the proposed
use [be] in the same or a more restrictive classification than the previous
use.”362 After a brief discussion, the Board voted unanimously to approve
the change in nonconforming use. This decision appears to be consistent
with the enabling legislation and zoning ordinance.
The third case was undoubtedly the most legally interesting and
technically difficult case the Board heard between July 2007 and December
2008. In that case,363 the appellant owned two lots totaling just under eleven
acres. One lot, about ten acres in size, had been zoned agricultural rural
since 1969. The other lot, about one acre, was in a single family residential
zone. A 30,000 square foot building that had been used since the 1930s as
a public school was located in the agricultural rural zone. A parking lot was
located partially in the agricultural rural zone and partially in the single
family residential zone. The appellants sought permission to change the
use to antique sales with an accessory restaurant.
The case first appeared on the Board’s agenda in January 2008. The
staff recommended that the Board disapprove the request. At the hearing,
the appellant requested a one–month postponement, which was granted.
The appellant’s attorney met with the staff to discuss the case before the
February hearing, and the staff changed its recommendation to approval.
After a lengthy hearing, the Board voted 4–2 to approve the request.
The first question the case raised was whether the prior use as a school
was a nonconforming use. The appellant argued that the school was
a nonconforming use because it did not meet the lot and structure size
requirements contained in the zoning ordinance. The zoning ordinance
imposed a 10,000 square foot limit on all structures used for certain
conditional uses, including schools for academic instruction, established

361 See Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Sept. 28,
2007) (on file with author) (discussing WML Props., LLC and Kerry T. Cauthen, AV–2007–85).
362 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance. art. 4–3(e) (2007). The
appellant proposed 121 square–foot window projections in two of the lofts. Ordinarily, such
projections would be impermissible because they would cause an increase in the size of the
nonconforming building. The appellant, however, planned to demolish a nonconforming garage and thus decrease the overall size of the nonconformity and thus the application did not
violate the requirement that building not be enlarged. See Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Sept. 28, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing WML
Props., LLC and Kerry T. Cauthen, AV–2007–85).
363 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
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in the agricultural rural zone after January 26, 1995.364 Because the school
building was 30,000 square feet, it clearly exceeded the maximum size
currently permitted for schools for academic instruction in the agricultural
rural zone. In addition, the agricultural rural zone imposed a minimum lot
size of forty acres.365 The agricultural rural portion of the appellant’s land
was significantly less than the required minimum of forty acres.
In arguing that the school constituted a nonconforming use, the appellant
focused on the language in KRS 100.111(13) defining a “nonconforming
use or structure.” Specifically, it defines a nonconforming use or structure
as:
an activity or a building, sign, structure, or a portion thereof
which lawfully existed before the adoption or amendment of
the zoning regulation, but which does not conform to all of the
regulations contained in the zoning regulation which pertain to
the zone in which it is located.366

The appellant also noted that the LFUC zoning ordinance provided
that “[i]ncluded in this definition [of nonconforming uses] are uses that
would otherwise be permitted in the zone by this Zoning Ordinance, but
do not meet the requirements associated with such uses, e.g., parking, open
space, and the like.”367
On its face, the language supports appellant’s argument that the school
was a nonconforming use because the structure and lot do not comply
with the structure and lot size requirements of the applicable zoning
district. In Grannis v. Schroeder,368 however, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
distinguished nonconforming uses from nonconforming structures. In that
case, a landowner sought a conditional use permit for a home occupation on
property zoned for agricultural use.369 The landowner sought to use a barn
for a base of operation to store equipment such as a dump truck, backhoe,
trailer, and construction trailer.370 In addition, the landowner proposed to
put a concrete floor in the barn and a water hydrant outside.371
Neighbors objected to the landowner’s request. They contended that
because the barn did not comply with a seventy–five foot setback applicable
364 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–1(d)(20)
(2008).
365 Id. art. 8–1(f).
366 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.111(13) (West 2006).
367 Applicant’s Exhibits at tab 7, Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6 (Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment Feb. 29, 2008) (quoting Lexington–Fayette
Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 4–1(a)).
368 Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997).
369 Id. at 329.
370 Id.
371 Id.
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to the proposed conditional use, granting the landowner’s request would
constitute an impermissible expansion or enlargement of a nonconforming
use. The court explained that the home occupation was a conditional use,
not a nonconforming use.372 The barn, in contrast, was a nonconforming
structure.373 The court noted that there were limitations on the expansion
of nonconforming structures but found that the landowner’s proposed
modifications to the barn were sufficiently modest so as not to constitute
an impermissible expansion of the nonconforming structure.374
The LFUC zoning ordinance clearly differentiates among
nonconforming uses, nonconforming structures, and nonconforming lots.
Nonconforming uses are defined as:
Uses of land or structures that were lawful prior to the adoption or
amendment of this Zoning Ordinance but would be prohibited,
regulated or restricted under this Zoning Ordinance in the zone
in which they are located. Included in this definition are uses
that would be otherwise permitted in the zone by this Zoning
Ordinance, but do not meet the requirements associated with
such uses, e.g., parking, open space, and the like.375

Nonconforming structures, in contrast, are defined as “[s]tructures that
were lawful prior to adoption or amendment of this Zoning Ordinance but
do not conform with the yard, coverage, height or other structural restrictions
of this Zoning Ordinance for the zone in which the structure is located.376
Finally, the ordinance defines nonconforming lots as, “[l]ots of record at
the time of the adoption or amendment of this Zoning Ordinance that do
not meet the minimum lot square footage and/or frontage requirements
prescribed for the zone in which the lot is located.”377
Article 4–3(e) of the LFUC zoning ordinance permits a nonconforming
use to be changed to another nonconforming use provided the proposed
use is in the same or more restrictive classification than the previous use.378
This provision, however, only applies to nonconforming uses.379 It does not
apply to nonconforming structures or lots.380 Thus, I believe that the Board
erred in approving the appellant’s request that the school, a conditional use,
372 Id. at 331.
373 Id.
374 Id. at 332.
375 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–1(a) (2008).
376 Id. art. 4–1(b).
377 Id. art. 4–1(c).
378 Id. art. 4–3
379 Article 4–3 of the ordinance is titled “Regulation of Non–Conforming Uses.” Id.
380 Non–conforming structures are regulated by Article 4–4 while non–conforming lots
are regulated by Article 4–5 of the zoning ordinance. Neither Article 4–4 nor Article 4–5 authorizes a change from one use to another use. See id. art. 4–4, 4–5.
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be changed to a nonconforming use, antique sales with accessory restaurant.
The nonconforming lot and structure did not make the conditional use
a nonconforming use and thus the zoning ordinance did not authorize a
change to a nonconforming use.
The Board, however, should not be faulted for failing to distinguish
among nonconforming uses, nonconforming structures, and nonconforming
lots. The staff never raised this issue, and neither the staff nor the appellant’s
attorney brought Grannis or the LFUC zoning ordinance’s regulation of
nonconforming structures and lots to the Board’s attention. Arguably, the
appellant’s attorney should be faulted for failing to bring this contrary law
to the Board’s attention.381 Indeed, had the case been argued on or after
July 15, 2009,382 Section 3.3(a)(2) of the Kentucky Rules of Professional
Responsibility arguably would have required the lawyer to have disclosed
this contrary authority.383
Although the staff did not raise the issue of whether the property
involved a nonconforming structure and nonconforming lot but not a
nonconforming use, the staff did raise a separate issue of whether the
school was an exempt use, not a nonconforming use. Section 100.361(2)
of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that any proposal affecting
land use by any instrumentality of state government does not require
approval of the local planning unit. The governmental entity must provide
the planning commission with adequate information about the proposal,
but the proposal need not be approved by the planning commission
or board of adjustment.384 Thus, public schools, as instrumentalities of
381 The attorney spent about an hour presenting the case to the Board. Most of the attorney’s argument was very technical and focused on whether the proposed use for antique
sales with an accessory restaurant was in the same or a more restrictive classification than the
school use.
As a Board member, at the hearing, I stated that the case involved a conditional use. The
attorney responded by turning to tab 7 of his Exhibits, which quoted the definitions of non–
conforming uses under KRS 100.111(13) and Article 4–1(a) of the LFUC zoning ordinance,
and argued that the school use was a non–conforming use under the statutory and regulatory
definitions of the term nonconforming use. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of
Adjustment, (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with author). The attorney did not mention or refer to
Grannis v. Schroder or Articles 4–1(b), 4–1(c), 4–4, and 4–5 of the LFUC zoning ordinance,
which define and regulate non–conforming lots and structures. Moreover, his supplement of
exhibits, which was almost 100 pages long, did not include Grannis or Articles 4–1(b), 4–1(c),
4–4, and 4–5 of the LFUC zoning ordinance. I had not done independent legal research on
this issue before the meeting and did not raise Grannis or Articles 4–1(b), 4–1(c), 4–4, and 4–5
of the LFUC zoning ordinance at the hearing.
382 See Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(3.3)(a)(2).
383 Section 3.3(a)(2) of the Kentucky Rules of the Supreme Court provides that “[a]
lawyer shall not knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal published legal authority in the
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client
and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . .” Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(3.3)(a)(2). For the definition
of “tribunal,” see Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 3.130(1.0)(m).
384 See Hopkinsville–Christian Cnty. Planning Comm’n v. Christian Cnty. Bd. of Educ.,
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state government, are exempt from local zoning regulations.385 The staff
declared:
[I]t is very doubtful that the intent of either KRS 100 or the
Zoning Ordinance is to include exempt uses under the umbrella
of how nonconforming uses should be regulated. Obviously, if a
particular use is exempt, there is no intent for that use to have
to comply with all of the restrictions that would apply to a use
that is not exempt.386

No Kentucky case has addressed the question of whether changes in
exempt governmental uses should be regulated as nonconforming uses.
The appellant cited two non–Kentucky cases in support of its claim that
prior exempt governmental uses should be treated as nonconforming uses.
The first case, Town of Coventry v. Glickman,387 involved a change in use
from United States military housing to private housing. The second case,
Tausch v. Parker,388 involved a change in use from a United States post
office to a retail store. Despite the appellant’s claim to the contrary, neither
case involved a change from an exempt governmental use to a private
nonconforming use. Rather, both cases involved a change from a federal
governmental nonconforming use to a private nonconforming use.
KRS 100.316 exempts state governmental entities from local zoning
regulations.389 The exemption does not extend to federal agencies.390 In
Town of Coventry v. Glickman, the court noted that federal governmental
instrumentalities are exempt from local zoning regulations that are contrary
to federal law.391 There was no suggestion, however, that the zoning
ordinance in that case was contrary to federal law. Instead, both parties
agreed that the federal government had a legal nonconforming use.392 The
principal question was whether the federal government had abandoned
its nonconforming use. In Tausch v. Parker, governmental exemptions
903 S.W.2d 531, 532–33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1995).
385 See Op. Ky. Att’y. Gen. 69–ORD–659 (1969) (opining that school facilities, being state
property, are exempt from local planning and zoning regulations under the terms of KRS
100.361); see also Op. Ky. Att’y. Gen. 75–ORD–108 (1975) (citing KRS 100.361(2) in support of
opinion that public “school property is not subject to regulation by a zoning board”); Op. Ky.
Att’y. Gen. 73–ORD–209 (1973) (noting that Attorney General’s office has taken position that
“school facilities, being state property, are exempt from local planning and zoning regulations
under the terms of KRS 100.361”).
386 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment
(2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
387 Town of Coventry v. Glickman, 429 A.2d 440 (R.I. 1981).
388 Tausch v. Parker, 217 N.Y.S.2d 953 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961).
389 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.316 (West 2006).
390 See Op. Ky. Att’y. Gen. 73–ORD–315 (1973).
391 Town of Coventry, 429 A.2d at 442.
392 Id.
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were never even mentioned. There was no question but that the federal
government had a nonconforming use.393 The issue was whether the
proposed change from a post office to a retail store was to the same or a
higher classification.394
As the staff noted, treating an exempt governmental use as a
nonconforming use seems to be contrary to the intent of chapter 100 and
the zoning regulations.395 First, if the state governmental instrumentality
sought to change from school use to any other use, the change in use would
not be regulated as a nonconforming use.396 Rather, the new use would
also be exempt from the zoning regulations.397 The question of whether
an exempt state use qualifies as a nonconforming use arises only when the
state government sells the property and the property ceases to be exempt
from the zoning regulations. The exempt status of state governmental
property arises from the state government’s sovereignty.398 Nonconforming
use status, in contrast, is designed to protect private property from being
taken by the government.399 State property, by definition, is not private
property, and thus does not give rise to takings concerns.
Second, the limitations on changes in nonconforming uses are designed
to promote the elimination of nonconforming uses.400 According to the
Kentucky Court of Appeals, “[a]s a matter of policy and consistent with the
spirit of zoning laws, nonconforming uses are to be gradually eliminated
and are to be held strictly within their boundaries.”401 Indeed, the LFUC
zoning ordinance expressly provides that:
It is the intent of this Zoning Ordinance to permit the non–
conformities established in Article 4–1 to continue until they are
393 Tausch, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
394 Id.
395 Cf. Beshear v. Haydon Bridge Co., 304 S.W.3d 682, 703 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he cardinal
rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.”)
(quoting Travelers Indem. Co. v. Reker, 100 S.W.3d 756, 763 (Ky. 2003)).
396 Cf. Grannis v. Schroder, 978 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997) (“[B]y exempting
agricultural land from application of the zoning ordinance, the provisions of KRS 100.203,
which deals with changes in nonconforming uses, do not apply.”).
397 Adequate information regarding the change would have to be submitted to the planning commission, but approval by the planning commission would not be required. See Ky.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.361(2) (West 2006).
398 Id. (“Nothing in this chapter shall impair the sovereignty of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky over its political subdivisions.”).
399 See Dempsey v. Newport Bd. of Adjustments, 941 S.W.2d 483, 485 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)
(noting that nonconforming use status gives the landowner legitimate, vested property rights
that enjoy broad constitutional protection).
400 See Louisville Metro Bd. of Zoning Adjustment v. A–1 Sanitation, No. 2007–CA–
000484–MR, 2008 WL 399642, at *3 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008) (“KRS 100.253(2) . . . reflects an intent
to gradually eliminate any nonconforming uses of property.”).
401 Legrand v. Ewbank, 284 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); see also Holloway Ready
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removed, but not to encourage their survival. It is also intended
that non–conformities shall not be enlarged or extended beyond
the scope and area of their operation at the time of the adoption
or amendment of this Ordinance, nor to be used as grounds for
adding additional structures or uses not permitted in the same
zone.402

Based on the intent and spirit of chapter 100 and the LFUC zoning
ordinance, I believe that the Board erred in treating the exempt use as
a nonconforming use. Nevertheless, the Board probably should not
be faulted for taking this position. In its February 2008 report, the staff
declared that Glickman and Tausch “confirm that in some instances it is
legitimate to approach a proposed change from an exempt use to another
use that is subject to regulation as a change in a nonconforming use.”403
Although I do not agree with the appellant’s use of these cases, it does not
seem unreasonable for the Board to rely on its professional staff to decide
the technical question of whether a change in an exempt governmental use
should be regulated as a change in nonconforming use.
The third issue raised by the case was whether the proposed antique
sales with accessory restaurant use was in the same or a more restrictive
classification than the school use. Section 100.253 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes prohibits the Board from permitting a change from
one nonconforming use to another nonconforming use “unless the new
nonconforming use is in the same or a more restrictive classification.”404
The LFUC zoning ordinance similarly requires that “the proposed use [be]
in the same or a more restrictive classification than the previous use.”405
In its January 2008 staff report, the staff recommended that the board
disapprove the request because it believed that the proposed change was
not in the same or a more restrictive classification.406 The staff explained that
“the ‘traditional’ comparison focuses on where the uses first appear in the
Zoning Ordinance as an allowable use, the logic being that the progression
Mix Co. v. Monfort, 474 S.W.2d 80, 83–84 (Ky. 1968) (“This conclusion is consistent with the
spirit and intent of zoning to eventually eliminate nonconforming uses.”).
402 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–2 (2011).
403 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb.
22, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6); see
also Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with
author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6) (noting that staff member
“said two relevant cases from other states were brought to the staff’s attention, which showed
that prior exempt uses such as a school can be legitimately considered as nonconforming uses;
and after reviewing those two cases, the staff was comfortable considering the prior exempt
public school use as nonconforming”).
404 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.253(2) (West 2006).
405 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 4–3(e) (2011).
406 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3, 5
(2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
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of zones in the Zoning Ordinance is generally from the most restrictive to
the least restrictive.”407 Using this approach, the staff contended that the
proposed use clearly was not in the same or a more restrictive classification
because retail sales of antiques are prohibited in the agricultural rural zone
while schools for academic instruction are listed as conditional uses in the
agricultural rural zone.408
The appellant objected to comparing where the existing and proposed
uses are first permitted in the zoning ordinance. The attorney contended
that “[t]he order in which the various zones appear in the Zoning Ordinance
is of little help in determining if one zone is more or less restrictive than
the zone appearing immediately prior to or after it.”409 In support of this
position, he cited a number of instances in which particular uses are first
permitted in a later zone.410 The lawyer argued that the staff’s “traditional”
approach of looking at where a use first appears in the ordinance was
contrary to the provisions of the statute and ordinance and that “the
specific language of the statute and ordinance requirement would have to
be changed” to permit the use of this “first appearing” approach.411
Instead, the appellant offered a number of arguments in support of the
claim that the proposed antique sales use with accessory restaurant should
be considered to be in the same or more restrictive classification than the
school. First, he contended that the two uses should be treated as being
in the same classification because “(i) schools for academic instruction,

407 Id. at 3.
408 Id.
409 Letter to Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
410 The appellant’s attorney began with the following example:
[T]he following zones are listed in the following order in the Zoning Ordinance:
P–1, B–1, B–2, B–2A, and B–2B. In addition, all of the zones in the Expansion
Area follow most of the other business or industrial zones. While schools for academic instruction are permitted in the P–1, B–1 and the B–2B zones and the sale
of antiques are permitted only in the B–1 and B–2B zones, the following uses are
permitted in the P–1 zone, but not in the B–1 and B–2B zones: funeral parlor; hospitals, nursing homes and rest homes; business colleges, technical or trade schools
or institutions; athletic club facilities; and assisted living facilities and rehabilitation homes. Therefore, to the extent that the P–1 zone permits uses not permitted
in the B–1 or B–2B zones, the B–1 zone and the B–2B zone are more restrictive
classifications than the P–1 zone even though the P–1 zone appears in the Zoning
Ordinance before the B–1 and B–2B zones.

Id.
411 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–
6); accord Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Bd. of Adjustment 18 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file with
author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
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(ii) establishments for the retail sale of antiques or antique shops and (iii)
restaurants are principal permitted uses in the B–1 and B–2B zones.”412
Second, citing Smith v. Howard413 and Prewitt v. Johnson,414 he contended
that determining whether a proposed use is in the same or more restrictive
classification should not be determined by focusing on the zoning
categories. Instead, the proposed use should be compared with the previous
use to determine whether the proposed use is no more objectionable
or obnoxious than the previous use. Specifically, the appellant argued,
“[I]f the proposed new nonconforming use will have no more of an adverse
effect on the adjacent property, then the test has been met, and the Board
is clearly entitled to approve the change from one nonconforming use
to another.”415 The appellant argued that the proposed use was no more
objectionable than the school use and thus the board should approve the
change in nonconforming use.
In its amended report submitted to the Board before the February
2008 hearing, the staff abandoned its traditional approach of determining
whether a use is in the same or more restrictive classification by looking
at where the use first appears in the zoning ordinance and recommended
that the Board approve the proposed change in use. The staff offered the
following reasons in support of its recommendation:
a. Under these unique and special circumstances, utilizing the
guidance of some related case law, it is appropriate to consider
the sale of antiques with an accessory restaurant as being in
the same classification as a public elementary school. Such
circumstances include:
(1) the prior school use was exempt from
the regulations of the Zoning Ordinance
for many years, and was first established
prior to the adoption of the First Zoning
Ordinance in Fayette County.
(2) the prior activity took place in what
is now considered a historic building
412 Letter to Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
413 Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966). In Smith, in considering whether to
permit a change from one form of light industry to another, the court declared that “[t]he
phrase ‘more restricted classification’ within the meaning of the above statute is synonymous
with ‘less objectionable’ or ‘less obnoxious.’” Id. at 142 (quoting Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.069
(West 2006)).
414 Prewitt v. Johnson, 710 S.W.2d 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986). In that case, the court found
that the operation of a retail used car business was in the same classification as a service station
and garage, but did not explain what “same classification” means. Id.
415 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 19 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6).
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that is recommended for preservation
in Lexington–Fayette County’s 2007
Comprehensive Plan; and
(3) items for display and sale at an antique
gallery potentially have historic and
cultural significance, often of a rural
nature consistent with the agricultural
zoning and rural setting of the subject
property.
b. It is not anticipated that the proposed antique gallery will
be any more “objectionable or obnoxious” than the prior use
as a public school. Retail sales are planned to take place only
on weekends (Friday, Saturday and Sunday), and only on one
or two weekends (6 days) per month. The former use operated
20 days per month, except during early summer. The antique
gallery will not be open after 6:00 PM, with the accessory
restaurant (the former school cafeteria) to be open only at times
that the gallery is open. Minimum off–street parking required
by the Zoning Ordinance for the proposed use can be provided
in the existing paved areas, which were sufficient for the former
school’s needs. Traffic is expected to be intermittent during
weekend sales events.
c. An antique gallery at this location should not adversely affect
the existing or future development of the subject property or the
surrounding area. The historic school building will be preserved
and maintained, with no external changes to take place. No
significant property improvements are needed to accommodate
the proposed use, other than some possible renovations to the
interior of the building. The nature of the activity proposed,
which is not inherently noisy and does not involve offensive
materials of any kind, should not result in any disturbances to
surrounding farms, or to the residential and business uses found
in the Athens Rural Settlement.416

After a lengthy hearing, the Board voted 4–2 to approve the appellant’s
request for the reasons recommended by the staff and subject to the
conditions imposed by the staff. I was one of the two Board members to vote
against the proposal.417 I voted against the proposal because I believed that
the proposed change was not in the same or a more restrictive classification.

416 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 6–7
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–
6).
417 Revised Staff Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 23
(Feb. 22, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–
6).
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It seemed clear to me that since schools were listed as a conditional use in
the A–R zone, the zone at issue, and the proposed use was prohibited in
that zone, the proposed use clearly was not in the same or a more restrictive
classification.418 Perhaps this is simply another way of saying, as I have
argued above, that the existing school use was not a nonconforming use in
the first place.419
Since I voted against the proposal and a majority of the Board voted in
favor of the proposal, I obviously think that the Board erred in approving
the request. On the other hand, that does not mean that I think that the
Board’s decisions were unreasonable. Prior to moving that the Board
approve the request, one Board member said:
[W]e’re not a court of law here. We’re the Board of Adjustment,
and we take a look at all the issues; and we either vote up or
down on the appeal for this administrative review. I think these
folks have put a lot of time, a lot of effort, a lot of money in this
project. I think it’s going to be preserved for perpetuity. I trust
our Planning and legal counsel that this has been thoroughly
researched; and if it goes to a judicial appeal, that’s not our
purview.420

Although these comments might appear a bit troubling at first blush, I
do not think they are unreasonable. The Board of Adjustment is a lay body.
Most Board members are not lawyers and are not trained in the law. It does
not seem unreasonable for Board members to rely on the staff to decide
technical legal issues, like those raised in this case. Thus, while I think

418 Not surprisingly, the appellant’s attorney objected to this approach. He argued
that “if the zone in which the property presently exists were relevant, then you could never
change from one nonconforming use to another.” Id. at 21. I disagree. I believe that the zone
in which the property is presently located is always relevant. The existing use will only be
listed in that zone if the nonconformity arises because the lot or structure is nonconforming,
or the use does not meet the other requirements associated with such uses, such as parking,
open space, and similar requirements. To the extent that the nonconforming use is a use that
is not permitted in the present zone, then, and only then, is it appropriate to look outside the
zone in which the property is presently located to determine which uses are in the same or a
more restrictive classification.
419 See supra text accompanying notes 364–80. As noted above, I did not do independent
legal research before the hearing. After having done some research, I now believe, for the
reasons discussed above, that I was wrong in conceding at the hearing that the school use was
a nonconforming use.
420 Meeting Transcript, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb. 29,
2008) (on file with author) (discussing Athens Schoolhouse Partners, LLC, A–2008–6). Prior
to voting against the appeal, another Board member declared, “I think your legal gymnastics
to get us to this nonconforming use are questionable; and I have a lot of nervousness about
this.” Id.
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the Board reached the wrong result, I do not think the Board should be
criticized for its decision.
The fourth nonconforming use case involved an appeal from the
building inspector’s decision that allowing an American Legion Post to
have Sunday liquor sales would constitute an impermissible expansion of
a nonconforming use.421 In that case, the building inspector characterized
the American Legion post as a nonconforming use because it did not
qualify as a “private club”422 or any other specifically permitted use under
the ordinance. The Post already had a license permitting liquor sales
on Monday through Saturday and sought permission to extend sales to
Sunday. The staff recommended that the appeal be approved and the
building inspector’s decision be overturned.423 In recommending that the
appeal be approved, the staff noted that the Post’s characterization as a
nonconforming use was not due to the sale of liquor, that Sunday activities
at the Post were already common and extending liquor sales to Sunday was
not likely to result in a noticeable increase in patrons, and that no building
or other physical expansions were necessary to accommodate the proposed
use.424 The Board voted unanimously to approve the appeal for the reasons
recommended by the staff.425 This decision appears to be consistent with
the enabling legislation and zoning ordinance.
In the fifth and final nonconforming use case, the appellant sought
permission to allow a fire–damaged cottage/accessory building to be rebuilt
and used for rental purposes.426 While there was evidence that the building
had been used for rental purposes as a dwelling unit for a lengthy period
of time, perhaps as long as fifty years, there was no evidence that that
use had ever been legal. Instead, there was evidence that the City had
disapproved use of the building for rental purposes fifty years earlier, and
that the Board of Adjustment had upheld that determination on November

421 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Am. Legion Post #8, A–2008–15).
422 See id. at 8. The property at issue was located in an R–4 zone, and “private clubs”
are listed as a conditional use on R–4 property. “Private club[s]” are defined as “Buildings
and facilities, the purpose of which is to render a social, educational, or recreational service
to members and their guests; and not primarily to render a service customarily carried on as
a business or to render a profit. Private club shall include country club.” Lexington–Fayette
Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–11 (2008). Building Inspection took the position that the American Legion Post did not qualify as a “private club” because the public
could access the facility without accompanying a Legionnaire, and the Post could not provide
a membership list, other than a national roster.
423 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 7 (Feb. 29, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Am. Legion Post #8, A–2008–15).
424 See id. at 8.
425 See id.
426 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Mar. 28, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Gary Taghizadeh, A–2008–25).
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5, 1958.427 The Board voted unanimously to disapprove the appeal because
the appellant failed to prove that the use had ever been legal and thus
qualified as nonconforming use.428 This decision appears to be consistent
with section 100.111(13) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, which defines a
“nonconforming use” as a use “which lawfully existed before the adoption
or amendment of the zoning regulation.”429
(c) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
The Board considered five separate nonconforming use appeals. The
staff recommended that three of the appeals be approved and two of the
appeals be disapproved. The Board followed the staff’s recommendation
in all four of the cases in which it rendered a final decision. (The appellant
withdrew its appeal in one of the two cases in which the staff recommended
disapproval.)
(d) Summary
I believe that the Board’s decision was clearly consistent with the
enabling legislation and zoning ordinance in three of the four cases. I
believe that the Board reached the wrong result in one of the cases. I do
not, however, believe that the Board should be faulted for its decision
in that case. The case raised a number of very technically difficult legal
questions, and it was not unreasonable for the Board to defer to the staff’s
recommendation under the circumstances.
2. Signs.—During the period between July 2007 and December 2008,
seven separate administrative appeals regarding signs were filed. One
of the cases, which also involved a variance request, was withdrawn.430 A
second case was indefinitely postponed so that the applicant could pursue
a text amendment to the zoning ordinance.431 Thus, the Board decided five
427 See id.
428 See id. at 18, 20.
429 In some jurisdictions, the use would have been a legal nonconforming use because
section 100.253(3) of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that an illegal use which has
been in continuous use for ten years shall be deemed a nonconforming use if it has not been
subject to an adverse order or other adverse action by the administrative official during that
ten year period. This provision converting illegal uses to nonconforming uses, however, does
not apply to urban–county governments. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann § 100.253(4) (West 2006).
430 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Castleton Lyons, Inc., AV–2007–84).
431 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (July 27, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Lamar Cos., A–2007–59). In that case, the applicant sought an administrative review to determine that a digital/electronic advertising sign should be permitted in
a planned shopping center zone when the zoning ordinance specifically disallows electronic
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separate administrative appeals involving signs. The Board approved three
of the appeals and disapproved the other two.
(a) Law Governing Signs
As discussed above,432 the Kentucky Revised Statutes authorize cities
and counties to regulate the size, width, height, bulk, and location of
signs.433 The LFUC Zoning Ordinance, however, imposes very strict and
detailed regulations regarding the number, size, height, type, and location
of signs,434 and prohibits the Board from granting variances (1) to increase
the number of permitted signs; (2) to permit any sign, design feature,
information, copy, or design type that is not specifically permitted in the
zone in which the sign is to be located; and (3) to increase the maximum
total permitted sign area on a single lot or building.435
(b) Board’s Administrative Sign Decisions
Although the zoning ordinance prohibits the Board from increasing the
maximum total permitted sign area on a single lot or building, it does not
prohibit the Board from permitting an applicant to combine the allowable
square footage of more than one permitted sign into a single sign. Thus,
in two of the three cases that the Board approved, it allowed the applicant
to combine the square footage of two permitted signs into a larger single
sign.436
The third case that the Board approved involved the interpretation
of the term, “roof sign.” The zoning ordinance prohibits roof signs in all
zones.437 It defines a “roof sign” as “[a] sign which projects above the
cornice of a flat roof or above the top edge of any roof, including the ridge
line of a gable or hipped roof. Such top edge shall not include any cupolas,
message boards in that zone. Id.
432 See supra Part II.A.3.a.
433 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.203(1)(b) (West 2006).
434 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 17 (2007).
435 Id. art. 17–8(a).
436 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Aug. 31, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Miami North Park, LLC, A–2007–74); Minutes, Lexington–Fayette
Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Laura Scott
Adkins/Cummings Signs, Inc., A–2008–37). In the second of these cases, the applicant initially
requested that the Board allow a 176 square–foot freestanding sign and a logo on a non–continuous parapet for a Saturn dealership in a Highway Service Business zone. At the hearing,
the staff noted that the applicant was entitled to two seventy–five square foot signs because
the property was located on a corner and recommended that the applicant transfer unused
square footage to the proposed sign. The applicant agreed to a single freestanding sign of 150
square feet and withdrew the request for a parapet sign. Id.
437 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 17–5(b) (2007).
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pylons, chimneys or other minor projections above the roof line.”438 In Greer
Land Co. Man O’ War, LLC,439 the applicant sought to place the text “Casual
Café” on top of the canopy of a Cheddar’s restaurant. Both the building
inspector and the planning staff determined that the proposed sign was a
prohibited roof sign, and the staff recommended that the Board disapprove
the appeal.440
Citing Webster’s definition of a “roof” as “the external covering of a
house or other building,” the applicant argued that the canopy was not a
roof and thus the sign on the canopy was not a prohibited roof sign.441 The
applicant recognized that roof signs are prohibited throughout the country,
but contended the proposed sign was not such a sign.442 The applicant
pointed out that there are fifty–seven Cheddar’s restaurants with this type
of sign package, and that no other city has considered the Casual Café sign
to be a prohibited roof sign.443 The applicant then argued that the proposed
sign was like the marquee for the Royal Cinema in Hamburg that was
permitted and did not require a variance.444 In response to this contention,
the building inspector asserted that “Building Inspection is holding a fine
line in this case” and that “Article 17 of the Zoning Ordinance hasn’t kept
up with the times.”445
The Board provided three reasons in support of its approval of the
appeal:
1.

The extension above the entrance area of the restaurant
is not the roof of the structure, as contemplated in the
definition of a roof sign in the Zoning Ordinance. It is
more comparable to a canopy than a roof, covering only
an open area, not an enclosed structure.

2.

The proposed sign does not project above the level
of the rest of the structure. In appearance, the impact
of this sign is comparable to a wall sign, and as such is

438 Id. art. 17–3(c)(10).
439 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment (Oct. 26, 2007) (on file
with author) (discussing Greer Land Co. Man O’War, LLC, A–2007–91).
440 Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Oct. 16, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Greer Land Co. Man O’ War, LLC, A–2007–91).
441 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 16 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Greer Land Co. Man O’War, LLC, A–2007–91).
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 Id.
445 Id.
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permitted so long as it does not exceed the applicable
limitations for wall signs.
3.

Alternatively, the proposed sign also more closely
resembles a canopy or awning sign in that the structure
at issue serves only as a canopy over the entranceway.446

I believe that the Board’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance was
reasonable.447 The zoning ordinance does not define the term “roof,”
and the Board was within its discretion when it determined that the
“canopy”448 was not part of the building’s roof. Indeed, in conjunction with
a comprehensive amendment to the zoning ordinance’s sign regulation in
2009, the Lexington–Fayette Urban County Council amended the zoning
ordinance to conform with this interpretation of the ordinance.449 The
ordinance now separately defines “above canopy signs”450 and “marquees”
and expressly permits the sign at issue in the Cheddar’s case.
The first sign appeal that the Board denied involved a freestanding
pre–sale menu board in a Planned Shopping Center zone.451 The LFUC
zoning ordinance does not expressly permit such signs in that zone452 and
provides that all signs that are not expressly permitted are prohibited.453
An exemption from the permitting requirements, however, is made for
signs that are not visible beyond the boundaries of the lot.454 The staff
noted that the case had been postponed several times in an effort to work
out an exemption for the signage “by virtue of it not being visible from
the surrounding properties.”455 The proposed sign did not fall within
that exemption and the staff recommended that the appeal be denied.456

446 Id.
447 I did not attend the October 2007 hearing and thus did not participate in this appeal.
448 Webster’s II New College Dictionary defines a “canopy” as “[a] rooflike ornamental
architectural structure,” not as a “roof.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary 167 (3d ed.
2008) (emphasis added).
449 See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Planning Comm’n 18–20 (Mar. 26,
2009) (on file with author) (discussing Amendment to Article 17 of Lexington–Fayette Urban
Cnty. Zoning Ordinance).
450 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 17–3(c)(4)
(2007).
451 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 22–23 (Jan. 25, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Clayton Signs, Inc., A–2007–73).
452 Cf. Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 17–7(k)(1)
(2008).
453 Id. art. 17–7.
454 Id. art. 17–2(a).
455 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 22–23 (Jan. 25, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Clayton Signs, Inc., A–2007–73).
456 Id.

514

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 100

Neither the applicant nor a representative for the applicant appeared at the
hearing, and the Board disapproved the appeal.457
The second sign appeal that the Board denied involved a request to
allow a wall sign on the side of a building that exceeds the total allowable
square footage for that building.458 As noted above, the zoning ordinance
provides that the Board of Adjustment is not authorized to increase the
maximum total permitted sign area on a lot or building.459 The Board
followed the staff’s recommendation and disapproved the appeal.460
In sum, it appears that the Board complied with the governing law in
all seven of the administrative sign appeals it decided. It was within its
power to permit the applicant to combine the allowable square footage of
multiple signs into a single sign, and its interpretation of the term “roof
sign” was reasonable. Accordingly, the Board acted within its powers in
the three cases in which it granted the appeal. In the two cases in which
it disapproved the appeal, the Board recognized and complied with the
express limitations of its power imposed by the zoning ordinance.
(c) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
The Board followed the staff’s recommendations in all but one of the
seven sign appeals that the Board heard between July 2007 and December
2008.461 Moreover, in the single case that the Board did not follow the staff’s
recommendation,462 the staff and Division of Building Inspection signaled
to the Board in a number of ways that the staff’s recommendation was
somewhat flexible. First, in its written recommendation, the staff stated that
since “no arguments have been presented by the appellant to support that
it is not a roof sign, it appears that the Division of Building Inspection has
made the correct determination in this case.”463 Second, at the beginning
of the hearing, legal counsel stated that “she agreed with the staff at this

457 Id.
458 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 18 (Mar. 28, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Triumph Signs, A–2008–18).
459 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 17–8(a) (2007).
460 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 17–18 (Mar. 23, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Triumph Signs, A–2008–18).
461 In one of the cases, the staff initially recommended that the appeal be denied. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 27 (Apr. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Laura Scott Adkins/Cummings Signs, Inc., A–2008–37). The staff worked
out a compromise with an applicant during the hearing and the Board approved the appeal in
part, and the applicant withdrew part of its request. See supra note 378.
462 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 15–17 (Oct. 26, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Greer Land Co., Man O’ War LLC., A–2007–91).
463 Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Oct. 16, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Greer Land Co., Man O’ War LLC, A–2007–91).
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point in time, not yet having heard from the applicant.”464 Finally, as noted
above, after the applicant offered its arguments, the building inspector
asserted that “Building Inspection is holding a fine line in this case” and
that “Article 17 of the zoning ordinance hasn’t kept up with the times.”465
Thus, while the Board did not defer to the staff’s recommendation in one
of the cases, the staff’s recommendation in that case was not particularly
strong.
(d) Summary
The Board decided five administrative appeals involving signs. It
approved three of the appeals and disapproved two of the appeals. I believe
that all five of the Board’s decisions were legally correct and adequately
supported. The Board followed the staff recommendation in four of the
five cases. In the single case that the Board did not follow the staff’s
recommendation, the staff signaled to the Board that its recommendation
was not strongly held.
3. Miscellaneous.—In addition to the five nonconforming use and seven
sign administrative appeals, four other administrative appeals appeared on
the Board’s agenda between July 2007 and December 2008. The Board
approved one of the appeals. The Board reached a tie vote in the second
appeal. The appellants withdrew the two remaining appeals.466
(a) Board’s decisions
The case that the Board approved involved a request to allow a church
to use a parking lot as a principal, rather than as an accessory, use on property
located in a two–family residential zone. In that case, the church building
was located on one lot, and the church wanted to use the lot across the street
for parking for the church.467 Parking lots are permissible accessory, but
not principal, uses in two–family residential zones.468 The LFUC zoning
ordinance prohibits accessory uses from being constructed before principal
uses.469 The building inspector opposed the application because it was
464 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 15 (Oct. 26, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Greer Land Co. Man O’War, LLC, A–2007–91).
465 Id. at 16.
466 One of the cases was postponed during the study period and withdrawn the following month, January 2009.
467 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 9 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
468 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance arts. 8–11(c), 8–5(c)
(1) (2007).
469 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky. Zoning Ordinace art. 1–11 (2007) (defi-
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prohibited by the zoning ordinance. At the hearing, the building inspector
stated that he was sympathetic to the applicant but urged the Board to
disapprove the application because it “would set a precedent by allowing a
prohibited use in the zone.”470The staff, on the other hand, noted that the
church was a conditional use, rather than a principal use, under the terms
of the ordinance, and recommended that the Board approve the appeal for
the following reasons:
a.

An overly strict interpretation of the Zoning Ordinance
provision related to off–street parking for churches
would be inconsistent with past approvals by the Board
(specifically CV–2006–87 and CV–95–76).

b.

Use of the subject lot for off–street parking for a church,
without a principal structure on the lot, is reasonable in this
particular case due to the location of the church directly
across the street.

c.

The off–street parking arrangement proposed is not
unusual, and similar situations have been approved by the
Board at other locations, such as at the corner of Jefferson
and West Sixth Streets.471

After a fairly lengthy discussion, the Board approved the appeal for the
reasons recommended by the staff.472
I believe that the Board’s decision was technically wrong. Parking is not
a principal use in a two–family residential zone. Thus, the Board did not
have the power to approve the appeal, and the applicant should only have
been permitted to use the lot for parking if the applicant sought and was
granted a text amendment to the zoning ordinance. On the other hand, I
am sympathetic to the Board’s decision.473 At the hearing, the staff noted
that the Board had approved a nearly identical request in the past. Although
the Board is not bound to follow its earlier decisions and consistently
wrong application of the law does not make it correct,474 I am sympathetic

nition of accessory structure) (“No accessory structure can be constructed on a lot before a
principal structure.”).
470 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 10 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
471 Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 3 (Aug. 24, 2007)
(on file with author) (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
472 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 11 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
473 In fact, I must confess that the Board’s decision was unanimous and I voted to approve the appeal. See id.
474 Cf. Michael P. Healy, Communis Opinio and the Methods of Statutory Interpretation: Interpreting Law or Changing Law, 43 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 539, 549 (2001) (discussing principle of
communis error facit jus [common error makes law]).
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to the Board’s desire to be fair to all applicants by treating their requests
consistently.475
The case that resulted in a tie vote involved conditional zoning
restrictions imposed on property in a highway service business zone.476
The property at issue was rezoned from light industrial to highway
service business in 1999.477 Pursuant to Article 6–7 of the LFUC zoning
ordinance,478 sixteen different uses were expressly prohibited at the
time of the zone change.479 Among the expressly prohibited uses were:
(1) “[i]ndoor amusements such as billiards or pool halls, dancing hall, skating
rinks, or bowling alleys;” and (2) “[i]ndoor and outdoor athletic facilities
such as a field house, gymnasium, football stadium, tennis courts, soccer
field or polo field, and baseball fields.”480 The appellant sought to establish
a “Kangaroo Bob’s” facility on the property but the building inspector
determined that the proposed use was similar to an indoor athletic facility
or indoor amusement facility and thus was prohibited by the conditional
zoning restrictions on the property.481 The staff concurred with the building
inspector’s determination and recommended that the Board disapprove the
appeal.482
At the hearing, the appellant argued that Kangaroo Bob’s was a unique
facility that emphasized learning and teamwork and was neither an indoor
athletic facility nor an indoor amusement facility.483 Kangaroo Bob’s
475 Cf. Daniel P. Selmi, The Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 Stan. L.
Rev. 591, 592–93, 627–28 (2011) (describing “the need to ensure that local government treats
applicants equally” as one of the underlying principles or norms of the traditional land use
system); Lea S. VanderVelde, Local Knowledge, Legal Knowledge, and Zoning Law, 75 Iowa L.
Rev. 1057, 1070–72 (1990) (criticizing Iowa City Zoning Board of Adjustment for failing to
treat two applicants in similar situation equally when one applicant was granted variance and
other was denied variance); Study, supra note 2, at 302 (implicitly criticizing LFUC Board of
Adjustment for failing to treat landowners equally).
476 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 29 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Tiverton Way, LLC, A–2008–17).
477 Exhibits Tendered on Behalf of Appellant Tiverton Way, LLC, exhibit 1, A–2008–17
(Lexington–Fayette Cty. Bd. Adjustment Feb. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Exhibits for Tiverton
Way] (on file with author) (describing Zone Change Request for I–1 to B–3 for 128 and 148
West Tiverton Way).
478 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance, art. 6–7 (2008) (“Pursuant to KRS 100.203(8), Planning Commission or the Urban County Council may, as a condition to granting a map amendment, restrict the use of property affected to a particular use, a
particular class of use, or a specified density within those permitted in a given zoning category
. . . .”).
479 Exhibits for Tiverton Way, supra note 477, exhibit 1.
480 Id.
481 Exhibits for Tiverton Way, supra note 477, exhibit 2 (Board of Adjustment refusal
letter dated Jan. 29, 2008).
482 Case Report, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 2 (Feb. 22, 2008)
(on file with author) (discussing Tiverton Way, LLC, A–2008–17).
483 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 25 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
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executive director explained that children are taught teamwork in a fun
environment through a series of fifty original educational team games.484
Instructors run the games every fifteen minutes, and at the end of each
game, the instructor takes the children to the back of the room where they
discuss the lesson that was just learned (such as awareness, leadership,
or emotional control).485 The appellant contended that the program is
different “because it is innovative, imaginative and creative, in addition
to which the children have fun and are engaged in physical activity.”486
He further explained that “[t]he emphasis on learning and structured
teamwork puts the proposed use in a different category than an indoor
amusement or athletic facility.”487 Citing Hamner v. Best,488 the appellant
argued that the zoning restriction should be construed strictly in favor of
the land owner. The appellant argued that the proposed use was neither
an indoor amusement nor an indoor athletic facility but was substantially
similar to four principal permitted uses in the highway service business
zone: (1) restaurant;489 (2) establishment for the retail sale of merchandise,490
(3) school for academic instruction,491 and (4) kindergarten, nursery school,
and child care center.492 Specifically, the appellant contended that Kangaroo
Bob’s was “substantially similar to a child care center with a mixture of
education, a restaurant and a retail component.”493
Three members of the Board of Adjustment voted to approve the
appeal. The following reasons were given for approving the appeal:
1.

The proposed facility will not have the typical
characteristics of an athletic center. There is no
gymnasium, no soccer facilities or basketball equipment.
The use does not include competitive athletic activities in
the traditional sense.

2.

The proposed facility will not have the typical
characteristics of an indoor amusement facility. It does
not include arcade or video games, or other electronic

file with author) (discussing Tiverton Way, LLC, A–2008–17).
484 Id.
485 Id.
486 Id.
487 Id. at 26.
488 Hamner v. Best, 656 S.W.2d 253 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
489 See Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 8–20(b)(3)
(2008).
490 See id. art. 8–20(b)(11).
491 See id. art. 8–20(b)(20).
492 See id. art. 8–20(b)(21).
493 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 26 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on
file with author) (discussing Tiverton Way, LLC, A–2008–17).
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amusements. The children are not free to use amusement
equipment at will, as in an indoor amusement facility.
3.

Employees are trained in instruction methods and are
retained with an emphasis on persons with training in
childhood development and education.

4.

Children’s activities are strictly structured and goal
oriented toward specific teaching accomplishments,
with a stress on the educational component of values.
Therefore, the proposed use is more substantially similar
to an innovative school for academic instruction and value
instruction than it is to an athletic center or an indoor
amusement facility. A school for academic instruction is a
principal permitted use in this zone.494

Three members of the Board voted against approval.495 One member of
the Board was absent.496 Because the vote was tie, the appeal was neither
approved nor disapproved.
I voted against the appeal because I believed that the proposed facility
was more similar to an indoor athletic or amusement facility than a school
for academic instruction. Nevertheless, I believe that the three members of
the Board who voted to approve the appeal were acting within the bounds
of their discretion in voting to approve the appeal for reasons number one
and two above.
The fourth reason given for approval, however, was clearly wrong.
The LFUC Zoning Ordinance defines schools for academic instruction
as “[a]ll schools offering primarily classroom instruction with participation
of teachers and students, limited to elementary, junior and middle high
schools, high schools, junior colleges, colleges, theological seminaries, bible
colleges, and universities; but not including business colleges, technical or
trade schools.”497 The proposed Kangaroo Bob’s clearly did not primarily
offer “classroom instruction.” Yet, again, I do not fault the Board members
for adopting this finding. Neither the appellant nor the staff brought the
zoning ordinance’s definition of “schools for academic instruction” to
the Board’s attention.498 Thus, it was not unreasonable for the Board to

494 Id. at 29.
495 See id.
496 See id.
497 Lexington–Fayette Urban County, Ky., Zoning Ordinance art. 1–12 (2007) (defining schools for academic instruction).
498 The appellant’s attorney introduced a package of fourteen different exhibits in addition to the Kangaroo Bob’s Game Training Manual and the Arts and Crafts Class schedule.
None of the exhibits included the definition of “school for academic instruction.”
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interpret “school for academic instruction” loosely to be any program that
emphasizes learning.499
(b) Role of Staff’s Recommendations
The Board followed the staff’s recommendation in one of the two
miscellaneous administrative appeals the Board decided between July
2007 and December 2008. The second appeal ended in a tie vote. Three
members of the Board voted against the appeal as recommended by the
staff. Three members of the Board voted in favor of the appeal contrary to
the staff’s recommendation.
(c) Summary
The Board decided two “miscellaneous” administrative appeals
between July 2007 and December 2008. The Board approved one of
the appeals and reached a tie vote in the second appeal. I believe that
the Board was technically wrong in the case in which it approved the
appeal. Technically, the Board did not have the power to grant the appeal.
Nevertheless, the Board had granted similar relief in the past and thus it
was not unreasonable for the Board to approve the appeal as a matter of
fundamental fairness. I believe that the Board should have disapproved the
second appeal. Nevertheless, I believe that the members of the Board who
voted to approve the appeal acted reasonably under the circumstances.
III. Reflections
In their study of the LFUC Board of Adjustment fifty years ago,
Jesse Dukeminier and Clyde Stapleton harshly criticized the Board and
many of its practices. Much has changed, and improved, since that study.
Nevertheless, some problems remain. This section will discuss the ways
in which the law and practice have changed since Dukeminier–Stapleton
study and the problems that remain.
A. Changes in Substantive Law
The substantive law has changed significantly since the Dukeminier–
Stapleton study. Three changes have been implemented that reduce the
Board’s discretion. First, and most significantly, the Kentucky legislature
499 This loose interpretation of school of academic instruction is consistent with the
Board’s decision in the museum case. Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 8–9 (July 27, 2007) (on file with author) (discussing Headley–Whitney Museum, Inc.,
C–2007–64). As discussed above, I believe that the Board erroneously interpreted the term
“school of academic instruction” in that case. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
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amended KRS Chapter 100 to expressly eliminate the Board’s power to
grant use variances.500 Second, the Lexington–Fayette Urban County
Council amended the zoning ordinance to severely constrain the Board’s
power to grant sign variances.501 Third, the Lexington–Fayette Urban
County council amended the zoning ordinance to clarify and tighten the
standards governing home occupations.502
On the other hand, the Kentucky legislature amended the enabling
legislation to greatly enhance the Board’s discretion with respect to the
findings required to make dimensional variances. Specifically, the Board is
no longer required to find unnecessary hardship/deprivation of reasonable
use before granting a dimensional variance.503 Instead, unnecessary
hardship/deprivation of reasonable use is simply one of three factors that
the Board is directed to consider in deciding whether to approve an appeal
for a dimensional variance.504
Because the Board takes the limits on its power seriously,505 and the
new standards governing dimensional variances grant the Board much
more discretion to grant dimensional variances, the Board’s current practice
conforms much more closely to the governing law than it did at the time of
the Dukeminier–Stapleton study.
B. Changes in Procedure
At the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, zoning was just coming
out of its infancy, and the Board’s procedures left much to be desired. The
LFUC Board’s procedures have matured and improved considerably since
the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study.
First, applicants requesting a dimensional variance must file an
application that clearly sets forth the legal requirements that must be
satisfied in order for the Board to grant a dimensional variance.506 Applicants
500 See supra Part II.A.1.
501 See supra Part II.A.3.a.
502 See supra Part II.B.3.
503 See supra Part II.A.2.a.
504 See id.
505 To illustrate, one poor applicant sat through a six–hour hearing only to learn that the
Board did not have the power to grant the applicant’s administrative appeal regarding a sign.
See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 29–30 (Feb. 29, 2008) (on file
with author) (discussing Triumph Signs, A–2008–18). Because the applicant had sat through
such a long hearing, the Board continued the meeting to give the applicant an opportunity to
discuss the matter further with the staff to determine if there was some way to grant the applicant relief. See id. The staff was unable to find a way to accommodate the applicant’s request
so the following month the Board disapproved the appeal when the applicant did not appear
at the hearing. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 17–18 (Mar.
28, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Triumph Signs, A–2008–18).
506 See Appendix A, infra, part F.
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must answer five separate questions, each of which the Board must
either find or consider before granting a variance.507 Thus, the form helps
applicants and the Board to focus on the legal requirements that apply to
variances.508
Second, a member of the planning staff records the meeting and prepares
minutes of the meeting that provide some detail about the arguments
and questions raised in the hearing and explicitly state the reasons why
the Board voted to approve or disapprove each request. These changes
in procedure make it much easier for an applicant to appeal the Board’s
decisions.
Third, an attorney for the LFUCG attends every meeting. If the
Board decides not to follow the staff’s recommendation, the attorney is
available to help the Board draft findings that focus on and satisfy the legal
requirements.509
C. Changes in Practice
In practice, the Board’s decisions have changed in two significant ways.
First, the Board is much more likely to make specific factual findings than
it was at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. Second, the Board
is much more deferential to the staff’s recommendations than it was at the
time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton study. Nevertheless, problems remain
with the Board’s decisions in practice.
1. Board’s Findings.—Unlike at the time of the Dukeminier–Stapleton
study, the Board now makes explicit findings in support of its decisions, and
the findings are recorded in the Board’s minutes. Thus, we are no longer
left in the dark as to why the Board reached a particular decision. Moreover,
the Board’s findings tend to track the applicable legal requirements and
offer specific facts rather than simply boilerplate conclusory findings.510
That is not to suggest that the Board’s findings are entirely flawless.
First, the Board does not expressly make all of the findings the enabling
legislation requires that it make in dimensional variance cases. KRS
100.243 requires that the Board make four specific findings before granting
a dimensional variance.511 In none of the thirty–nine cases in which the
507 See id.
508 Because the enabling legislation does not require explicit findings for conditional
use permits like it does for variances, the application form for conditional use permits does not
distill specific legal issues that must be addressed. See Appendix A, infra.
509 Cf. Jack S. Hawbaker, Appeals Boards Need to Clean Up Their Act, Planning, Nov. 1982,
at 23 (“[C]ounties that have the assistance of planning staff or a lawyer produce better opinions than counties that don’t. Their opinions are less likely to be reversed by a circuit court,
even if the court arrives at a different conclusion about the case.”).
510 See, e.g., supra Part II.A.2.b; Part II.A.3.b; Part II.B.2.a.
511 See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 100.243 (West 2006).
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Board granted a dimensional variance (including the sign case) did the
Board expressly make all four of the findings required by the KRS 100.243.
Thus, in none of the cases did the Board entirely satisfy the applicable
legal requirements. In addition, KRS 100.243 directs the Board to consider
three separate factors in deciding whether to grant or deny a dimensional
variance. In only one of the thirty–nine cases approving a dimensional
variance request did the Board expressly address all three factors. Although
the Board was not technically wrong for failing to consider all three factors
in every case, it would be a better practice for the Board to consider all
three factors in every case.
2. Deference to Staff’s Recommendations.—Unlike at the time of the
Dukeminier–Stapleton study, the Board today is highly deferential to the
professional staff. The Board followed the staff’s recommendation in 145 of
the 154 separate cases on which the Board voted, or 94 percent of the cases.
In addition, the Board deferred to the Division of Building Inspection’s
recommendation in all five of the conditional use permit cases it reviewed.
The current Board clearly takes the recommendations of the staff and
the Division of Building Inspection to heart in making its decisions. In fact,
in one case, a Board member virtually chastised the staff and Division of
Building Inspection for failing to agree on their recommendations to the
Board in light of “the importance of their assessments in helping the Board
with its decision on these matters.”512
Generally, the Board’s faith in the staff and Division of Building
Inspection appears to be well–placed. Unlike the members of the Board,
the staff members are professional land use planners. This expertise makes
them “uniquely qualified to maintain the integrity of both neighborhood
zoning and the overall city plan.”513
That is not to suggest, however, that the staff and Division of
Building Inspection never make mistakes and that the Board should
simply rubberstamp their recommendations.514 The Division of Building
Inspection has made mistakes,515 and I do not believe that the staff’s
recommendations are always correct.516 Nevertheless, most of the time it is
512 Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment 10 (Aug. 31, 2007) (on
file with author) (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
513 Shapiro, supra note 8, at 12.
514 Cf. Bryden, supra note 7, at 774 n.36 (“The planners’ recommendations, however, are
not necessarily based primarily upon analyses of the land use consequences of variances.”);
Sampson, supra note 3, at 908 nn.158–59 (noting that staff may make recommendations contrary to governing standards).
515 For example, in one case, the Division of Building Inspection issued a certificate of
occupancy to a landowner before the landowner had satisfied all of the conditions imposed in
its conditional use permit. See Minutes, Lexington–Fayette Urban Cnty. Bd. of Adjustment
6 (Jan. 25, 2008) (on file with author) (discussing Carolyn Wagoner, C–2005–139); supra Part
II.B.4.
516 See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2.a. (critiquing recommendation and decision in Headley–

524

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[ Vol. 100

appropriate for the Board to defer to recommendations by the staff and the
Division of Building Inspection.
D. Changes in Training for Board Members
In 2001, Kentucky became the first state to require that members of
the Board of Adjustment receive comprehensive training.517 Specifically,
Kentucky law requires that Board members (1) attend at least four hours
of orientation training within one year prior to appointment or within 120
days after appointment, and (2) receive at least eight hours of continuing
education every two years.518
On a related note, in 2011, Lexington launched its first voluntary
Citizens Planning Academy. The twelve–hour program provided its
thirty–two participants with an in–depth understanding of the principles
and process of community planning in Lexington. The program was very
successful and the organizers plan to offer the program again in 2012. The
Mayor attended the last session of the 2011 Academy and said that he
hoped to select future appointees to the Planning Commission and Board
of Adjustment from the pool of graduates from the program. The program’s
organizers hope that participation in the program will eventually become
a prerequisite for appointment to the LFUC Planning Commission and
Board of Adjustment.519
This mandatory (and voluntary) training is intended to, and does, make
Board members more knowledgeable about their duties and responsibilities
as well as the law governing their decisions. It does not, however, make
them an adjudicative body with judicial impartiality,520 nor does it provide
them with the expertise to decide technical questions of law.521 Thus, while

Whitney Museum); supra Part II.B.3 (critiquing recommendation and decision in Fantasy
Friends Costuming); supra Part II.C.3.b (critiquing recommendation and decision in Athens
Schoolhouse Partners).
517 Patricia E. Salkin, 1 American Law of Zoning § 4:8 (5th ed. Supp. 2011); see also
Marshall Slagle, Kentucky Enacts Continuing Education Requirements for Planning Officials: The
Inside Story, 53 Land Use L. & Zoning Dig. 11 (2001).
518 Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 147A.027(1)(a)–(b) (West 2006).
519 E–mails from Steve Austin, Organizer of the Citizens Planning Acad., to Kathryn L.
Moore, Laramie L. Leatherman Professor of Law, Univ. of Ky. Coll. of Law (Sept. 29, 2011,
10:37 AM, 11:22 AM) (on file with author).
520 Cf. Rose, supra note 63, at 868 (noting that The Federalist attributes judicial due consideration and fairness in part to “secure tenure of office, in order to promote judicial steadiness, impartiality, and insulation from irrelevant pressures”).
521 Cf. supra Part II.C.1.b (critiquing Athens Schoolhouse decision).
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the training is certainly desirable and beneficial,522 it does not eliminate all
of the problems with a lay board.523
Conclusion
The law and practice before the LFUC Board of Adjustment has
matured and improved considerably since Jesse Dukeminier and Clyde
Stapleton studied the Board fifty year ago. Many of the suggestions
offered by past critics of boards of adjustment, such as mandatory training
for Board members and able assistance from professional staff and legal
counsel, have been incorporated. In addition, the law governing variances
has been substantially changed. As a result, the Board no longer deserves to
be described as a case study in misrule.
This is not to suggest, however, that the Board of Adjustment is
without fault. First, although the Board’s dimensional variance decisions
have improved considerably since the Dukeminier–Stapleton study, they
still do not fully comply with the law. Specifically, the decisions approving
dimensional variances do not expressly include all four of the findings
required under KRS 100.243. It would be relatively easy for the Board to
correct this problem. The staff could easily draft its recommendations to
expressly include all four findings required under KRS 100.243. In addition,
on a related note, it would be better practice for the staff’s recommendations
(and the Board’s decisions) to expressly address all three factors KRS
100.243 directs the Board to consider in its dimensional variance decisions.
The second, and more difficult problem to correct, is the Board’s
tendency to make decisions that seem fair and practical rather than
technically legally correct. Indeed, I am not sure that it is possible
or even reasonable to expect a lay body to prefer technically legally
correct decisions to practical and fair decisions, especially when the staff
recommends the practical decision over the legally correct decision. When
522 The American Planning Association’s Legislative Guidebook recommends mandatory training for Board of Adjustment members. See Model Statutes for Planning and the
Management of Change § 10–404 (Am. Planning Ass’n 2002).
523 Cf. The Mun. Art Soc’y of N.Y., Zoning Variances and the New York City Board of Standards and Appeals, 30 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 193, 241–44 (2005) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of replacing boards with a zoning administrator charged with overseeing requests
for hardship variances and describing how zoning administrators used in variety of states);
Sampson, supra note 3, at 927–29 (discussing inherent limitations of citizen boards and providing a number of suggestions on how to address these limitations—many of which have been
adopted in Lexington); Shapiro, supra note 8, at 18 (discussing inherent limitations of citizen
boards and contending that the crucial shortcoming is its lack of expertise).
Of course, replacing the lay body with a board of professional planners or locally elected
judges still would not guarantee that the Board would always reach the legally correct result.
Cf. Ann Martindale, Comment, Replacing the Hardship Doctrine: A Workable, Equitable Test for
Zoning Variances, 20 Conn. L. Rev. 669, 709 (1988) (noting that fifty percent of Connecticut
superior court decisions reversed by Connecticut Supreme Court).
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express limitations are placed on the Board’s power, the Board respects
those limitations. The Board does not grant use variances or sign variances
in contravention of the express limitations on its power. On the other hand,
when its authority is more discretionary, or at least the staff advises the
Board that its authority is more discretionary, the Board tends to defer
to the staff and prefer the practical to the technically legally correct. For
example, in one case, the Board deferred to the staff’s recommendation and
approved a conditional use permit for a dressmaking home occupation that
would permit a nonresident co–owner to participate in the business despite
the fact that the zoning ordinance expressly limits home occupations to
residents of the dwelling.524 In another case, the Board deferred to the
staff’s recommendation and approved a church parking lot as a principal
rather than an accessory use on property located across the street from
a church when the zoning ordinance expressly identifies parking lots as
accessory, not principal, uses.525
Fortunately, the Board’s legally incorrect decisions are the exception
rather than the rule. Overall, the LFUC Board of Adjustment does a good
job of mediating and resolving land use disputes in Lexington–Fayette
County.

524 See, e.g., supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Fantasy Friends Costuming, LLC, C–2007–79).
525 See, e.g., supra Part II.C.3.a (discussing Glen Arvin Ave. Church of Christ, A–2007–72).
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Appendix
Urban County Board of Adjustment
101 E. Vine St. Suite 700, Lexington, KY 40507

Filing Date ______________
Public Hearing Date ______________

Filing Fee $____________
Case # ________________

DIMENSIONAL VARIANCE APPLICATION
A. APPLICANT INFORMATION

B. CONTACT PERSON or REPRESENTATIVE INFO

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

City, State, Zip Code:

City, State, Zip Code:

Phone #
(w/ area code):

Phone #
(w/ area code):

C. PROPERTY INFORMATION
Address:

Current Zoning:

Proposed Use:

Current Use:

D. URBAN SERVICES STATUS (Indicate whether existing, or how to be provided)
Storm Sewers
Existing OR
To be constructed by:
Developer
Others:
Sanitary Sewers
Existing by:
LFUCG
Septic System OR
To be constructed by:
Refuse Collection
LFUCG OR
Other (please list):

Developer

Others

E. POSSIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF TENANTS
Are there any existing dwelling units on the subject property that will be removed if this application is approved?
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
Yes
No
1. Have any such dwelling units on the property been occupied within the past 12 months?
2. Are these units currently occupied by households earning less than 40% of the median income in Lexington-Fayette
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
County?
3. How many units? [ ______ units]
Yes
No If yes,
4. Have any efforts already been taken to assist those residents in obtaining alternative housing?
provide an attachment and give details about those efforts.
F. DETAILS OF VARIANCE REQUESTED
This variance requested is from ______________ feet to ________________ feet, in order to_____________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
_.
G. FINDINGS AND JUSTIFICATION FOR VARIANCE (Please feel free to use an attachment, if necessary.)
In order to grant a variance, the Board must find that the granting of the variance:
1) will not adversely affect the public health, safety or welfare;
2) will not alter the character of the general vicinity;
3) will not cause a hazard or a nuisance to the public; and
4) will not allow an unreasonable circumvention of the requirements of the zoning regulations.
The answers to these questions will help the Board in their deliberation and, therefore, should be thorough yet
concise.
1. Why will the granting of this variance not negatively affect the public health, safety or welfare, not alter the character
of the general vicinity, and not cause a hazard or nuisance to the public?

Page 1 of Dimensional Variance Application
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Urban County Board of Adjustment
101 E. Vine St. Suite 700, Lexington, KY 40507

Filing Date ______________
Public Hearing Date ______________

[ Vol. 100
Filing Fee $____________
Case # ________________

CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT APPLICATION
A. APPLICANT INFORMATION

B. CONTACT PERSON or REPRESENTATIVE INFO

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

City, State, Zip Code:

City, State, Zip Code:

Phone #
(w/ area code):

Phone #
(w/ area code):

C. PROPERTY INFORMATION
Address:

Current Zoning:

Conditional Use
Requested:

Current Use:

D. URBAN SERVICES STATUS (Indicate whether existing, or how to be provided)
Storm Sewers
Existing OR
To be constructed by:
Developer
Others:
Sanitary Sewers
Existing by:
LFUCG
Septic System OR
To be constructed by:
Refuse Collection
LFUCG OR
Other (please list):

Developer

Others

E. POSSIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF TENANTS
Are there any existing dwelling units on the subject property that will be removed if this application is approved?
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
Yes
No
1. Have any such dwelling units on the property been occupied within the past 12 months?
2. Are these units currently occupied by households earning less than 40% of the median income in Lexington-Fayette
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
County?
3. How many units? [ ______ units]
Yes
No If yes,
4. Have any efforts already been taken to assist those residents in obtaining alternative housing?
provide an attachment and give details about those efforts.
F. PROJECT DETAILS (If additional space is required, please use a separate page)
Describe in detail the proposed activity, including any operational or design provisions that will be used to limit the
potential for disturbing surrounding properties. Please see the “Supplemental Application Requirements” listed on the
reverse side of this page for guidance.

G. APPLICANT CERTIFICATION
I do hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information supplied with this application is true and
accurate. I further certify that if I am not the current owner of this property, that I have obtained written permission from
the current property owner, and that it has been submitted as part of this application.
SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT __________________________________________________

DATE ____________

SIGNATURE OF LFUCG EMPLOYEE/OFFICER (if applicable) _____________________________________________
Page 1 of Conditional Use Permit Application
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Urban County Board of Adjustment
101 E. Vine St. Suite 700, Lexington, KY 40507

Filing Date ______________
Public Hearing Date ______________

529
Filing Fee $____________
Case # A ________________

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL APPLICATION
A. APPLICANT INFORMATION

B. CONTACT PERSON or REPRESENTATIVE INFO

Name:

Name:

Address:

Address:

City, State, Zip Code:

City, State, Zip Code:

Phone #
(w/ area code):

Phone #
(w/ area code):

C. PROPERTY INFORMATION
Address:

Current Zoning:

Requested Use
(if applicable):

Current Use:

D. URBAN SERVICES STATUS (Indicate whether existing, or how to be provided)
Storm Sewers
Existing OR
To be constructed by:
Developer
Others:
Sanitary Sewers
Existing by:
LFUCG
Septic System OR
To be constructed by:
Refuse Collection
LFUCG OR
Other (please list):

Developer

Others

E. POSSIBLE DISPLACEMENT OF TENNANTS
Are there any existing dwelling units on the subject property that will be removed if this application is approved?
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
Yes
No
1. Have any such dwelling units on the property been occupied within the past 12 months?
2. Are these units currently occupied by households earning less than 40% of the median income in Lexington-Fayette
Yes
No If yes, please answer the next two questions:
County?
3. How many units? [ ______ units]
Yes
No If
4. Have any efforts already be taken to assist those residents in obtaining alternative housing?
yes,
provide an attachment and give details about those efforts.
F. DESCRIBE YOUR APPEAL, so that the Board may understand your request. (Use an attachment, if
necessary.)

G. APPLICANT CERTIFICATION
I do hereby certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the information supplied with this application is true
and accurate. I further certify that if I am not the current owner of this property, that I have obtained written
permission from the current property owner, and that it has been submitted as part of this application.
SIGNATURE OF APPELLANT _________________________________________________ DATE _____________

SIGNATURE OF LFUCG EMPLOYEE/OFFICER (if applicable) __________________________________________
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